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INTRODUCTION
The cause of action for dilution, which punishes those who
purportedly dilute the selling power of famous trademarks by blurring or
tarnishing them, is a relatively new and controversial one.1 Trademark
litigation has traditionally turned on claims of infringement, which
require proof of a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff’s mark
and that of the defendant.2 The interests of consumers and trademark
holders are at least theoretically aligned in such actions: when the court
prohibits infringement, consumers are better off because they are no
longer duped into buying products they do not want, and trademark
owners benefit because they no longer lose sales and have their
reputations damaged by inferior products masquerading as the real thing.
Dilution, by contrast, manifests no such convergence. A plaintiff may
state a claim for dilution even though no one is likely to be confused;
plaintiff and defendant do not compete; and plaintiff has incurred no
actual economic injury.3
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Although state anti-dilution laws started appearing in the 1940’s, see infra note
72, the first federal dilution statute was passed in 1995. Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1995). The act was substantially
revised and renamed in 2006. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA),
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
2
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a) & 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring proof of
likelihood of confusion for an infringement claim).
3
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (permitting liability “regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic
injury”).

213

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

[Vol. 11

Statutory dilution claims are traditionally justified on the theory
that even non-confusing uses of a famous trademark (or similar mark)
can nonetheless minutely dilute the source-identifying power of the
targeted trademark.4 The alleged harm from dilution is cumulative:
unchecked, the dilutive activity subjects the trademark to death by a
thousand cuts.5 Both the original federal dilution statute of 1995 and its
substantial enlargement in 2006 assume that the source-identifying
capacity of a trademark is akin to a glass of water: spill a drop here, spill
a drop there and eventually your glass is empty. This Article advances
three claims. First, dilution statutes incorrectly assume that the sourceidentifying function of a trademark is akin to a rivalrous good (a good
that is dissipated by use). If marks are nonrivalrous and therefore
function more like words than disposable goods, the economic
justification for the dilution cause of action ceases to exist.
Second, even if diluting but noninfringing uses of famous
trademarks do impair the source identifying capacity of some marks, the
social and transaction costs imposed by dilution law still outweigh the
harm that it is designed to avert. Dilution claims inflict anticompetitive
burdens and, as a result, may entrench dominant (often oligopolist) firms
at the expense of market entrants. Dilution laws have serious noneconomic costs as well, as they infringe upon protected speech without
sufficient justification. For these reasons and others, dilution law causes
more harm than it prevents.
4

This presumed damage may arise from either “dilution by blurring,” which
exists when similarity between two marks impairs the distinctiveness of the
more famous one, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B), or “dilution by tarnishment,”
which typically exists when the defendant uses a famous trademark in an
unwholesome context. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
5
Numerous cases have embraced the idea that the harm caused by dilution is a
gradual, cumulative one. See, e.g., Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v.
Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991)
(describing dilution as the “gradual ‘whittling away’” of a mark’s value);
Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir.
1987) (describing dilution as a “gradual diminution in the mark’s
distinctiveness,” which “corrodes the senior user’s interest in the trademark”);
Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1164 (N.Y.
1977) (describing purpose of New York’s anti-dilution statute as prevention of
“the ‘whittling away’ of an established trade-mark’s selling power and value”);
Augusta Nat., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. 210, 222
(S.D. Ga. 1976) (reasoning that if defendant were allowed to use the term
“Ladies’ Masters” to describe a women’s golf tournament, “there is reasonable
certainty that the value of plaintiff's mark will be eroded; a little now, more later,
until the ‘magic’ of the [original] Masters will be mortally dissipated if not
completely dispelled”).
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Finally, the true foundation for dilution law lies in the misplaced
fiction of corporate personality, not in alleged economic harms. We do
not require trademark holders to prove actual economic injury in the
context of a dilution claim because, in truth, there probably is none.
Instead, we have granted the holders of famous trademarks the
equivalent of a moral right to these marks: an extension of the rights
granted to a creator of an expressive work in the copyright context.
Trademark holders are vested in their brands, many of which are
deliberately anthropomorphized, and the dilution statute reifies and
protects these rights as a matter of federal law.
When dilution is recognized for what it really is, it becomes even
harder to justify its existence. Although the Pillsbury Doughboy and
Barbie may well be trademarks that are imbued with personality traits in
the minds of consumers (as well as in the minds of their respective
corporate parents), they do not have the type of creative “soul” that
normatively warrants this type of protection. Properly viewed, the
federal dilution statute is a legislative precursor to the type of corporate
personification underlying the Supreme Court’s analogous treatment of
corporate speech under the First Amendment in Citizens United6 and is
equally misplaced. Trademark holders do not have an abstract moral
right to ownership of particular words. Absent anticompetitive effects,
those words properly remain in the public domain. By granting nearmonopoly protection to famous marks, notwithstanding the absence of
actual economic injury, the federal dilution statute turns competition on
its head and serves to entrench and further concentrate economic power
in the hands of dominant corporate firms at the expense of consumers
and competitors alike. Dilution law should be repealed or, at the very
least, reformed.

I. THE INTENT AND REALITY OF DILUTION
In the 1920s, Frank Schechter, a trademark practitioner and
academic, proposed a cause of action to protect the uniqueness of a mark
as a way to remedy what he perceived to be arbitrary and harmful
limitations on the reach of trademark infringement law. Although the
claim for dilution he proposed was not initially a powerful one, it has
since become so. The Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) has
expanded the scope and practical impact of the dilution cause of action.
However, the economic justification for the dilution cause of action,
which requires no proof of actual harm or damages, remains as elusive as
ever.
6

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); see infra text accompanying
notes 337-338.
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A. The Origins of the Dilution Doctrine
The concept of trademark dilution arose at a time when the
“needs of modern business” demanded the expansion of trademark law.7
The cause of action for trademark dilution was one proposal to
accomplish that goal. The desire to expand trademark law was achieved
by the 1946 Lanham Act and subsequent amendments to it, but the
emphasis then and, until recently, now was on trademark infringement,
not dilution. The historical genesis of dilution claims has substantial
significance for its contemporary breadth.
1. The Rational Basis for Trademark Protection
The cause of action for trademark dilution traces its roots to
Frank Schechter’s 1927 article in the Harvard Law Review, The Rational
Basis of Trademark Protection.8 In this article, Schechter observed that
many courts had grown impatient with “old theories of trademark
protection,” which he believed were insufficient to “serve the needs of
modern business.”9 Although Schechter agreed that trademark law
needed to expand to keep pace with the evolution of consumer culture in
the United States, he rejected a subjective approach that relied on “good
conscience” and “judicial sensibilities” to achieve that result.10 Instead,
he argued for a new paradigm in trademark law, planting a seed that went
on to become the cause of action for trademark dilution. Schechter
argued that a trademark, especially a strong one, was injured by “the
gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the
public mind of the mark” when the mark was used on non-competing
goods.11 Schechter concluded that “the preservation of the uniqueness of
a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection.”12

7

Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813, 813 (1927). In the introduction to his article, Schechter opined that
judicial impatience with “old theories of trademark protection” were “indicative
of a desire to keep abreast of and to serve the needs of modern business.” Id.
8
Id. For a thorough and compelling analysis of Schechter’s article, see Robert
G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s Rocky Road, 24
SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469 (2008).
9
Schechter, supra note 7, at 813; see also id. at 824 (observing that “the proper
expansion of trademark law has been hampered by obsolete conceptions both as
to the function of a trademark and as to the need for its protection”).
10
Id. at 813.
11
Id. at 825. Schechter further argued that, the stronger the mark, the greater the
need for protection against this type of harm: “The more distinctive or unique
the mark, the deeper its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater
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The bulk of Schechter’s article derides what he perceived to be
the cumbersome limitations of trademark law as it existed in 1927. His
chief complaint was that trademark law failed to prohibit copying a
trademark so long as the copier did not place the mark upon goods that
were directly competing with those manufactured by the original
trademark holder.13 At the time, many courts held that if two users of the
trademark (or substantially similar marks) were not directly competing
with each other, there could be no unfair competition and hence no
trademark infringement.14 Although this rule was fading in 1927, as
evidenced by a growing trend toward narrowing its interpretation,
Schechter was nonetheless impatient with the pace of change and

its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular
product in connection with which it has been used.” Id.
12
Id. at 831.
13
Id. at 821–24. Schechter’s second major critique focused on the territoriality
principle of trademark law. Under the common law, a trademark holder had
priority in its mark only in the geographic location in which the mark was being
used. To Schechter’s great dissatisfaction, many courts interpreted this
territoriality principle quite narrowly, in one case holding that “a nationally
known chain of theatres, with a branch in Boston, did not extent its market, or
rather its audience, to [other cities in Massachusetts].” Id. at 824 (citing Loew’s
Boston Theatres Co. v. Lowe, 143 N.E. 496 (Mass. 1924)); see also id.
(discussing similar cases). The Supreme Court recognized the territoriality
principle in trademark law in United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90, 101 (1918), and Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415
(1916). Schechter argued that these decisions were based on “an antiquated
neighborhood theory of trade” and that, even in 1927, consumers tended to shop
“far from home” and therefore relied on trademarks “as symbols of quality and
guarantees of satisfaction.” Schechter, supra note 7, at 824.
14
Schechter, supra note 7, at 824 n.52 (citing cases). In a case that classically
illustrates this principle, the Seventh Circuit refused to enjoin the use of the
mark “Borden” on ice cream, even though a different company had developed
the trademark and had used it for years to sell condensed milk, because the
original trademark holder had never used the mark to sell ice cream. Borden Ice
Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912).
The court reasoned that, even if the public was deceived by this use of the
“Borden” name, such use was not actionable unless it actually diverted sales
from the original mark holder (which it could not, given that the company did
not manufacture ice cream). Id. at 513–15; see also, e.g., Corning Glass Works
v. Corning Cut Glass Co., 90 N.E. 449, 450 (N.Y. 1910) (refusing to enjoin
defendant’s use of the name “Corning Cut Glass Co.” in part because plaintiff
manufactured glass products, but did not cut glass and therefore did not compete
with defendant).
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rejected even nominal adherence to what he considered to be outdated,
ineffectual rules.15
2. The Historical Backdrop of Schechter’s Idea
Although Schechter’s dilution proposition has been lately
characterized as a radical, property-based theory inconsistent with the
mainstream of trademark law,16 it may not have been considered radical
at the time it was written. Indeed, it was arguably the opposite: a
throwback to the mid-to-late nineteenth century view of trademarks.
During this era, only “technical trademarks” (primarily fanciful or

15

Schechter, supra note 7, at 813, 823–24 (comparing cases). The 1905 version
of the federal trademark statute prohibited registration of marks that were so
similar to currently registered marks “of the same descriptive properties” as to
“be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive
purchasers.” Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946).
Many courts expressed frustration with the ambiguousness of this statutory
language. See, e.g., Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 672 (7th
Cir. 1943) (observing that “[i]t would be difficult to choose words more
ambiguous than this phrase”); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hockmeyer, 40 F.2d 99, 101
(C.C.P.A. 1930) (noting that the phrase “has given the courts considerable
concern,” leading to inconsistency and arbitrary decision-making). Some courts
interpreted the phrase “descriptive properties” expansively; others did not. See,
e.g., Rosenberg Bros. Co. v. Elliott, 7 F.2d 962, 966 (3d Cir. 1925) (holding that
men’s suits and overcoats share the same descriptive properties as men’s hats
and caps, because they are worn together); Philadelphia Inquirer Co. v. Coe, 133
F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (holding that magazine supplement section of
Sunday newspaper shares the same descriptive properties as a stapled, tabloid
weekly news magazine, reasoning that if “coffee can be classed with horseradish, fish with tea, [and] mouth washes with cold creams,” then these
publications clearly belong to the same class); compare France Milling Co. v.
Washburn-Crosby Co., 7 F.2d 304, 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1925) (concluding both
parties were entitled to use the mark “Gold Medal,” where one applied the mark
to wheat, pancake and buckwheat flour, while the other applied the mark to pure
or straight wheat flour) with Arrow Distilleries v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d
347, 351 (4th Cir. 1941) (holding no infringement when defendant used the
mark “Arrow” on cordials and liqueurs and plaintiff applied the mark to beer,
because the manufacture of beer and ale and the manufacture of cordials and
liqueurs are “separate industries”).
16
See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 797 (1997)
(characterizing dilution as a “radical alternative to the consumer protection
model of trademark rights”); Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” Expansion of
Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 85 TRADEMARK
REP. 525, 552-59 (1995) (justifying trademark dilution as a claim based on tort,
not trespass).
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arbitrary marks) were protected against trademark infringement.17
Schechter similarly argued that “arbitrary, coined or fanciful marks or
names,” such as Aunt Jemima’s and Kodak, should be given a
significantly broader degree of protection than “words or phrases in
common use,” such as Gold Medal and Universal.18
Although
Schechter’s reasons for supporting a dilution cause of action diverged
sharply from the justifications for the old common law regime, the end
result was arguably not that different.
During this era, a great deal of legal argument focused on
whether a given name for a good or service qualified as a “technical
trademark.” Most early trademark cases were decided by courts of
equity, because courts of law were not empowered to award equitable
relief, the typical form of remedy in a trademark infringement case.
Equity courts based their jurisdiction on the plaintiff’s property interest
in the trademark.19 If the plaintiff did not have a technical trademark,
there was no property to protect and hence no jurisdiction. Similarly,
early trademark statutes allowed registration of only those names that
qualified as technical trademarks.20 Trade names or “non-technical
trademarks,” such as marks based on personal names, geographic terms,

17

See Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 547 (1891)
(holding that “a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of
trade, of its qualities, ingredients, or characteristics” cannot be employed as a
trade-mark); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) (holding that “a
generic name, or a name merely descriptive of an article of trade, of its qualities,
ingredients, or characteristics, [cannot] be employed as a trade-mark and the
exclusive use of it be entitled to legal protection”); see generally Deven R. Desai
& Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1789, 1811–16 (2007) (discussing the distinctions between common law
trademarks and trade names).
18
Schechter, supra note 7, at 828–30.
19
RUDOLF CALLMAN, 2 THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS §
66.3 (1945) (citing Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. C. 338 (1838) and other cases);
WALTER J. DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 48
(1936).
20
Only technical trademarks could be registered under the federal Trade-Mark
Act of 1905, which specified that personal names, geographic terms and terms
that were “descriptive of the goods with which they are used, or of the character
or quality of such goods” could not be registered. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15
U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946). The 1905 Act was intended to codify, not
alter, the common law of trademarks. Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 103
(1905) (repealed 1946) (clarifying that the Act did not “prevent, lessen,
impeach, or avoid any remedy at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by
any wrongful use of any trade-mark might have had if . . . . this Act had not been
passed”).
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or descriptive words or phrases, could not be registered or infringed.21
At least in theory, the degree to which a word or phrase was entitled to
legal protection depended on whether it was classified as a technical
trademark.22 If the mark or name fit into this category, its owner held
what many courts characterized as an exclusive property right in that
trademark, creating a virtual monopoly on the part of the trademark
holder.23
The United States Supreme Court characterized technical
trademarks as the exclusive property of their owners during this period.
In The Trade-Mark Cases, decided in 1879, the Court set forth this
proposition in no uncertain terms:
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to
the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized
by the common law. . . and by the statutes of some of the States. It
21

Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946); see also,
e.g., Candee, Swan & Co. v. Deere & Co., 54 Ill. 439, 466 (1870) (holding that
plaintiff could not have a property interest in the name “Moline Plow” or the
words “Moline, Ill.,” despite evidence of secondary meaning, as others had a
right to manufacture plows in Moline, Illinois, and similarly designate their
origin).
22
See Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276, 278–79 (C.C. Ind. 1900)
(discussing differences between technical trademarks and trade names); Daniel
M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal
Thought, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 305, 316–17 (1979) (describing differences
between technical trademarks and trade names in the context of late-nineteenth
century legal formalism); Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and
Trade Names – An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 168-70
(1930) (explaining the technical differences between trademarks and trade
names) [hereinafter Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I]; Charles Grove
Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition, 29 YALE L. J. 1, 8 (1919)
(observing that “[u]nfair competition is distinguishable from the infringement of
trade-marks”); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4 (4th ed. 1924) (opining that trademark rights are
“broader and by far . . . more valuable” than rights to a trade name); RUDOLF
CALLMAN, 2 THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 66.1
(1945) (quoting Handler & Pickett).
23
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L.
Rev. 325, 343–44 (1980) (describing early treatment of trademarks as “absolute
property”); McClure, supra note 22, at 317–19 (characterizing early treatment of
technical trademarks as conferring monopolistic property rights); Grafton
Dulany Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 321, 322 (1890) (noting that “[a] trademark has become an absolute
right”).
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is a property right. . . . This exclusive right was not created by . . .
Congress, and does not now depend upon it for its enforcement.24

In fact, trademarks’ status as property led to the demise of the
first federal trademark statute. The Supreme Court held that the law was
unconstitutional because trademarks, as a form of property, were
regulated by state law, and Congress had no power to define or regulate
that property.25
As a result of the judiciary’s characterization of trademarks as
exclusive property, certain limitations inherent in modern trademark law
did not apply to technical trademarks at the turn of the century. For
example, the owner of a technical trademark did not have to show
“likelihood of [consumer] confusion” to prove that a trademark had been
infringed.26 Nor was the technical trademark owner required to
demonstrate bad intent on the part of the defendant, proof of which was
initially required in cases involving non-technical trademarks.27
24

The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (emphasis added). The Court
concluded that “[t]hese propositions are so well understood as to require neither
the citation of authorities nor an elaborate argument to prove them.” Id. See
also G. W. Cole Co. v. Am. Cement & Oil Co., 130 F. 703, 705 (7th Cir. 1904)
(characterizing trademarks as “the exclusive property of [their] proprietor[s]”);
Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 292, 295 (1865) (observing that “[t]he trademark is
property, and the owner’s right of property in it is as complete as that which he
possesses in the goods to which he attaches it, and the law protects him in the
enjoyment of the one as fully as of the other. . . .”).
25
See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93 (holding that “[a]s the property in
trademarks and the right to their exclusive use rest on the laws of the States, and,
like the great body of the rights of person and of property, depend on them for
security and protection, the power of Congress to legislate on the subject . . . . if
such power exist at all, must be found in the Constitution of the United States. . .
.”); see also id. at 96–97 (holding that the federal trademark statute, as written,
was not authorized under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution).
26
See Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 183–84
(1936) (observing that “[s]imulation of a tradename will be restrained only if
there is a likelihood of confusion of the public,” while “[c]ommercial usage of
the identical trademark in the same business field is taboo, regardless of the
element of confusion”).
27
See Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674
(1901) (noting when “a plaintiff has the absolute right to the use of a particular
word or words as a trademark, then, if an infringement is shown, the wrongful or
fraudulent intent is presumed, and . . . the further violation of the right of
property will. . . be restrained”) (emphasis added); Lawrence Mfg. Co. v.
Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 548 (1891) (noting that “fraudulent intent
would be inferred” if plaintiff could prove infringement of a technical
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Similarly, the dilution cause of action, both in Schechter’s inception and
its modern-day application, does not require the plaintiff to prove either
of these elements.
By the time Schechter wrote his Rational Basis article, the all-ornothing approach to trademark law was largely extinct. Courts in the
United States quickly abandoned the formalist doctrine that attempted to
demarcate a bright line between technical trademarks, designated as the
exclusive property of their owners, and trade names, to which
substantially fewer rights would attach. This model was found to be
simultaneously under-and over-inclusive: trade names were given too
little protection, whereas trademarks received too much.
The old model, which granted almost unlimited protection to
technical trademarks and precious little to descriptive terms or other
types of trade names, was under-inclusive because it did not always
reach deliberately deceitful conduct. Courts of equity were reluctant to
allow outright deception to go undeterred and unpunished, regardless of
whether the aggrieved business owner had chosen a technical trademark
as the name for his business. Accordingly, courts began to extend
protection to non-technical trademarks, or trade names, when (1) those
names had acquired secondary meaning (i.e., the consuming public
associated the trade name with a particular business);28 and (2) the
trademark); Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F.2d 402, 404 (3d Cir. 1924) (“A technical
trade-mark being treated as property, infringement thereof carries with it the
presumption of fraud; but where no exclusive right to the use of a trade-mark
exists, fraud – unfair competition – in the use of the mark by another must be
proved. . . .”); see also HOPKINS, supra note 22, at § 118 (noting that, in
technical trademark cases, defendant’s good faith was relevant to the issue of
punitive damages only, not liability); McClure, supra note 22, at 317–18 (noting
that in contrast to trade name cases, trademark infringement does not require
proof of fraudulent intent); Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and
Trade Names – An Analysis and Synthesis: II , 30 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 769–70
(1930) [hereinafter Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part II]; Handler, supra
note 26, at 184 (“A trademark will be protected even against innocent
infringement; a tradename, only against fraudulent simulation.”).
28
See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS: DEFINITION OF TRADE NAME
§ 716 (b) cmt. b (1938) (stating that a trade name has acquired “secondary
meaning” when “a substantial number of present or prospective purchasers
understand the designation, when used in connection with goods, services, or a
business, not in its primary lexicographical sense, but as referring to a particular
place or association”); HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
TRADE-MARKS § 50 (3d ed. 1929) (“In the absence of secondary meaning, the
law of unfair competition does not protect a name which is based on or is truly
descriptive of the construction common to, or characteristics of an article.”); see
also Standard Oil Co. of Maine v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 45 F.2d 309, 310
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plaintiff could prove fraud by the defendant.29 To establish fraud, most
courts required the plaintiff to show that the defendant had deliberately
attempted to pass off his goods as those of the plaintiff.30 However, most

(1st Cir. 1930) (holding that appellee was entitled to protection against “unfair
or fraudulent use” of the names “Standard Oil” and “Standard Oil Company” in
competition, because the names had acquired secondary meaning,); Computing
Scale Co. v. Standard Computing Scale Co., 118 F. 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1902)
(holding that when a word “is incapable of becoming a valid trade-mark. . . yet
has by use come to stand for a particular maker or vendor, its use by another in
this secondary sense will be restrained as unfair and fraudulent competition. . .
.”); Am. Waltham Watch Co. v. U.S. Watch Co., 53 N.E. 141, 142 (Mass. 1899)
(holding that, although “Waltham” was not a valid trademark, it had acquired
secondary meaning and hence was entitled to protection from unfair
competition).
29
For example, in a case decided at the turn of the century, the California
Supreme Court affirmed an injunction in favor of plaintiff, whose business
operated under the name “Mechanics’ Store,” because the name had acquired
secondary meaning and defendant had chosen a similar name for the purpose of
poaching plaintiff’s customers. Weinstock, Lubin & Co. v. Marks, 42 P. 142,
145, 146 (Cal. 1895). Plaintiff’s name, “Mechanics’ Store,” was admittedly
descriptive and ineligible for protection as a technical trademark. Id. at 144.
The court found that defendant had acted with fraudulent intent when he chose
the name “Mechanical Store,” by seeking to deceive “the public, and especially
plaintiff’s customers, and thereby secur[e] the advantages and benefits of the
good will of plaintiff’s business.” Id. The court reasoned that “it is a fraud on a
person who has established a business for his goods, and carries it on under a
given name. . . , for some other person to assume the same name or mark, or the
same with a slight alteration, in such a way as to induce persons to deal with him
in the belief that they are dealing with a person who has given a reputation to
that name or mark.” Id. See also Cushing, supra note 23, at 332 (arguing that in
“cases analogous to trade-marks,” for example, cases involving common law
trade names, “fraud is the gist of the action”); HOPKINS, supra note 22, at § 22
(“While fraud is presumed from the wrongful use of a trademark it must be
proven, directly or by inference, in all cases of unfair competition which do not
involve a technical trademark.”); Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 345 (observing
that trade names were not considered property and therefore would be protected
only to prevent fraud).
30
See, e.g., Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 F. 896, 897 (C.C.N.Y. 1897) (holding that
“[n]o man has a right to use names, symbols, signs or marks which are intended,
or calculated, to represent that his business is that of another,” and “[f]raud
should be clearly proved”); Drive It Yourself Co. v. North, 130 A. 57, 59 (Md.
App. 1925) (use of “merely generic or descriptive” words may be enjoined only
if there is “actual fraud or intent to deceive”); DERENBERG, supra note 19, at 53
(noting that, “until about [1916], [the courts] always sought to discover and to
stress in unfair competition cases – as opposed to trade-mark infringement cases
– the elements of an intentional fraud as the basis of their jurisdiction”);
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courts eventually dropped the fraud requirement, so long as the plaintiff
could prove actual or likely confusion on the part of the consumer.31
Similarly, the old model was over-inclusive because it granted
overly broad, exclusive rights to technical trademark holders. The extent
of these rights almost immediately raised fears that trademark law
created anti-competitive monopolies.32 As one federal court observed in
1923: “Patents, copyrights, and trade-marks excite two deeply seated
feelings. One is the feeling of anyone who has originated anything of his
right to claim an exclusive property in it and to the trade growing out of
it. The other is a hatred of monopoly.”33 This desire to avoid granting
monopolies to trademark owners led courts to adopt the now-familiar
maxim that trademark rights are not held “in gross.”34 Less than forty
McClure, supra note 22, at 317 (noting that in an unfair competition claim
plaintiff “was required to prove . . . fraudulent intent by the defendant”).
31
See, e.g., Boice v. Stevenson, 187 P.2d 648, 653 (Ariz. 1947) (holding that
“[t]he universal test [of unfair competition] is whether the public is likely to be
deceived”) (citation omitted); New York World’s Fair v. World’s Fair News,
256 A.D. 373, 374 (N.Y. App. 1939) (holding that “[t]he determining factor is
not that people have actually been deceived but that there is a likelihood of that
happening”) (citation omitted); Sartor v. Schaden, 101 N.W. 511, 513 (Iowa
1904) (holding that, even if a word is not “capable of becoming an arbitrary
trade-mark,” if it has acquired secondary meaning its use will be restrained if
“confusion [of the public] has been or is likely to be produced”); see also
Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I, supra note 22, at 169
(holding that a competitor’s use of trade names will be restrained only when
such use “render[s] it likely that the public will confuse the products bearing the
marks”); Zechariah Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1296–
97 (1940) (noting that “[f]raud has been squeezed out of” cases involving trade
names and trademarks); RUDOLF CALLMAN, 2 THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 66.1 (1945) (observing that the distinction
between technical trademarks and trade names is “gradually disappearing”); see
generally E.H. Schloper, Annotation, Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in the
Law of Trademark and of Unfair Competition, 150 A.L.R. 1067, 1133 (1944)
(noting split of authorities as to whether “it is necessary for the plaintiff to show
actual fraud on the part of the defendant” in cases where plaintiff’s rights in a
trade name are predicated on secondary meaning).
32
See McClure, supra note 22, at 306–08 (discussing tension between trademark
protection and its potential for anticompetitive effects).
33
Loughran v. Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co., 286 F. 694, 697
(E.D. Pa. 1923). Professor Zechariah Chafee, a noted First Amendment scholar,
similarly observed, “It may seem shabby for a defendant to appropriate valuable
ideas from the plaintiff . . . . but in the words of the song: ‘The best things in life
are free.’” Chafee, supra note 31, at 1317–18.
34
See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)
(holding that a trade-mark right is not “a right in gross or at large, like a
statutory copyright or a patent for an invention”).
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years after characterizing trademarks as an “exclusive” form of property,
the Supreme Court gave a considerably more qualified definition of
trademarks as property interest:
Common-law trademarks, and the right to their exclusive use, are,
of course, to be classed among property rights, but only in the sense
that a man’s right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation
and the good will that flows from it, free from unwarranted
interference by others, is a property right, for the protection of
which a trademark is an instrumentality. [T]he right grows out of
use, not mere adoption.35

This push and pull resulted in the gradual conflation of the two
categories of marks, as courts both expanded the protection given to
trade names and limited the scope of rights accorded to technical
trademarks.36 The judiciary essentially pulled both doctrines to a middle
ground that was equally inhabited by both types of marks, and courts
began to treat the two classes of common law marks essentially the
same.37 In 1916, the Supreme Court embraced the merger of doctrine
with regard to technical trademarks and trade names under the general
rubric of unfair competition law:
Courts afford redress or relief upon the ground that a party has a
valuable interest in the good-will of his trade or business. . . . The
essence of the wrong consists of the sale of the goods of one
manufacturer for those of another. This essential element is the
same in trade-mark cases as in cases of unfair competition
unaccompanied by trademark infringement. In fact, the common

35

Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); see also
Loughran, 286 F. at 697 (observing that “[m]ere dealers in commodities are
prone to think themselves entitled to a . . . monopoly [like that extended to
patents and copyrights] unlimited in time. This is a mistake. The only right they
have is their right to sell their goods as such and to protection against the goods
of another being palmed off upon their customers as theirs.”).
36
See, e.g., Hanover, 240 U.S. at 413; Church & Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 F. 276,
278 (C.C. Ind. 1900) (observing that “[t]he tendency of the courts at the present
time seems to be to restrict the scope of the law applicable to technical trademarks, and to extend its scope in cases of unfair competition”) (citations
omitted); Haines, supra note 22, at 21 (same).
37
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 28, at § 717 cmt. a (stating that
“there are no important differences between the protection given to the interest
in trade-marks and that given to the interest in trade names”); Chafee, supra note
31, at 1298 (observing that, in 1940, the only important difference between trade
names and technical trademarks related to federal registration, which was only
allowed for technical trademarks under the 1905 Act).
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law of trademarks is but a part of the broader law of unfair
competition.38

Schechter was thus bucking the trend when he argued for a
different form of trademark protection for inherently distinctive marks.
Schechter’s dilution cause of action (although he never referred to it by
that name) was reserved for fanciful or arbitrary marks; he did not intend
that it would apply to words or terms that were not inherently distinctive.
His argument for distinguishing the two classes of marks was directly
contrary to the definite trend in favor of conflating them.
3. Schechter: Legal Formalist, Realist, or Both?
To be properly understood, Schechter’s ideas must be analyzed
in the context of his era. When Schechter published his famous thesis
that became the genesis of the dilution doctrine, trademark law and the
law in general were in a state of transition. The once-ubiquitous doctrine
of legal formalism was fading, and legal realism, or positivism, was
dawning over the American legal landscape. Moreover, the nation as a
whole was also in a state of transition. American business was booming
in 1927 as the nation basked in economic prosperity in the aftermath of
World War I. Although the Great Depression loomed on the not-toodistant horizon, few could have conceived, let alone anticipated, a
worldwide economic collapse in 1927.
The supposedly bright-line distinction between technical
trademarks and trade names was typical of legal formalism, which
permeated American jurisprudence during the late nineteenth century.
The legal formalists believed that “the law was objective, unchanging,
extrinsic to the social climate, and, above all, different from and superior
to politics.”39 In the formalist period, typically defined as lasting from

38

Hanover, 240 U.S. at 412-13 (emphasis added). Although trademark law is
commonly referred to as a subset of the law of unfair competition, at least
during the modern era, an argument can be made that the concept of unfair
competition derived from trademark law rather than the other way around.
Derenberg observed that “the law of unfair competition first developed at the
beginning of the 20th century and was considered an outgrowth of trademark
law.” DERENBERG, supra note 19, at 39-40.
39
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 187 (1988); see also Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal
Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 251, 252 (1975) (characterizing legal
formalism as “an intellectual system which gave common law rules the
appearance of being self-contained, apolitical, and inexorable”).
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1873 to 1937,40 “results in individual cases were accomplished not by an
assessment of competing principles and policies, but rather an
‘automatic’ application of rules deduced logically from greater principles
that supposedly dictated a single, correct result in every case.”41 In sum,
legal formalists favored supposedly objective, bright-line rules over
balancing tests.42 To determine whether a plaintiff could recover in a
trademark infringement suit, the formalist jurist would only need to
determine whether the name in question qualified as a technical
trademark. If it did, plaintiff had an exclusive property right therein and
could preclude defendant from using the mark, much the same as he
could prevent the defendant from trespassing on his real property.
Schechter’s dilution proposal may be viewed as a plea to return
to the certainty of bright-line rules preferred by the legal formalists.43 In
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, Schechter decried the
unpredictability of then-current trademark law. Dilution is, in fact, not
that different than the formalist conception of trademark law at the turn
of the century. The extent of rights attendant to the trademark under the
modern dilution doctrine turns on whether the mark is characterized as
famous,44 analogous to the designation of a mark as a technical
trademark. Once a mark is deemed famous, in practice few limitations
are placed on the trademark holder’s ability to prevent others from using
the mark. Schechter’s dilution theory, as articulated in 1927, can be
40

Wiecek fixes the start date for the “judicial hegemony of the formalist era” as
1873, marked by two dissenting opinions in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
36 (1872) (opinions of Justices Field and Bradley). WIECEK, supra note 39, at
115–16. The formalist era unofficially ended with a string of Supreme Court
cases in 1937 that upheld the Constitutionality of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. Id. at 137–39.
41
McClure, supra note 22, at 320.
42
Although the formalist era supposedly ended in 1937, the philosophy has been
reinvigorated to a certain extent by some modern-day conservatives. The Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Roberts, embraced formalism
in colloquial terms when he famously told the United States Senate, “[I]t’s my
job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.” Roberts: ‘My job is to call
balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat,’ CNN POLITICS, (Sept. 12, 2005),
http://articles.cnn.com/2005-09-12/politics/roberts.statement_1_judicial-rolejudges-judicial-oath?_s=PM:POLITICS; see generally Frederick Shauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509 (1988).
43
See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 621, 686 (2004) (arguing that Schechter “believed that antidilution
protection would bring greater predictability to the law” by “returning it to
formalism”).
44
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (restricting dilution protection to the owners
of “famous” trademarks).
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characterized as a proposal to re-propertize certain categories of marks.45
The modern dilution doctrine serves that same function.
However, as Professor Robert Bone has argued, portraying
Schechter as a legal formalist, yearning for the days of bright-line rules
and easy answers, oversimplifies Schechter’s dilution proposal.46
Schechter’s push for a new paradigm in trademark law was openly
driven by a pragmatic desire to serve the needs of modern business, a
distinctly realist approach that was the polar opposite of the stated goals
(though perhaps not the results achieved by) the formalists. Schechter
“believed that dilution was the real reason to protect marks because it
was the reason that fit the way marks actually functioned in the
marketplace, and he urged judges to acknowledge this fact openly
because doing so would produce better decisions.”47
Therefore,
Schechter is perhaps best characterized as a transitional figure between
the formalist and realist eras. His dilution proposal embodied aspects of
both legal philosophies.
4. Dilution’s Temporary Demise
The desire to merge legal doctrine with regard to trademarks and
trade names – as described above, a marked departure from the legal
regime proposed by Schechter – was also born of the realist movement.
The legal realists observed that technical trademarks and trade names
functioned much the same in practice. Therefore, it made little sense to
protect one more or less than the other. Edward S. Rogers, a leading
trademark scholar who is credited as the author of the Lanham Act,48
observed the following:
The notion that there is ‘property’ in trademarks as a separate thing
was once quite generally entertained and for a while it served well
enough, but it was very soon perceived that a trader’s customers
might be diverted by the imitation of things which were not
45

See, e.g., McClure, supra note 22, at 323–24 (characterizing Schechter’s
proposal as “[t]he furthest extension of the concept of ‘protection of property’ to
expand protection of trademarks”).
46
Bone, supra note 8, at 483–85. Although Beebe ultimately characterizes
Schechter’s dilution proposal as a formalist one, he too observes that Schechter
“had the critical instincts of a realist.” Beebe, supra note 43, at 686.
47
Bone, supra note 8, at 471.
48
Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trademarks,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 178–80 (1949) (describing Lanham Act history
and Rogers’ own role therein); see generally Walter J. Derenberg, The
Contribution of Edward S. Rogers to the Trademark Act of 1946 in Historical
Perspective, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 189 (1972).
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trademarks and in which property rights could not be maintained,
such as . . . the misuse of personal names, descriptive words and the
like.49

Three years after Schechter published his Rational Basis article,
another “epoch making article”50 on the subject of trademark law
appeared, this time in the Columbia Law Review, entitled Trade-Marks
and Trade Names – An Analysis and Synthesis.51 The authors of the
article, Milton Handler and Charles Pickett, argued that there was no
“rational basis”52 for the legal distinctions then existing between
technical trademarks and trade names.53 Handler and Pickett were
consummate realists who argued that the tenets of trademark law should
derive from a realistic depiction of the way marks functioned in practice,
not the formal label that was attached to a particular mark:
Whether or not there is property in trademarks or trade names seems
to us a fruitless and unhelpful inquiry. Both types of mark
frequently are the most valuable assets of a business. [ ] It is
enough that plaintiff has a material interest which is worthy of
protection. It does not matter much what label is tagged to it. . . .
The approach to the law of trade-marks would probably be more
realistic if courts entirely abandoned the property notion.54

However, Handler and Pickett, unlike Schechter, did not argue
that trademark law needed a new paradigm. Although Handler and
Pickett cited Schechter numerous times, they never discussed his specific

49

Edward S. Rogers, New Concepts of Unfair Competition under the Lanham
Act, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 259, 260 (1948); see also Haines, supra note 22, at 21
(noting that cases affording relief to plaintiffs whose business names did not
qualify as technical trademarks were based upon “principles of common honesty
and sportsmanship”).
50
Chafee, supra note 31, at 1297; see also DERENBERG, supra note 19, at 42
(citing Handler & Pickett).
51
The article was published in two parts, Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and
Trade Names: Part I, supra note 22, and Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and
Trade Names: Part II, supra note 27.
52
Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I, supra note 22, at
169.
53
Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part II, supra note 27, at
776.
54
Id. at 776 n.81. Handler and Pickett wrote that “[t]he and lawyer and business
man, unlike the grammarian, is not primarily interested in etymology for its own
sake.” Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I, supra note
22, at 180.
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proposal that became the dilution cause of action.55 Handler and
Pickett’s idea that all types of marks should be entitled to protection
under the likelihood of confusion standard, unlike Schechter’s dilution
proposal, came to fruition when Congress enacted the 1946 Lanham Act.

B. Trademark Law in the Modern Era
The 1946 Lanham Act codified and unified the law of
trademarks in the United States, which had become strictly a creature of
state law after the Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Erie.56 Although
Schechter most likely would have been pleased by many of the
developments codified in the federal statute,57 Congress did not embrace
his claim for dilution. Instead, the Act reflected the predominant trend,
as convincingly advocated by Handler and Pickett, of treating all types of
marks essentially the same. Moreover, the Act preserved the likelihood
of confusion standard for trademark infringement of all types of marks
(until it was amended in 1995 to include a dilution cause of action).
The Lanham Act represented a triumph of legal realism, as it
swept away many of the rules that, in the minds of many practitioners
55

See, e.g., Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names: Part I, supra
note 22, at 176 n.24 (citing Schechter’s critique of the rule limiting trademark
protection in cases where marks were placed on dissimilar goods).
56
Although the Supreme Court held the federal trademark statute
unconstitutional in The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879), this decision
did not eliminate the federal common law of trademarks. Until the Supreme
Court famously overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), the federal courts
were free to decide substantive issues of state law, unrestrained by the decisions
of state courts, so long as those laws were not codified in a state statute. See
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Therefore, if a state had not
adopted a trademark statute, a federal court hearing a trademark case in that state
(under diversity jurisdiction) was free to interpret the applicable common law
doctrines as it saw fit, even if its interpretation differed from that of the state
courts. The Erie Doctrine – which dictated that federal courts sitting in diversity
were required to follow state law precedents, whether based on common law or
statutes – invalidated the federal common law of trademarks. See Rogers, supra
note 48, at 263 (decrying the “chaos” created by Erie’s invalidation of the “great
body of Federal [common] Law dealing with trade-marks and unfair
competition”); accord Chafee, supra note 31, at 1299, 1300 (predicting that the
valuable and “great body of federal unfair competition law” would likely be
“torn into pieces” as a result of Erie, rendering the United States “a legal
checkerboard” in this area of the law).
57
Schechter died in 1937, ten years after publishing his famous article in the
Harvard Law Review and approximately ten years before the Lanham Act was
enacted. Therefore, his opinion of the evolution of trademark law, even in the
relatively short term, will never be known.
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and academics, had artificially limited the scope of trademark law and its
ability to prevent unfair competition. Edward S. Rogers explained the
impact of the Act as follows:
Under the modern law . . . , unfair competition includes any act, not
necessarily fraudulent, which artificially interferes with the normal
course of trade to the disadvantage of another. There need be no
competition if the artificial interference is present. It is true, of
course, that most of the cases have arisen between competitors in
business, but the fact of competition or its absence ought not to be
controlling. It is the nature or the result of the act, not the
occupation of the actor which should determine its character.58

The Act codified the merger of doctrine as to technical
trademarks and trade names. Since 1946, the Lanham Act has extended
trademark registration rights and other types of protection to descriptive
marks, geographic marks, and other types of marks that were not
considered “trademarks” under the common law, so long as they have
acquired secondary meaning, or distinctiveness.59 Although the 1946
Lanham Act addressed many of Schechter’s concerns about trademark
law,60 it did not create a separate cause of action for fanciful and
58

Rogers, supra note 48, at 262 (emphasis added).
Compare Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946)
(stating “[t]hat no mark by which the goods of the owner of the mark may be
distinguished from other goods of the same class shall be refused registration as
a trade-mark on account of the nature of such mark unless such mark” was
“descriptive of the goods with which they are used, or of the character or quality
of such goods”) with Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (stating that, with certain
exceptions, “nothing in this [statute] shall prevent the registration of a mark used
by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in
commerce” even if the mark is merely descriptive). However, the modern
Lanham Act does not allow registration of generic words or phrases, regardless
of whether they have acquired distinctiveness. 15 U.S.C. §1064; see also Desai
& Rierson, supra note 17, at 1809–10 (discussing the prohibition of registering
generic names under the Lanham Act).
60
For example, Schechter rejected the common law rule that trademark rights
were limited to the mark holder’s geographic area of use, i.e., those geographic
areas in which the mark had acquired “goodwill.” Schechter, supra note 7, at
824. The Lanham Act gave the holder of a registered mark nationwide priority
in that mark, even if a junior user was the first to acquire goodwill in a given
geographic area. Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 2(d), 60 Stat. 427, 428 (1946)
(amended 1988). However, the Lanham Act does not automatically grant the
senior user the right to enjoin others’ use of its mark. To state a claim for
infringement, the senior user must always prove likelihood of confusion
between the two marks. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.,
267 F.2d 358, 361, 364 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding no likelihood of confusion and
59
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arbitrary marks. Instead, the 1946 Lanham Act created a single cause of
action, trademark infringement, for all classes of valid trademarks,
judged under the likelihood of confusion standard. Even today, the
inherent strength of the mark, i.e., whether the mark is descriptive,
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful,61 remains relevant to a claim of
trademark infringement, but only as a factor in the likelihood of
confusion analysis.62
The Lanham Act also addressed Schechter’s dissatisfaction with
the judiciary’s reluctance to find trademark infringement when the senior
and junior users’ goods or services were not identical. The 1905
Trademark Act prevented registration of a mark that was likely to cause
confusion with a mark that was already registered, but only if the marks
were placed on goods of the “same descriptive properties” as those of the
senior user.63 The Lanham Act of 1946 eliminated this requirement.
Under the revised version of the Act, a junior user could not register or
use a mark “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or advertising
of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the
source of origin of such goods or services.”64 As a result, the courts have
relegated the similarity (or lack thereof) between the types of goods or

therefore no trademark infringement due to separate trading areas, where trading
areas were only sixty miles apart).
61
See Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1805–10 (explaining the spectrum of
marks).
62
See Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 121 (1st
Cir. 2006); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983); Pizzeria
Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Exxon Corp. v.
Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 504 (5th. Cir. 1980); Wynn
Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186-87 (6th Cir. 1988); Barbecue Marx,
Inc. v. 551 Ogden, Inc., 235 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 2000); Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. Balducci Publ’n, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994); AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979); Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v.
Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 975-76 (10th Cir. 2002); Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611
F.3d 767, 776 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of
the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1633–
40 (2006) (discussing strength of the mark as a factor in likelihood of confusion
analysis).
63
Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 85 (1905) (repealed 1946).
64
Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, §43(a)(1)(A), 60 Stat. 444, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A) (1946); see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 314 F.2d 149, 151 (9th Cir. 1963) (noting this distinction between the 1905
and 1946 versions of the statute); id. at 160–61 (finding likelihood of confusion
between use of trademark “Black and White” for beer and Scotch whiskey).

No. 2]

THE MYTH AND REALITY OF DILUTION

232

services offered by the plaintiff and defendant to a single factor in the
multi-factor litmus test for likelihood of confusion.65
The scope of the likelihood of confusion standard was broadened
again in 1962, when Congress eliminated even more qualifying language
from the statute by deleting the reference to “purchasers.”66 Although
some courts have interpreted this deletion more narrowly,67 many have
held that its effect has been to prohibit uses of a mark that result in a
likelihood of confusion by third parties, not the purchaser of the relevant
good or service (post-sale confusion)68 and confusion by the purchaser
prior to (but not at) the point of sale (initial interest confusion).69 At the
65

See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, 531 F.3d 1, 35 (1st
Cir. 2008); Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495; Sabinsa Corp. v. Creative Compounds,
LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 189 (3d Cir. 2010); Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1535; Amstar
Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 261 (5th Cir. 1980); Wynn Oil, 839
F.2d at 1187; Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc. 237 F.3d 891, 899–900 (7th Cir.
2001); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980);
Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350; Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1532–33 (10th Cir. 1994); Caliber Auto. Liquidators, Inc. v.
Premier Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge, LLC, 605 F.3d 931, 939–40 (11th Cir. 2010);
see also Beebe, supra note 62, at 1631–33 (discussing the competitive proximity
factor in likelihood of confusion analysis).
66
See S. Rep. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962) reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844,
2847. Under the current version of the statute, which has existed since 1962, the
Lanham Act prohibits all uses of a trademark that are “likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 25 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
67
The legislative history of the 1962 amendments suggests that the word
“purchasers” was deleted because “the provision actually relates to potential
purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.” S. Rep. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962). As
a result, some courts have held that, even under the current version of the Act,
the focus remains on potential confusion on the part of actual or potential
purchasers, not third parties. See, e.g., Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (construing the likelihood of
confusion inquiry to generally turn on whether actual or potential purchasers are
confused); Astra Pharmaceutical Prods. v. Beckman Instruments, 718 F.2d 1201,
1206 (1st Cir.1983) (considering the classes of “prospective purchasers” in
assessing the likelihood of confusion).
68
See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir.
1991) (“the Act’s protection is not limited to confusion at the point of sale”); A
& H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 216 (3d
Cir. 2000); Lois Sportswear, USA v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872, 874
(2d Cir.1986).
69
See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638
F.3d 1137, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2011); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’n
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024-26 (9th Cir. 2004); Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul
Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 2005) (defining initial
interest confusion as “when a manufacturer improperly uses a trademark to
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same time, Congress eliminated language from the Act referring to
confusion “as to the source of origin” of the plaintiff’s goods or
services.70 As a result, the Act has been interpreted to prohibit confusion
as to sponsorship or endorsement of a good or service, rather than its
source.71 Suffice it to say, Schechter would scarcely recognize the
likelihood of confusion standard as it exists today.
Schechter’s desire to expand trademark law was therefore
emphatically achieved by the 1946 Lanham Act, but not exactly in the
manner he had envisioned. The cause of action he had proposed,
however, did not die. Dilution materialized in state statutes as early as
1947, and many states still recognize a dilution cause of action.72
Congress federalized dilution when it enacted the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA) in 1995.73 Federal dilution law was substantially
revised in 2006, when Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act (TDRA).74 The dilution cause of action has thus existed for over
sixty years, not as a substitute for trademark infringement (as Schechter
proposed), but coexistent with it. Remarkably, it has persisted—and
create initial customer interest in a product”); Perfumebay.com Inc. v. eBay,
Inc., 506 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan
Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1018-20 (9th Cir. 2004).
70
S. Rep. No. 87-2107, at 4 (1962).
71
See, e.g., Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg and Co., 633 F.2d 912,
920 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that the name and emblem at issue were not
trademarks partly due to lack of evidence showing customers being misled about
sponsorship or endorsement); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir.1979) (holding that the consumers’
confusion about the mark owner’s sponsorship or approval of use as sufficient
for the confusion requirement).
72
Massachusetts enacted the first dilution statute in 1947. Act of May 2, 1947,
ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 110H § 13 (West Supp. 2007)). New York, Illinois, and Georgia soon
followed suit. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (1961 N.Y. Laws 1806,
1813) (recodified at N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-l (McKinney 1996 & Supp.
2008)); 140 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ¶ 22 (West 1986) (superseded by 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 1036/5, 1036/65 (West 2001)); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1451 (2000). See also Bone, supra note 8, at 497–504 (discussing evolution of
state dilution law).
73
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat.
985, 986 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000), superseded in part by Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)). Some commentators have argued that,
even though dilution is now a federal claim, it remains a marginal cause of
action that has little practical impact.
See infra notes 339-342 and
accompanying text.
74
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).

No. 2]

THE MYTH AND REALITY OF DILUTION

234

thrived—despite the lack of a convincing or even coherent explanation
for its existence.

C. The Failure of the Traditional Justification for Trademark
Dilution Law
The claim for dilution, as embodied in the TDRA, the FTDA,
and numerous state statutes, derives from the notion that an “association”
between the junior and senior users’ marks, even in the absence of a
likelihood of confusion, will diminish the distinctiveness of the senior
mark, thereby reducing its value.75 Although some have argued that the
dilution cause of action is justified by the same law and economics
theories that traditionally support trademark infringement claims, those
arguments have been subjected to vigorous critique. The attempt to
rationalize dilution on the same terms as trademark infringement is akin
to fitting a square peg into a round hole, and just as futile.
1. Dilution by Blurring
The TDRA defines dilution by blurring as an “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”76 The mark’s
distinctiveness is impaired, at least in theory, because the consumer’s
ability to recall the famous trademark is compromised due to the
consumer’s exposure to the mark in unrelated contexts. The effect of
each dilutive use is cumulative and eventually can even result in the
demise of the mark.77 Whether this phenomenon actually occurs in
practice is the subject of substantial debate.
To understand how dilution is supposed to work, it is helpful to
start with the law and economics explanation for a different cause of
action: trademark infringement.78 This theory rests on the notion that
trademarks are economically efficient because they act as a form of
commercial shorthand.79 By quickly and effectively communicating
75

See infra note 133.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
77
See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
78
See generally Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1797–99 (discussing the
traditional law and economics explanation of trademark law).
79
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) (noting that “a trademark conveys
information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need not investigate
the attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a
shorthand way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I
enjoyed earlier.”).
76

235

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

[Vol. 11

information about goods or services to consumers, they reduce consumer
search costs in the marketplace.80 The efficiency of a trademark depends
on its ability to act as a source identifier: when the consumer sees the
mark, she has to know that the good or service to which it is attached
derives from a particular source, with certain known and attendant
attributes.81 For example, few people in the United States (and in many
other nations around the globe) are forced to wonder what they will get
when they order a hamburger at McDonald’s.® For better or worse, when
they see the Golden Arches, consumers know what to expect.
Trademark infringement—using another’s trademark (or a similar mark)
in a manner that is likely to confuse consumers—is prohibited, at least in
part, because it makes trademarks less reliable and, hence, less
efficient.82

80

See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995)
(stating that “trademark law. . . reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions, for it quickly and easily assures a potential
customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer
as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past”)
(citations omitted); see also Misawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (observing that a trademark conveys to
customers the “desirability of the commodity upon which it appears”); Ralph
Folsom & Larry Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1336
(1980) (noting that trademarks help to reduce search costs and enhance
distributional efficiency); Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Trouble with
Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762 (1990) (arguing that “[t]he principal benefit
of trademark protection is that it lowers consumer search costs”).
81
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining a trademark as a “word, name, symbol, or
device” that is used to “identify and distinguish [the mark holder’s] goods . . .
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown”); accord 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3.1 (4th ed. 2005)
(“[T]o become a ‘trademark’ is to identify the source of one seller’s goods and
distinguish that source from other sources[.]”); but see FRANK I. SCHECHTER,
THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 150
(1925) (arguing that the consumer does not regard a trademark as an indication
of origin “but rather as a guaranty that the goods purchased under the trade-mark
will have the same meritorious qualities as those previously noted by him in his
purchases of other goods bearing the same mark”).
82
Landes and Posner have observed that “[t]he benefits of trademarks in
lowering search costs presuppose legal protection because the cost of
duplicating someone else’s trademark is small and the incentive to incur this
cost in the absence of legal impediments will be greater the stronger the
trademark.” WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168 (2003).
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Prohibiting trademark infringement furthers other policy goals as
well. In the classic case of passing off, the infringer injures the
consumer by tricking her into buying something that she did not want:
the consumer wanted to purchase product A, but instead she was lured
into buying product B.83 Trademark infringement also harms the
trademark holder by putting the “goodwill” associated with the mark,
loosely defined as the mark’s reputation with consumers, in the hands of
someone outside the mark holder’s control.84

83

See Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. 599, 605–06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849)
(observing that, when a trademark is infringed, “[t]he purchaser has imposed
upon him an article that he never meant to buy”). Arguably, the consumer is not
really injured if product B is equal to, or better than, product A in terms of
quality, but this kind of consumer injury is not required to prove trademark
infringement. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that defendant’s manufacture of
similar-quality goods (as opposed to goods of lesser quality) may actually
increase the likelihood of confusion and therefore be more likely to infringe).
Moreover, the trademark holder (here, the maker of product A) can decrease the
quality of his own goods or services at will, without notice to the consumer, at
any time. See generally Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in
Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 348 (2007) [hereinafter
Calboli, The Sunset of Quality Control]; Elizabeth C. Bannon, The Growing Risk
of Self-Dilution, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 570 (1992). For these reasons, several
commentators have argued that the benefit to consumers provided by traditional
trademark law has been overstated. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of
Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 730–32 (2004) (pointing out that,
because a trademark imposes no “actual obligation” upon its holder, the mark’s
benefits to consumers are overstated, unless the consumers continually monitor
the quality of the products bearing the trademark); see also Irene Calboli,
Trademark Assignment “with Goodwill”: A Concept Whose Time Has Gone, 57
FLA. L. REV. 771, 833–36 (2005) [hereinafter Calboli, Trademark Assignment
with Goodwill] (arguing that trademarks should be transferable “with or without
goodwill,” in part because trademark owners have always had the ability to
change the quality or nature of their products at will); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999) (further critiquing the
traditional economic justification for trademark law).
84
The “goodwill” associated with a trademark has been described by financier
Warren Buffet (in the context of discussing the Sees Candies brand) as a
“pervasive favorable reputation with consumers based on countless pleasant
experiences that they have had with both product and personnel.” Warren E.
Buffet, The Essays of Warren Buffet: Lessons for Corporate America, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 173 (1997) (selected, arranged, and introduced by
Lawrence E. Cunningham); see also Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 413 (1916) (reasoning that “a party has a valuable interest in the good will
of his trade or business, and in the trademarks adopted to maintain and extend
it”); Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 F. 896, 897 (C.C.N.Y. 1897) (“Where the goods of
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For example, if a consumer sees the Golden Arches and thinks
she is in McDonald’s but, in reality, the restaurant is a “McDowell’s”
and serves food that does not taste as good as McDonald’s, then both the
consumer and McDonald’s will potentially suffer.85 The consumer is
harmed because she thought she paid for a McDonald’s hamburger, but
in fact she bought something different and, in this example, something
worse. McDonald’s is similarly harmed because the goodwill associated
with its trademark has suffered a blow, at least as to this consumer. The
customer’s experience with the imposter McDowell’s has lowered her
expectations as to quality associated with the McDonald’s brand, and
therefore she may buy her fast food somewhere else in the future.
Moreover, the next time she sees the Golden Arches, she is not quite as
sure about what she is going to get when she places an order.
The law and economics theory for trademark infringement does
not easily transfer to a cause of action for dilution, because dilution, by
definition, does not require the plaintiff to prove that consumers are
likely to be confused.86 If the consumer is not confused (or even likely to
be confused) by the defendant’s use of a mark, then she has not been
tricked into buying something that she does not want. Moreover, the
a manufacturer have become popular not only because of their intrinsic worth,
but also by reason of the ingenious, attractive and persistent manner in which
they have been advertised, the good will thus created is entitled to protection.”);
SCHECHTER, supra note 81, at 144 (stating that, when a trademark is infringed,
“the owner is robbed of the fruits of the reputation that he had successfully
labored to earn”); Calboli, Trademark Assignment with Goodwill, supra note 83,
at 785-95 (explaining the history and evolution of the concept of goodwill in
trademark law); see generally Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of
the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U.L. REV. 547 (2006).
85
In the 1988 film Coming to America, comedian Eddie Murphy gets a job at a
fast food restaurant called “McDowell’s.” Coming to America (Paramount
Pictures 1988).
The ongoing legal conflict between McDonald’s and
McDowell’s is a humorous subplot in the movie. This conflict is summarized
when the in-movie owner of McDowell’s, Cleo McDowell, states: “Look . . .
me and the McDonald’s people got this little misunderstanding. See, they’re
McDonald’s; I’m McDowell’s. They got the Golden Arches; mine is the
Golden Arcs. They got the Big Mac; I got the Big Mick. We both got two allbeef patties, special sauce, lettuce, cheese, pickles and onions, but their buns
have sesame seeds. My buns have no seeds.” Id.
86
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (specifying that dilution is actionable “regardless
of the presence of absence of actual or likely confusion”); see also Starbucks
Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc. 588 F.3d 97, 109 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting
that “the absence of actual or even of a likelihood of confusion does not
undermine evidence of trademark dilution”); Franklin Mint Co. v. Manatt,
Phelps & Phillips, LLP, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 143, 170 (Cal. App. 2010) (“In the
dilution context, likelihood of confusion is irrelevant.”).
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mark holder’s goodwill has not suffered, because the consumer knows
that the goods or services are coming from two distinct sources, and
neither is owned or endorsed by the other.87
Therefore, a claim for dilution by blurring does not further the
policy goals of either preventing consumer fraud or preserving the mark
owner’s goodwill. Rather, the traditional justification for dilution by
blurring focuses on the source identifying function of the mark and its
ability to bolster economic efficiency in the marketplace.88
Commentators have argued that trademarks function less efficiently in
the marketplace if the consumer makes multiple associations with a
given mark, rather than just one. At least in theory, what Schechter
characterized as the “uniqueness” of the famous mark is imperiled by
these noninfringing uses. Professors Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley
give the following example:
Blurring takes a formerly unique mark (say, Exxon), which
consumers can associate with the mark owner without any
necessary context, and applies it to unrelated products – say, Exxon
pianos or Exxon carpets. Even if the consumer understands that
these different Exxons are unrelated, the proliferation of Exxonmarked products may make it more difficult for consumers to figure
out which company is responsible for any particular product.89

87

As discussed infra, dilution by tarnishment proceeds on the theory that
association with unsavory goods or services can damage a trademark holder’s
reputation or goodwill, even when consumers are not likely to be confused and
therefore understand that the senior user is not the source of, and does not
endorse, the offensive goods or services. See infra notes 116-127 and
accompanying text.
88
Judge Posner explained the consumer search cost rationale for dilution by
blurring in Ty Inc. v. Perryman: “Suppose an upscale restaurant calls itself
‘Tiffany.’ There is little danger that the consuming public will think it’s dealing
with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it patronizes this restaurant. But
when consumers next see the name ‘Tiffany’ they may think about both the
restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the name as an
identifier of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to think harder—
incur as it were a higher imagination cost—to recognize the name as the name of
the store.” Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002).
89
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1198 (2006) (emphasis added);
see also Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 37 HOUS. L.
REV. 729, 759 (2000) (defining dilution as “the difference between a brand with
a meaning substantially in the abstract, and a brand with a substantial meaning
only in context or after cueing”).
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Dogan and Lemley conclude that blurring “can make it somewhat more
difficult for consumers to associate a famous mark with its owner.”90
The cause of action for dilution by blurring thus rests upon two
critical assumptions: 1) using the same (or similar) marks on different
goods or services, in contexts that will not support a cause of action for
trademark infringement (because consumers are not likely to be
confused), decreases consumers’ ability to “associate [the famous mark]
with the mark owner without any necessary context”91; and 2) preserving
consumers’ ability to identify the famous trademark with the holder of
the mark, absent context, has value and should be protected. Both of
these statements are properly subject to substantial empirical challenge.
The first conclusion—that imbuing a famous trademark with
multiple meanings devalues or weakens the original definition of the
mark—requires the belief that trademarks do not behave like other
words. Language is not immutable.92 Countless words in the English
language have multiple meanings and, outside the trademark context,
few would suggest that additional or even derivative meanings
necessarily sap strength from the word’s original definition.93 Deven
Desai and I have made a similar argument in the context of the
90

Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1198; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in
Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507,
516 (2008) (describing dilution theory, in cognitive terms, as a “tragedy of the
mental commons, in which a consumer’s mind is overpopulated with meaning
and her understanding of a brand descends into incoherence”); Stacey L. Dogan
& Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 777, 790 (2004) (noting that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
focuses on uses that “increase consumer search costs” by blurring); Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L. J. 1687, 1704 n.90 (1999) (arguing that “[t]he information consumers can
obtain and process is in part a function of how clear the association between
mark and product remains in their minds; ‘clutter’ therefore imposes real costs
on consumers”); see generally Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the
Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605
(2007).
91
Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1198.
92
See Shawn M. Clankie, Brand Name Use in Creative Writing: Genericide or
Language Right?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 253, 262 (Lide Buranen & Alice M. Roy
eds., 1999) (“Language change and innovation are natural and, in general,
unmanageable.”).
93
In the trademark context, multiple definitions of the same word are assumed
to have dilutive effect. See, e.g., Swann, supra note 89, at 759 (noting that
“[d]ilution equals the diffusion of a singular definition in the dictionary of
commercial terms”).
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genericism doctrine, reasoning that “unorthodox” uses of a trademark in
noncommercial contexts should not necessarily indicate that a mark has
fallen victim to genericide. In that piece, we gave the following
example:
[T]he word ‘snow’ is defined as (1) ‘precipitation in the form of . . .
white ice crystals’; (2) ‘a dessert made of stiffly beaten whites of
eggs, sugar, and fruit pulp’; (3) cocaine or heroin; or (4) ‘to deceive,
persuade, or charm glibly.’94 Even though definitions 2-4 are fairly
clearly derived from the first definition of the word ‘snow,’ their
existence does not undermine . . . the validity of the word ‘snow’ as
it refers to fluffy, white, frozen precipitation. We determine the
meaning of the word by the context in which it is used.95

If the word “snow” were a famous trademark used to sell frozen
precipitation, dilution by blurring could prevent the use of the word
“snow” in other contexts, e.g., to refer to a dessert, on the grounds that
doing so would impede the word’s ability to identify the fluffy white
stuff that is a form of precipitation rather than food. Using the word to
refer to cocaine or heroin would additionally support a cause of action
for dilution by tarnishment. Dilution laws presume that, unlike other
words, trademarks are not resilient to multiple uses.
Trademark law has traditionally tolerated multiple uses of the
same word in unrelated contexts, so long as these uses are not likely to
cause consumer confusion. For example, United Airlines and United
Van Lines have peacefully co-existed for years, as have marks like
Champion spark plugs and Champion sportswear, Ace retail hardware
stores and Ace bandages, Tropicana orange juice and the Tropicana Las
Vegas hotel, and numerous others.96 Consumers use context to attach the
appropriate meaning to the word being used, in commercial as well as
noncommercial settings. For example, if a person were instructed to

94

WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1117 (1983).
Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1839.
96
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:11 (4th ed. 2005) (listing “well-known examples” of marks
that can “peacefully co-exist without confusion”). A recent empirical study has
shown that, in part due to the expansion of trademark infringement doctrine and
anti-dilution law, brand sharing has declined significantly over the past fifty
years. Robert Brauneis & Paul Heald, Trademark Infringement, Trademark
Dilution, and the Decline in Sharing of Famous Brands: An Introduction and
Empirical Study, 59 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 141 (2011); Robert Brauneis & Paul
Heald, The Myth of Buick Aspirin: An Empirical Study of Trademark Dilution by
Product and Trade Names, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 255 (2011).
95
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“make a reservation at the Tropicana,” that person would be highly
unlikely to think about orange juice.
Some empirical research has attempted to prove that the use of a
famous trademark on an unrelated product does, in fact, impede the
mark’s effectiveness as a source identifier for the original user of the
mark.97 Maureen Morrin and Jacob Jacoby conducted a study in which
consumers were exposed to allegedly dilutive ads that used famous
trademarks in unfamiliar contexts, e.g., Heineken popcorn and Hyatt
legal services.98 The consumers were then asked to identify the senior
user’s mark, e.g., Heineken beer and Hyatt hotels.99 The results of the
study were inconsistent between these two brands. The study showed
that exposure to dilutive ads, as compared to exposure to unrelated ads,
increased the amount of time required to identify the proper mark by 125
milliseconds (increasing the response time from 645 milliseconds to 770
milliseconds), as to the Heineken brand.100 However, exposure to
dilutive ads had no measurable negative impact on response rates with
regard to the Hyatt brand. In fact, response rates of study participants
who were exposed to dilutive ads were 130 milliseconds faster than those
of participants exposed to unrelated ones (decreasing the response time
from 810 milliseconds to 680 milliseconds).101
Although these studies are frequently cited as empirical evidence
of a dilutive effect, their findings are less than convincing. The impact
identified by these studies, even taken at face value, is objectively
minimal, literally measured in milliseconds.102 As Professor Daniel
Klerman has argued, an increase in response time of 125 milliseconds
(approximately one-tenth of a second), as in the Heineken example, is
not economically significant.103 Moreover, the study results also

97

Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures
for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265 (2000).
98
Id. at 268.
99
Id. at 268–69.
100
Id. at 269.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 269–70.
103
Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1759, 1765 (2006). Klerman calculates that, at the rate of
$250 an hour, the increase in search costs shown in the Heineken example
would amount to less than a cent. Id. Some dilution proponents argue that even
milliseconds of delay in associating a mark with its proper product are
substantial enough to affect consumer purchasing decisions and therefore such
delays cause real economic harm to trademark holders. See Tushnet, supra note
90, at 522 n.68 (citing a study demonstrating that “dilution-generated delayed
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demonstrate that the dilutive effect, even measured in milliseconds, does
not impact all marks equally and should not be presumed. In the Hyatt
example, for instance, exposure to dilutive ads appeared to reinforce
rather than undermine the brand’s distinctiveness. These findings tend to
suggest, and Morrin and Jacoby have concluded, that the strongest, or
most “famous” trademarks are more resilient and therefore less likely to
suffer a dilutive effect,104 which is somewhat ironic given that those
marks are the only ones entitled to protection from dilution.105
Another limitation of the study derives from the examples of
dilution by blurring that it utilized. The facts supporting a dilution claim
are typically not as clear-cut as those shown to survey respondents in the
Morrin and Jacoby study. The 2006 amendments to the federal dilution
statute (the TDRA) have been interpreted by the circuit courts to deemphasize mark similarity.106 Marks like “Heineken popcorn” and
“Hyatt legal services,” which employ direct copies of famous marks on
unrelated goods or services, are simply not the typical dilution case.107
Another question not addressed by this study is whether the
effect measured in the laboratory persists in real-life commercial settings.
As discussed above, when determining the meaning and the effectiveness
of language, the power of context is difficult to overstate.108 The law and
response” is correlated with decreased probability that subjects would later
choose the diluted brand).
104
Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 97, at 270-71. Morrin and Jacoby found that
“very strong brands are immune to dilution because their memory connections
are so strong that it is difficult for consumers to alter or create new ones with the
same brand name.” Id. at 274; see also Klerman, supra note 103, at 1765 (citing
Morrin’s study as indicating some strong brands may be more “resistant to
harm”).
105
See Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution
Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1143, 1162–63 (2006).
106
See infra notes 142–186 and accompanying text.
107
The Morrin and Jacoby study examined one mark (Dogiva Dog Biscuits) that
was not identical to the famous mark that it theoretically diluted (Godiva
Chocolates). The Dogiva ad was included in the study to provide an example of
tarnishment. Morrin & Jacoby, supra note 97, at 268. The study suggested that
exposure to Dogiva Dog Biscuits delayed the study participant’s ability to
identify Godiva Chocolates by 73 milliseconds, if the participant had not been
previously exposed to ads for Godiva chocolate. Curiously, when survey
participants were exposed to Godiva and Dogiva ads, the delay in their response
times increased to 129 milliseconds. Id. at 269.
108
Tushnet, supra note 90, at 529–32 (discussing the impact of context in terms
of the source-identifying power of trademarks and words in general). As
Tushnet succinctly concludes, “When context is king, dilution loses much of its
theoretical appeal.” Id. at 529.
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economics explanation of trademark law is based on the notion that
trademarks function as source identifiers in the commercial marketplace.
A mark’s ability to act as a source identifier for the consumer outside
that context, or in no context at all (a situation which is more likely to
exist, if at all, in a controlled study rather than any ordinary consumer
experience), is of questionable value.109 The aim of trademark law is not
(and should not be) to preserve a mark’s ability to identify a particular
source in the abstract, outside the realm of commerce and indeed devoid
of any context at all.
Context is crucial because trademarks are words—even though
they are words that simultaneously function as valuable corporate
assets—and therefore do not behave in the same manner as more tangible
forms of “property.” Dilution by blurring stems from the premise that a
trademark is essentially a rivalrous good: one that is depleted by use.
Any child will tell you (in so many words) that candy, for example, is a
rivalrous good. If one child takes a bite of a chocolate bar, then there is
less chocolate to go around for everyone else. If everyone helps
themselves to the chocolate, even by small bites, eventually the chocolate
is gone. Dilution assumes that the source identifying capacity of a
trademark similarly functions as a rivalrous good. In theory, the famous
mark has a finite amount of source identifying capacity, which is
depleted by non-infringing (yet commercial) uses on unrelated goods and
services.
Trademarks, by contrast, may well be nonrivalrous goods.110
Nonrivalrous goods, like information or scientific research, can be
109

As linguist Roger Shuy has written, “[w]ords in isolation seldom occur in our
lives, except in spelling bees and grocery lists. Since humans commonly use
context to disambiguate and figure out what is meant, it is reasonable to expect
them to keep on doing this with trademarks.” Roger Shuy, Linguistic Thoughts
on Trademark Dilution, 5-6 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author). See also Klerman, supra note 103, at 1765–66 (observing that
“[c]onsumers just do not confront trademarks in the abstract very often, and,
when they do, context usually makes the product category obvious”).
110
As Professor Boyle explains, “Unlike the earthly commons, the commons of
the mind is generally ‘non-rival.’ Many uses of land are mutually exclusive. If
I am using the field for grazing, it may interfere with your plans to use it for
growing crops. By contrast, a gene sequence, an MP3 file, or an image may be
used by multiple parties; my use does not interfere with yours. To simplify a
complicated analysis, this means that the threat of overuse of fields and fisheries
is generally not a problem with the informational or innovational commons.”
James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003); see also Sonia
Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1601, 1663, 1695
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“consumed” by multiple people at the same time, without depletion and
at low cost per additional consumer. Outside the context of trademark
law, words or language would almost certainly be characterized as
nonrivalrous. Words are not depleted and do not lose their expressive
meaning due to overuse. In fact, the opposite is true: if the population
stops using a word, its meaning may be permanently lost. Entire
languages have died or become extinct due to lack of use.111 Moreover,
some evidence suggests that repetition of a word actually reinforces
(rather than detracts from) its meaning.112 Nor does the existence of
homonyms (as in the case of the word “snow” discussed above)
necessarily indicate that the word’s primary or original definition is
weak. The question is whether famous trademarks, which are both
language and valued assets, behave more like words or tangible property
in terms of their rivalrous or nonrivalrous characteristics.
Because trademarks are words, there is a strong argument that
trademarks largely function like other words and therefore can be used in
multiple contexts simultaneously, without depletion. Trademarks are
less likely to behave like real estate or some other form of tangible
property that is necessarily dissipated through use. Moreover, even
assuming that the source-identifying function of a trademark is “whittled
away” by allegedly diluting uses, the resulting chips are infinitesimally
small, which is why trademark holders are not required to prove damages
to prevail on a dilution claim.113 If proof of actual damages were
required, the cause of action would almost certainly be practically
meaningless.114 Trademark holders may be unable to prove damages in
these types of cases because they simply do not have any.115

(2010); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and
Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 946 (2005).
111
See generally K. DAVID HARRISON, WHEN LANGUAGES DIE: THE
EXTINCTION OF THE WORLD'S LANGUAGES AND THE EROSION OF HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE (2007).
112
See Tushnet, supra note 90, at 536 (describing one study as suggesting that
“dilution does not harm many famous trademarks because adding associations to
low-frequency words does not interfere with retrieval or recognition – and may
even help”); see also id. at 540 (“By adding branches to a trademark’s mental
tree, multiple associations make it bigger, which improves availability in a wellforested mind.”)
113
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (cause of action for dilution does not depend
on “the presence or absence of . . . actual economic injury”); see also Miss.
Code Ann. § 75-25-1 (2011) (same).
114
Although the Supreme Court initially interpreted the FTDA to require proof
of “actual dilution,” it specified that, under this standard, plaintiffs were not
required to prove “the consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales
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2. Dilution by Tarnishment
The TDRA also prohibits use of a trademark that is “likely to
cause dilution by tarnishment [of a famous mark].”116 Dilution by
tarnishment is further defined as a use that “harms the reputation of the
famous mark.”117 The language of the statute itself provides no further
guidance as to what constitutes an actionable claim for dilution by
tarnishment. Dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment are similar
in that, as to both causes of action, the plaintiff need not prove likelihood
of consumer confusion, actual economic injury, or actual dilution.118
Moreover, both causes of action stem from the consuming public’s
“association” of the junior user’s mark with that of the senior user.
However, in a claim for dilution by tarnishment, the association between
the two marks is actionable not because it harms the mark’s
distinctiveness, but because, in theory, it harms the mark owner’s
goodwill. As stated by the Second Circuit, “[t]he sine qua non of
tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff's mark will suffer negative
associations through defendant’s use.”119
Dilution via tarnishment arguably increases consumer search
costs in the same manner as a claim for dilution by blurring: by

or profits.” Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). The
revised statute, the TDRA, changed the standard of proof to one of likelihood of
dilution and specifies that plaintiffs are not required to prove any “actual
economic injury.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) (2006). The Subcommittee on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, in 2004 and 2005, heard
testimony from a representative of the International Trademark Association,
who argued that the “actual dilution” standard established in Moseley was too
burdensome for trademark holders: “By the time measurable, provable damage
to the mark has occurred much time has passed, the damage has been done, and
the remedy, which is injunctive relief, is far less effective.” H.R. Rep. No. 10923, at 5 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1093–94.
115
Professor Farley has also proffered this explanation: “Let me suggest that
trademark owners desire a likelihood of dilution standard rather than an actual
dilution standard because they cannot prove actual dilution. There is a good
reason that trademark owners cannot prove actual dilution. My thesis is that
there is no such harm; it does not exist . . . . The main problem with dilution law
is that it provides a remedy without a supportable theorization of the harm.”
Christine Haight Farley, Why We are Confused about the Trademark Dilution
Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175, 1184 (2006).
116
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1).
117
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(2)(C).
118
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1).
119
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir.
1996).
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diminishing the mark’s capacity as a source identifier.120 However,
tarnishment is more commonly associated with an alternative policy
justification for trademark law, the preservation of the mark owner’s
goodwill.121 Unlike the injury suffered by a mark holder in a case of
trademark infringement, the alleged injury to goodwill targeted by a
cause of action for dilution by tarnishment is indirect, due to the lack of
consumer confusion. The tarnishment claim arises from the fear that the
famous trademark holder will suffer guilt by (admittedly indirect)
association. In other words, the theory is that even though the consumer
is unlikely to think that the trademark holder is the source of the junior
user’s unsavory or inferior product or service, she will nonetheless no
longer have uniformly positive associations with the original trademark
as a result of her exposure to the tarnishing use.122 In a case of
tarnishment, the consumer’s distaste for the unsavory or inferior product
has “rubbed off” on the famous trademark, thereby damaging it.123
The concept of dilution by tarnishment has more intuitive appeal
than the claim of dilution by blurring and therefore has proved to be less
controversial (although not without its critics).124 Even if we assume that
the tarnishment phenomenon of guilt by association does in fact occur,
however, we still must wrestle with the difficult question of how it
120

See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (characterizing
tarnishment as “a second form of dilution,” reasoning that “[a]nalytically it is a
subset of blurring, since it reduces the distinctness of the trademark as a signifier
of the trademarked product or service”); see generally Layne T. Smith,
Comment, Tarnishment and the FTDA: Lessening the Capacity to Identify and
Distinguish, 2004 BYU L. REV. 825, 850–60 (2004).
121
See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
122
Judge Posner explains the tarnishment phenomenon with the following
example: Suppose a “striptease joint” adopts the name “Tiffany.” “[C]onsumers
will not think the striptease joint [is] under common ownership with the jewelry
store. But because of the inveterate tendency of the human mind to proceed by
association, every time they think of the word ‘Tiffany’ their image of the fancy
jewelry store will be tarnished by the association of the word with the strip
joint.” Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511.
123
See Tushnet, supra note 90, at 522-23 (noting that “emotion drives cognition,
meaning that negative associations may do real, even measurable harm” to a
trademark holder, describing such associations as “poisoned fruit”); see also
Stacey L. Dogan & Marc Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or
Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 494 (2005) (describing dilution by
tarnishment as a form of “subconscious pollution”).
124
See generally Jessica Taran, Dilution by Tarnishment: A Case for Vulgar
Humor, 7 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1 (2002); Regina Schaffer-Goldman, Note,
Cease-and-Desist: Tarnishment’s Blunt Sword in its Battle against the
Unseemly, the Unwholesome, and the Unsavory, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1241 (2010).
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should be proven. Like dilution by blurring, the theory behind the cause
of action for dilution by tarnishment is that tarnishing uses of a
trademark cause the trademark holder an economic harm, albeit such a
minor one that it may not be measurable in an individual case. Proving
that consumers’ exposure to an allegedly tarnishing use of a famous
trademark has negatively impacted their opinion of the mark, or the
opposite (lack of tarnishing effect), can be difficult if not impossible, at
least not without spending large sums of money for experts and survey
consultants.
In most cases, of course, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
its case. However, in tarnishment cases involving uses of a mark related
to sex or the illegal use of drugs, courts rarely require trademark holders
to prove harm to sustain a claim of dilution by tarnishment. In fact,
courts have adopted a virtual per se rule regarding uses of trademarks in
contexts involving pornography, finding almost uniformly that such uses
tarnish the image of the mark holder.125 On the other hand, when the
allegedly tarnishing use is a non-vulgar parody or generally does not
relate in any way to sex or the illegal use of drugs, the dilution plaintiff is
less likely to prevail.126

125

See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinemas, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979) (enjoining use of Dallas Cowboy cheerleader
uniforms in a pornographic film); Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 948–50 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that pornographic website’s use
of the mark “VelVeeda” was likely to tarnish the Velveeta trademark);
Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. P’ship v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d
1339, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that defendants’ use of domain names
“victoriassexsecret.com” and “victoriassexysecret.com” to sell “entertainment of
a lascivious nature suitable only for adults” was likely to tarnish the Victoria’s
Secret trademark). When a defendant uses sexual imagery, particularly
pornography, to mock the trademark holder or the mark itself in a manner that
might otherwise be considered a parody, courts are typically not amused. See,
e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 125, 126, 134 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (enjoining use of Pillsbury Doughboy character in magazine which
featured the Doughboy in various sexual positions); but see Burnett v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing
claim of dilution by tarnishment by actress Carol Burnett based on lewd
portrayal of her “Charwoman” character in an episode of the cartoon Family
Guy, on grounds that use of Burnett’s character was noncommercial parody).
126
See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506,
508 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding defendant’s use of wild boar puppet named
“Spa’am” in the movie Muppett Treasure Island did not dilute or tarnish the
SPAM trademark (for lunch meat)). See also infra notes 223–228 and
accompanying text (discussing Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity
Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007)).
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Proof of dilution by tarnishment, like dilution by blurring, is
perhaps elusive because, at least in the typical case, no dilution has
occurred. In other words, the trademark holder probably cannot prove
that he has been harmed because, in fact, he has not been harmed. Even
if he has suffered some economic harm, it may well be minute.
However, as noted above, the burden of proof in these cases seems to be
shifting from the plaintiff to the defendant. Although the TDRA purports
to prevent unauthorized uses of a famous mark that are likely to “cause
dilution” of it, it has eliminated the plaintiff’s duty to prove economic
harm altogether.127

D. The Expansion of Dilution Protection
At least initially, state legislatures and the United States
Congress adopted the dilution cause of action to combat the problem of
“hypothetical anomalies” such as “Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin tablets,
Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, [and] Bulova gowns.”128 Schechter, in
theorizing the need for a dilution cause of action, cited similar examples:
“[i]f ‘Kodak’ may be used for bath tubs and cakes, ‘Mazda’ for cameras
and shoes, or ‘Ritz-Carlton’ for coffee, these marks must inevitably be
lost in the commonplace words of the language, despite the originality
and ingenuity in their contrivance, and the vast expenditures in
advertising them . . . .”129 In other words, the cause of action was
considered necessary to combat the perceived harm caused by the use of
well-known trademarks to sell unrelated goods by someone other than
the owner of the well-known trademark. Trademark holders arguably
needed the dilution cause of action to prevent such uses, because they
fell outside the scope of trademark infringement law. Even today, courts
consider the proximity of goods when determining whether consumers
are likely to be confused by defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s
trademark.130 Like the trademark infringement standard, the modern
127

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026,
1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting the legislative history of New York’s state dilution
statute). The United States Congress similarly cited “DUPONT shoes, BUICK
aspirin, and KODAK pianos” as hypothetical misuses of a trademark that a
federal dilution cause of action would combat. H.R. Rep. 104-374, at 3 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (legislative history of Federal
Trademark Dilution Act).
129
Schechter, supra note 7, at 830. Schechter’s statement here blurs the
concepts of dilution and genericide, portraying the ultimate “death” of the
trademark as the inevitable result of unchecked dilution. See Desai & Rierson,
supra note 17, at 1842–44 (discussing the link between the dilution and
genericide doctrines).
130
See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
128
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dilution doctrine has evolved far beyond its historical roots and the stated
reasons for its existence.
The current version of the federal trademark dilution statute, the
TDRA, prohibits the use of any “famous” mark that is “likely to cause
dilution by blurring.”131 A “famous” mark is defined by statute as one
which is “widely recognized by the general consuming public of the
United States” as a designation of source.132 The Act defines dilution by
blurring as an “association arising from the similarity between a mark or
trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the
famous mark.”133 The TDRA does not require proof of “actual dilution,”
in contrast to the 1995 version of the Act (as interpreted by the Supreme
Court).134 The Act lists six non-exclusive factors that courts may
consider in determining whether dilution by blurring is likely to occur.135
The TDRA also includes a cause of action for “dilution by
tarnishment,” which is defined as an “association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms
131

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
Id. at § 1125(c)(2)(A). The statute identifies four non-exclusive factors for
courts to consider in determining whether a mark is “famous.” Id. at §
1125(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). The TDRA narrowed the scope of famousness, as
compared to the FTDA, by attempting to eliminate marks that had achieved only
niche fame or regional fame from the scope of dilution protection. See, e.g.,
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame in
Trademark Law, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 89, 94 (2011) (noting that the fame
requirement “functions as a gatekeeper to prevent widespread treating of
trademarks purely as property in trademark jurisprudence”).
133
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). State dilution statutes have largely adopted the
same definition of “dilution by blurring.” See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §
14202(l) (West 2008) (defining “dilution by blurring” as an “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or a trade name and a famous mark that
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-251(l) (West 2011) (same); ALA. CODE 1975 § 8-12-6(3) (2012) (same).
134
See infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text.
135
The Act provides that courts may consider “all relevant factors” in
“determining whether a mark or trade name is likely to cause dilution by
blurring,” including (but presumably not limited to) (1) “[t]he degree of
similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark”; (2) “[t]he
degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark”; (3) “[t]he
extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially
exclusive use of the mark”; (4) “[t]he degree of recognition of the famous
mark”; (5) “[w]hether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an
association with the famous mark”; and (6) “[a]ny actual association between
the mark or trade name and the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–
(vi).
132
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the reputation of the famous mark.”136 The 1995 version of the statute,
the FTDA, did not explicitly prohibit dilution by tarnishment, although it
was generally interpreted as having that effect.137 Unlike a cause of
action for dilution by blurring, the TDRA suggests no specific factors for
a court to consider when determining whether dilution by tarnishment
has occurred.
The TDRA also identifies certain types of trademark use that are
not actionable: 1) fair use, 2) news reporting, and 3) noncommercial
use.138 Unlike the FTDA, the TDRA specifically includes parodies or
criticism of a famous trademark within its definition of “fair use.”139
However, the TDRA excludes from fair use protection any use of a mark
that serves as a “designation of source” for the defendant’s “own goods
or services.”140
Although commentators initially heralded the TDRA as a
“sensible and progressive reform of American federal antidilution
protection,”141 it has expanded the dilution cause of action in some ways
that were perhaps unanticipated by its drafters. Under the TDRA’s
likelihood of dilution standard, particularly as the courts have interpreted
it, proof of association between plaintiff’s and defendant’s respective
marks has become tantamount to proof of dilution. Even when the
competing marks are not substantially similar, proof of association may
be enough to avoid summary judgment on a dilution claim. The TDRA
also allows claims for dilution of trade dress and lawsuits between
136

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
Compare Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003)
(noting the absence of any direct reference to tarnishment in the FTDA and
questioning whether the statute actually embraced this cause of action, despite
references to tarnishment in the legislative history), with Kraft Foods Holdings,
Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 948–50 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that
pornographic website’s use of the mark “VelVeeda” was likely to tarnish the
Velveeta trademark, in violation of the FTDA); Victoria's Cyber Secret Ltd.
P’ship v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001)
(holding that defendants’ use of domain names “victoriassexsecret.com” and
“victoriassexysecret.com” to sell “entertainment of a lascivious nature suitable
only for adults” was likely to tarnish the Victoria’s Secret trademark, in
violation of the FTDA).
138
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
139
Id. at § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).
140
Id. at § 1125(c)(3)(A).
141
Beebe, supra note 105, at 1144; see also Jennifer Files Beerline, Note, AntiDilution Law, New and Improved: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 511, 513 (concluding that, “while imperfect, the
TDRA is a vast improvement over the FTDA”).
137
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competitors, which again draws dilution away from the narrowly
prescribed paradigm that it was initially intended to address.
1. The Decline in Relevance of Mark Similarity and the Increase in
Significance of Mark Association
The hypothetical case envisioned by the legislatures that enacted
dilution statutes was one in which a defendant copied, essentially
verbatim, a well-known trademark and used it to sell his own (unrelated)
goods or services, thereby diluting the distinctiveness of the well-known
trademark.142 Although imagined cases of “Buick aspirin” and “Dupont
shoes” may be the inspiration for dilution law,143 they bear little
resemblance to most of the published cases in which a defendant’s use of
plaintiff’s trademark has been found to dilute but not infringe,
particularly under the TDRA. In the majority of cases, the mark used by
the defendant is not identical to the plaintiff’s famous trademark. Rather,
defendant’s use of the mark is better characterized as a play on words
deriving from plaintiff’s famous trademark. In far too many cases,
evidence of “mental association” between plaintiff’s and defendant’s
marks has become tantamount to proof of dilution itself.
When Congress amended the Act and passed the TDRA, it
modified the statutory language in a manner that effectively decreased
the importance of mark similarity and increased the relevance of mark
association in dilution cases. It did so largely in response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Moseley, which interpreted the former version of the
federal dilution statute, the FTDA. In this case, the Supreme Court held
that, when the competing marks were not identical, the plaintiff had to
prove more than mere association between them to demonstrate that
defendant had “impaired the distinctiveness” of and thereby diluted
plaintiff’s famous trademark.144 The “actual dilution” standard articulated
in Moseley was roundly criticized by the holders of famous
trademarks.145
In Moseley, the plaintiff, owner of the admittedly famous
Victoria’s Secret trademark, sued Victor and Cathy Moseley, proprietors
142

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting the legislative history of New York’s state
dilution statute).
144
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003).
145
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 6 (2005) (statement of Anne Gundelfinger on behalf of the
International Trademark Association (INTA)).
143
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of a business named “Victor’s Little Secret,” for trademark infringement
and dilution.146 The trial court granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s
trademark infringement and unfair competition claims, finding that the
Moseleys’ use of the mark “Victor’s Little Secret” created no likelihood
of consumer confusion.147 However, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Victoria’s Secret on the dilution claim, and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed.148 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that evidence of “association” between the two marks was
insufficient to prove dilution.
Plaintiff introduced only one piece of evidence that its famous
trademark had been diluted and tarnished by the Moseleys’ use of the
name “Victor’s Little Secret.” An army colonel, who happened upon an
advertisement for the grand opening of the Moseleys’ store, “was
offended by what he perceived to be an attempt to use a reputable
company’s trademark to promote the sale of ‘unwholesome, tawdry
merchandise,’” and therefore sent a copy of the ad to Victoria’s Secret.149
The Supreme Court observed that the colonel’s “mental association”
between Victor’s Little Secret and Victoria’s Secret did not impair the
distinctiveness of or tarnish the Victoria’s Secret trademark:
There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the
capacity of the VICTORIA’S SECRET mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria's Secret stores or
advertised in its catalogs. The officer was offended by the ad, but it
did not change his conception of Victoria’s Secret. His offense was
directed entirely at petitioners, not at respondents.150

The Court in Moseley specifically rejected the notion that mere
association between non-identical marks was sufficient to prove dilution.
In reaching this conclusion, it commented upon an earlier Fourth Circuit
opinion holding that a slogan adopted by the state of Utah, “The Greatest
Snow on Earth,” did not dilute the famous slogan of the Ringling

146

Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422. The name of the store was originally “Victor’s
Secret,” but the Moseleys changed the name after receiving a letter from
plaintiff’s lawyer indicating that plaintiff believed that the name both infringed
and diluted its federally registered trademark. Id. at 423.
147
Id. at 425. Plaintiff did not appeal the court’s ruling on the trademark
infringement and unfair competition claims. Id. at 428.
148
Id. at 425.
149
Id. at 423. The advertisement in question promoted the sale of “‘Intimate
Lingerie for every woman’; ‘Romantic Lighting’; ‘Lycra Dresses’; ‘Pagers’; and
‘Adult Novelties/Gifts.’” Id.
150
Id. at 434.
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Brothers Barnum & Bailey Circus, “The Greatest Show on Earth.”151
The Supreme Court endorsed the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that
Ringling Brothers had not proved dilution merely because it had shown
that Utah’s slogan, which admittedly was not identical to “The Greatest
Show on Earth,” nonetheless invoked an association with it:
[M]ental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the
famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory
requirement for dilution under the FTDA. For even though Utah
drivers may be reminded of the circus when they see a license plate
referring to the ‘greatest snow on earth,’ it by no means follows that
they will associate ‘the greatest show on earth’ with skiing or snow
sports, or associate it less strongly or exclusively with the circus.
‘Blurring’ is not a necessary consequence of mental association.
(Nor, for that matter, is ‘tarnishing.’)152

The FTDA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, therefore made
it difficult for a plaintiff to prove dilution of a famous trademark in cases
where the marks in question were not identical, even if plaintiff could
show that consumers “associated” the defendant’s mark with that of the
plaintiff.153 In the wake of Moseley, many courts held that “[a] plaintiff
cannot prevail on a state or federal dilution claim unless the marks at
issue are ‘very’ or ‘substantially similar.’”154 Although Moseley may
have temporarily sounded the death knell for dilution cases involving
non-identical marks, the impact of the decision was decidedly short
lived. Congress amended the federal trademark dilution statute, largely

151

170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir. 1999).
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433–34.
153
Id. at 434 (noting that the customer “did not change his conception of
Victoria’s Secret,” despite being “offended by the ad”). In dicta, the Court
suggested that, if the junior and senior marks were “identical,” the plaintiff
would have “circumstantial evidence” of actual dilution. Id.
154
Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. 390 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir.
2004); see also Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th
Cir. 2002) (referring to the “recently-established requirement that for a dilution
claim to succeed, the mark used by the alleged diluter must be identical, or
nearly identical, to the protected mark”); Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso,
Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Luigino’s, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.,
170 F.3d 827, 832 (8th Cir. 1999) (“To support an action for dilution by
blurring, the marks must at least be similar enough that a significant segment of
the target group of customers sees the two marks as essentially the same.”)
(internal citations omitted).
152
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in response to the Moseley decision, and redefined the standard of proof
in these cases. 155
Under the TDRA, a plaintiff need only prove a likelihood of
dilution to prevail on a claim seeking injunctive relief.156 The Act directs
courts to consider “all relevant factors” in assessing likelihood of
dilution.157 However, it identifies only six “relevant” factors, and in
practice the vast majority of courts confine their analysis to these six
factors. Three of the six factors relate to the overall strength of the
plaintiff’s mark, and, in that sense, overlie the factors considered relevant
to determine whether the mark is famous.158 The remaining three factors
relate to (1) the degree of similarity between the marks, (2) defendant’s
intent to create an association with the famous mark (or lack thereof),
and (3) any evidence of “actual association” between the marks.159 The
impact of these statutory amendments, at least in comparison to the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FTDA, has been to de-emphasize
the importance of mark similarity160 and to increase the significance of
evidence of “association” between the two marks.
Professor Thomas McCarthy has characterized the six TDRA
factors as “both incomplete and misleading” because none of them
“directs attention to the crucial issue: is there a likelihood that this
defendant’s mark is likely to be a use that ‘impairs the distinctiveness of
155

See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 104
(2d Cir. 2009) (noting that the TDRA was passed “in response to” the Supreme
Court’s decision in Moseley).
156
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
157
Id. at § 1125(c)(2)(B).
158
These factors include “[t]he degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
the famous mark”; “[t]he extent to which the owner of the famous mark is
engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark”; and “[t]he degree of
recognition of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(ii)–(iv). These
factors are essentially identical to three of the “famousness” factors listed in the
former version of the statute, the FTDA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A), (F)–
(G) (superseded).
159
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v)–(vi).
160
Some early post-TDRA cases suggested, and some commentators have
argued, that the “identical mark presumption” should persist in the face of the
TDRA’s revised statutory language. See, e.g., Jeremy M. Roe, Note, The
Current State of Antidilution Law: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act and the
Identical Mark Presumption, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 571, 590 (2008) (arguing that
“courts should strictly enforce the use of the identical mark presumption”).
However, post-TDRA case law appears to be trending in the opposite direction.
See, e.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d
1158, 1166–71 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing and distinguishing earlier post-TDRA
cases).
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the famous mark?’”161 He concludes that, “[l]ike a signpost pointing in
the wrong direction, the list of factors directs attention away from the
key issue of whether there is a likelihood of damage to the famous
mark.”162 In the wake of the TDRA, few courts require dilution plaintiffs
to prove much beyond the mere fact that consumers “associate”
defendant’s mark with that of the plaintiff, even when the marks in
question are far from identical.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s
Borough Coffee, Inc.163 illustrates many of the changes arising from the
TDRA. In this case, the owner of another undeniably famous trademark,
Starbucks, sued a small business, Black Bear Microroastery (“Black
Bear”), for federal trademark infringement, dilution, and related state law
claims.164 Black Bear was sued because it sold a dark roasted coffee
under the name “Charbucks Blend” and “Mr. Charbucks” (the
“Charbucks marks”).165 The trial court, after a bench trial, ruled in favor
of Black Bear, finding no likelihood of confusion and no likelihood of
dilution under federal or state law.166 The Second Circuit affirmed the
judgment as to the trademark infringement claim, but reversed and
remanded on the claim asserted under the TDRA.167
In the Starbucks case, the district court determined that the two
trademarks in question, Starbucks and Charbucks, were only “minimally
similar” due to the differences in the context in which they were
presented to the consumer (e.g., packaging and logos).168 The court of
appeals agreed.169 The Second Circuit nonetheless reversed the trial
court’s decision in part because the trial court had given too much weight
to the similarity factor. The circuit court reasoned that if Congress had
wanted to require “substantial similarity” between the competing marks
to establish a dilution claim, it would have put those words in the TDRA,

161

J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24:119 (2011).
162
Id.
163
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).
164
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 474
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
165
Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 103.
166
Id. at 104.
167
Id. at 109, 119. The original lawsuit against Black Bear was filed under the
1995 version of the Act, the FTDA. However, the revised Act (TDRA) went
into effect after the bench trial in the case, and the case was reviewed under the
TDRA by the Second Circuit on appeal. Id. at 104.
168
Id. at 106–07 (describing differences between the two trademarks).
169
Id.
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and it did not do so.170 In other words, because Congress did nothing to
indicate that the “degree of mark similarity” was more important than the
other listed factors, the trial court could not give it special weight. The
Ninth Circuit has reached the same conclusion.171
The Second Circuit in Starbucks also critiqued the district court
for giving too little weight to the evidence presented regarding
“association” between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks. Although
the court found that Black Bear did have an “intent to associate” its
coffee with Starbucks, it did not weigh that factor in favor of a likelihood
of dilution finding because it determined that Black Bear did not act “in
bad faith.”172 The Second Circuit noted that the TDRA does not require
or even mention evidence of “bad faith” in the context of this factor, and
it was therefore error to consider it.173 Similarly, it held that the district
court erred in failing to take into account evidence of “actual
association” between the two marks. That evidence was a survey finding
that 30.5% of 600 consumers surveyed thought of “Starbucks” when they
heard the name “Charbucks.”174 That evidence of actual association,
under the TDRA, was significant. In some district court cases, courts
have issued injunctive relief when the only proof of dilution, other than
some similarity between the marks, has been defendant’s intent to
associate with the famous mark of the plaintiff.175

170

See id. at 108 (finding it significant that “the federal dilution statute does not
use the words ‘very’ or ‘substantial’ in connection with the similarity factor”).
171
See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158,
1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “the plain language of 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c) does not require that a plaintiff establish that the junior mark is
identical, nearly identical or substantially similar to the senior mark in order to
obtain injunctive relief”). In this case, the district court dismissed the dilution
claim because the advisory jury found that the two designs were not “identical
or nearly identical.” Id. at 1160. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding that the court had misstated the degree of similarity necessary to support
a dilution claim under the TDRA. Id. at 1159.
172
588 F.3d at 109.
173
Id.
174
Id. Only about 3% of consumers who participated in the telephone survey
thought Starbucks was the “possible source” of Charbucks. Id.
175
See, e.g., Hershey Co. v. Art Van Furniture Inc., 2008 WL 4724756 (E.D.
Mich. 2008). In this case, the court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent
defendant from advertising furniture with a picture of a brown couch emerging
from a wrapper reminiscent of a Hershey candy bar (on the side of a furniture
delivery van). Id. at *1. Although the court found no likelihood of confusion
and therefore no likelihood of success on the merits of plaintiff’s trademark
infringement claim, it found defendant’s mark was likely to dilute Hershey’s
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In the tarnishment context, the potential impact of the TDRA in
elevating the importance of “association” between the defendant’s mark
and the plaintiff’s famous one is even starker, even though the TDRA
lists no specific factors for courts to consider in the context of a dilution
by tarnishment claim. In one of the few appellate cases that has
considered the tarnishment provisions of the TDRA, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that proof of association equates proof of tarnishment, citing
the legislative history of the TDRA as well as Congress’s specific
concern that the “actual dilution” standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Moseley “creates an undue burden for trademark holders who
contest diluting uses and should be revised.”176
The Sixth Circuit case interpreting the TDRA’s tarnishment
provisions features none other than Victor and Carol Moseley.177
Although the Supreme Court held that summary judgment on plaintiff’s
dilution claim was inappropriate under the FTDA,178 on remand the
FTDA did not apply. When the same facts were analyzed under the
TDRA, the Sixth Circuit (and the district court) reached the opposite
conclusion.179
In analyzing the Moseleys’ case for the second time, the circuit
court noted that “[t]here appears to be a clearly emerging consensus . . .
that the creation of an ‘association’ between a famous mark and lewd or
bawdy sexual activity disparages and defiles the famous mark and
reduces the commercial value of its selling power.”180 The court
famous trademark and trade dress, and therefore issued the injunction. Id. at
*12, *14.
176
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing U.S.C.C.A.N., 109th Cong. 2d Sess. 2006, Vol. 4, pp. 1091, 1092, 1097)
[hereinafter Moseley II]. Of course, it is possible that the Sixth Circuit’s
decision in Moseley II will not be followed by other federal circuits, and that its
expansive interpretation of dilution by tarnishment will ultimately die on the
vine. At least one commentator has predicted that the tarnishment cause of
action under the TDRA is actually “a much narrower cause of action than
existed in pre-TDRA tarnishment case law.” Sarah L. Burstein, Dilution by
Tarnishment: The New Cause of Action, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1189, 1189
(2008).
However, given that the Sixth Circuit decision is the most
comprehensive judicial interpretation of the TDRA tarnishment provision to
date, particularly in the context of an allegedly tarnishing use with sexual
connotations, its opinion should not be ignored and, at the very least, will
constitute persuasive authority in other circuits.
177
Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 382.
178
See supra notes 144–150 and accompanying text.
179
Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 387.
180
Id. at 387–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing cases).
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concluded that, when plaintiff can show a “clear semantic association”
between a new mark that is used to sell “sex-related products” and the
famous one, this association creates “a kind of rebuttable presumption, or
at least a very strong inference” that the new mark is likely to tarnish the
famous one.181 If the presumption is established, the owner of the new
mark has “the burden of coming forward with evidence that there is no
likelihood or probability of tarnishment.”182 In effect, the court conflated
the blurring factors of mark similarity and mark association, creating a
rule that if the marks are similar enough to create a “semantic
association” between them, the likelihood of dilution is presumed, even
when, as in this case, the court finds that the tarnishing effect on
plaintiff’s famous trademark is “somewhat speculative.”183 The opinion
effectively shifts the burden of proof in a dilution by tarnishment case
from the plaintiff to the defendant so long as the plaintiff can show an
“association” between the two marks.184 Perhaps predictably, when the
burden of proof was shifted in this case, the Moseleys could not produce
evidence disproving that their use of the mark “Victor’s Little Secret”
had tarnished the image of the famous Victoria’s Secret trademark.185
In sum, one effect of the TDRA has been to decrease the
relevance of mark similarity in trademark dilution cases and to increase
the significance of proof of mark association. Although dilution laws
may have been conceived as necessary to prevent a defendant from using
a mark identical to plaintiff’s famous one (evading liability for trademark
infringement by placing the mark on unrelated goods), this type of case
does not appear to be common. Moreover, if such misuse of a mark does
occur, it is rarely the case that dilution constitutes plaintiff’s only viable
claim. Rather, at least in recent cases decided under the TDRA, dilution
seems to have relevance as a cause of action primarily when defendant’s
181

Id. at 388. The “rebuttable presumption” language appears in the majority
opinion, but it was rejected in the concurrence in favor of creating a “strong
inference” of tarnishment. Id. at 390.
182
Id. at 388. The court suggested that such proof could include “expert
testimony or surveys or polls or customer testimony.” Id.
183
Id. at 389.
184
One judge in the three-judge panel that decided Moseley II dissented and
argued that the court had misinterpreted both the plain language and the
legislative history of the TDRA in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 391–95
(Moore, J., dissenting).
185
Id. at 388–89. The type of evidence cited by the court as helpful in
disproving tarnishment – expert testimony and consumer surveys – is
notoriously costly. See, e.g., Lon Tai Shing Co., Ltd. v. Koch & Lowy, 19
U.S.P.Q.2d 1081, 1095 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1991) (estimating the cost of
conducting consumer survey in the instant trademark case at approximately
$100,000).
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mark is not particularly similar to the plaintiff’s, such that the
dissimilarity between them precludes, at least in part, a finding of
trademark infringement.186 In this type of case, proof of mental
association between the two marks goes a long way towards proving a
likelihood of dilution, and it may be dispositive in cases involving claims
of tarnishment.
2. Dilution by Competitors
In addition to mark identity, the other hallmark of the traditional
dilution claim—at least as articulated by those who enacted the dilution
statutes—has been the use of a famous mark to sell unrelated goods or
services. As discussed above, Schechter’s original “rational basis”
theory was largely born of frustration with the limitations of trademark
infringement law of his era, particularly because it did not always offer
relief when the defendant placed its mark on goods that were not of the
“same descriptive properties” as those of the plaintiff.187 It is therefore
not surprising that he cited Kodak bath tubs and Mazda shoes as
examples of the harm that dilution was intended to prevent.188 Dilution
claims are, however, often litigated under the TDRA in cases where
plaintiff and defendant are not selling goods or services in radically
different markets and, in fact, may be competitors.189

186

See Beebe, supra note 62, at 1623 (concluding, based on empirical data, that
“the similarity of the marks factor is by far the most important factor in the
multifactor test” for determining likelihood of confusion and trademark
infringement).
187
See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
188
Schechter, supra note 7, at 830.
189
The application of the dilution doctrine in cases involving competitors is not
without controversy. In his iconic trademark treatise, Professor McCarthy
states, “[i]t is difficult to understand why an anti-dilution law is invoked when
the parties operate in competitive or closely related product or service lines. The
legal theory of anti-dilution was conceived to protect strong marks against a
diluting use by a junior user in a product or service line far removed from that in
which the famous mark appears. Thus, using the anti-dilution law when the
parties are competitors in the same market sounds a dissonant and false note.
Why the need to invoke the ‘super weapon’ of anti-dilution law to resolve what
appears to be a garden variety infringement case.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:72, at 24–136
(Supp. 12/2003). The Second Circuit rejected this reasoning (without citing
McCarthy), based on the plain language of the FTDA: “In the absence of
contrary legislative command, the fact that other remedies [such as trademark
infringement] may be available to prevent a perceived ill does not seem to be
sufficient reason to construe a statute as not reaching circumstances that fall
squarely within its words. The fact that injured senior users may thus be given a
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In these cases, the defendant typically chooses a trademark for
his business that creates an association with the plaintiff’s famous mark
for the purpose of communicating information about his own business to
the consuming public. In some of these cases, the defendant is a
relatively small business owner who is attempting to tell consumers that,
at some level, his business and that of the famous trademark holder are
similar. The desire to create an association with the famous mark is not
the same as a desire to “pass off” one’s goods as those of the mark
holder. In other words, the defendant does not intend to trick the public
into buying his goods instead of the plaintiff’s. If such facts were
proven, the case would undoubtedly be one of trademark infringement,
without the need to resort to a trademark dilution claim.190 However, as
discussed above, evidence of an “intent to associate” alone currently
constitutes powerful evidence of a likelihood of dilution. It is perhaps
not surprising, then, that those with the most incentive to create this kind
of association (competitors) may find themselves defending a trademark
dilution lawsuit.
The trademark case filed by coffee behemoth Starbucks against
Black Bear squarely illustrates this phenomenon. Starbucks and Black
Bear both sell coffee, although not in comparable amounts. Black Bear
is described as a “family-run business that ‘manufactures and sells . . .
roasted coffee beans and related goods via mail order, internet order, and
at a limited number of New England supermarkets.’”191 Black Bear
operates one retail outlet and occasionally hires part-time workers.192
The Starbucks trademark, on the other hand, is associated with “8,700
retail locations in the United States, Canada, and 34 foreign countries
and territories.”193 Moreover, Starbucks coffee is sold in “hundreds of

choice of remedies is not sufficient reason to read into the antidilution statute
limitations that Congress did not write.” Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191
F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999). Moreover, the court hypothesized that “failure to
construe the antidilution statutes as reaching competing products may lead to a
gap in coverage; the products might be found too far apart to support a finding
of likelihood of confusion—(and therefore an infringement action)—yet too
close together to permit a finding of dilution.” Id.
190
See Beebe, supra note 62, at 1628 (concluding, based on empirical data, “a
finding of bad faith intent creates, if not in doctrine, then at least in practice, a
nearly un-rebuttable presumption of a likelihood of confusion”).
191
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir.
2009).
192
Id.
193
Id. at 102.
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restaurants, supermarkets, airlines, sport and entertainment venues,
motion picture theaters, hotels, and cruise ship lines.”194
The district court understandably found that Black Bear’s choice
of the names “Mr. Charbucks” and “Charbucks Blend” for its coffee
product was intended to invoke an association with the famous Starbucks
mark.195 In its appellate brief, Starbucks claimed that Black Bear
adopted “Charbucks” as a mark “because there ‘could not have been a
more perfect way for [Black Bear] to grab the attention of
consumers.’”196 In addition to invoking a general association with the
famous coffee retailer, the name was apparently chosen to convey
information about this particular blend of coffee. The owner of Black
Bear testified that “‘[t]he inspiration for the term Charbucks comes
directly from Starbucks’ tendency to roast its products more darkly than
that of other major roasters.’”197 The slogans accompanying the name
emphasized that the blend was dark roasted, promising that the coffee
was “[r]oasted to the Extreme . . . For those who like the extreme.”198
The name and the slogan can be interpreted as suggesting that the Black
Bear coffee blend, like some Starbucks coffee, is dark roasted, but better
than Starbucks.199 This is a form of comparative advertising, one in
which a small competitor attempts to enter a market to challenge a
dominant competitor.
The Moseley case similarly involved parties operating in related
if not identical markets. The Moseleys, who had one store in
194

Id.
Id. at 109.
196
Proof Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendants-Appellants, Starbucks Corp.,
588 F.3d 97 (2006) (No. 06-0435-cv), 2006 WL 4846966 at *17. Black Bear
did not admit that its choice of the Charbucks name was intended to invoke an
association with Starbucks. In its appellate brief, Black Bear argued that it
“chose the descriptor ‘Charbucks Blend’ as a humorous way to alert customers
that the very dark roast was different from Black Bear’s typical products.” Brief
for Defendant-Appellee, Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d 97 (2006) (No. 06-0435-cv),
2006 WL 4846967 at *3.
197
Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 113.
198
Id. at 103. Another slogan stated, “You wanted it dark . . . You’ve got it
dark!” Id.
199
The Second Circuit rejected Starbucks’ claim that Black Bear’s use of the
name Charbucks resulted in tarnishment of the Starbucks trademark by evoking
an image of “bitter, over-roasted coffee.” Id. at 110. At least one pre-TDRA
case did find dilution by tarnishment in a case between competitors, where the
plaintiff’s famous logo was used in defendant’s comparative advertisement in a
manner that mocked the plaintiff. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41
F.3d 39, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting New York anti-dilution law).
195
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Elizabethtown, Kentucky and no employees, sold adult videos and “adult
novelties,” including women’s lingerie, which accounted for
approximately five percent of total sales.200 The plaintiff, which operated
over 750 Victoria’s Secret stores and reported annual sales in excess of
$1.5 billion at the time of the litigation, described its product as
“moderately priced, high quality, attractively designed lingerie sold in a
store setting designed to look like a wom[a]n’s bedroom.”201 Testimony
in the case indicated that Victoria’s Secret attempts to create and
maintain a “sexy and playful” image.202
Although Victoria’s Secret and the Moseleys may not have
shared the same business model, this case is hardly one of Kodak pianos
or Dupont shoes. As the record in the case plainly illustrated, the
Victoria’s Secret trademark has deliberately cultivated sexual
connotations,203 which is most likely why the Moseleys initially chose
the names “Victor’s Secret” and “Victor’s Little Secret” for their
business. Although there was little evidence of any likelihood of
confusion between the two businesses, which is why summary judgment
was granted on the trademark infringement claim, both companies tried
to cultivate a sex-related image. By using a name evoking an association
with the famous Victoria’s Secret trademark, the Moseleys attempted to
convey precisely such an image to their potential customers.
It should not be surprising that dilution cases arise in contexts
wherein the plaintiff’s goods or services bear some resemblance to those
of the defendant. A defendant who copies a mark like “Kodak” onto an
unrelated item such as a piano receives a limited amount of benefit from
doing so, given that the specific attributes of a Kodak camera have little
significance in terms of assessing the attractiveness of a large musical
instrument. Moreover, to the extent the Kodak piano appealed to the
consumer because she was misled into believing that the owner of the
Kodak trademark somehow endorsed the product, the defendant would
be liable for trademark infringement, and a claim for dilution would be
unnecessary.

200

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 424 (2003).
Id. at 422–23.
202
Moseley II, 605 F.3d 382, 394 (6th Cir. 2010) (Moore, J., dissenting).
203
The dissent in Moseley II took note of Victoria’s Secret advertisements for
“‘sexy little things’ lingerie.” Moseley II, 605 F.3d at 394. These ads urge
customers to “‘[b]e bad for goodness sake’” by wearing Victoria’s Secret
merchandise, specifically “‘peek-a-boo’s, bras and sexy Santa accessories.’” Id.
The ads also encourage participation “in the store’s ‘panty fantasy,’ which they
describe as ‘Very racy. Very lacy.’” Id.
201
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However, a play on words that associates with a famous brand in
a related market—like Victor’s Little Secret or Mr. Charbucks— may
signal certain information to the consumer about the product, particularly
given the almost universal recognition of famous brands. These types of
names, when presented in contexts clarifying that the famous trademark
holder is not the source of the relevant good or service, also have the
benefit of avoiding the creation of a likelihood of confusion, i.e.,
trademark infringement. If this type of word play is actionable, dilution
is the most likely claim.
3. Dilution of Trade Dress
Dilution claims have also arisen outside the classic formulation
of identical marks on unrelated goods in cases involving trade dress.
Although the FTDA did not specifically refer to trade dress dilution,
some courts did apply the Act in trade dress cases.204 The TDRA
explicitly applies to cases involving trade dress.205 Although the number
of trade dress dilution cases is relatively small, they deserve mention
because, given the nature of the claim, they tend to arise in the context of
disputes between competitors. Defendant’s trade dress is unlikely to
allegedly dilute that of plaintiff if the parties are in unrelated industries.
An early case involving a claim of trade dress dilution was
brought by the maker of a product that is certainly “famous” to the
parents of young children: the Goldfish cracker, a product of Pepperidge
Farms.206 The goldfish shape of the cracker, which Pepperidge Farms
claimed as its trade dress,207 was allegedly diluted by a new brand of
cracker manufactured by Nabisco that included, among other shapes, a

204

See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); I.P.
Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998) (considering
FTDA trademark dilution claim regarding trade dress of KOHLER faucet); but
see Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir.
1999) (expressing doubt as to whether trade dress falls within the scope of the
FTDA).
205
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2006).
206
Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 208. This case held that, under the 1995 version of
the federal trademark dilution law (the FTDA), only proof of a “likelihood of
dilution,” rather than “actual dilution” was required. Id. at 214. The Supreme
Court overruled this holding in Moseley, requiring proof of “actual dilution,”
but, as discussed above, that holding was in turn abrogated by the 2006
amendments to the Act (the TDRA). The TDRA explicitly requires proof only
of a “likelihood of dilution” rather than “actual dilution.” See supra notes 156160 and accompanying text.
207
Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 212–13.
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cracker in the shape of a fish.208 In the ensuing lawsuit, Pepperidge
Farms alleged that Nabisco’s cracker mix both infringed and diluted its
trade dress in the Goldfish cracker. Its infringement claim failed at the
trial court level, but its dilution claim prevailed and was upheld on
appeal.
The Second Circuit concluded that the Nabisco crackers were
“likely to dilute” the distinctiveness of the Pepperidge Farms goldfish.
The court explicitly considered and rejected the argument that dilution
was not an appropriate cause of action in a case between two
competitors, as snack food giants Pepperidge Farms and Nabisco
undoubtedly are. First, it noted that the express language of the FTDA
contained no such limitation; to the contrary, the statute provided that
dilution could occur “regardless of the presence or absence of . . .
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties.”209
The TDRA contains essentially identical language.210 Moreover, the
court reasoned that “the closer the products are to one another, the
greater the likelihood of both confusion and dilution. The senior user has
a right to the antidilution law’s remedy in either case.”211
4. The Limitations of Fair Use
When it was enacted, the TDRA’s definition of “fair use” was
widely perceived to be more generous than that encompassed in the
FTDA. Unlike the FTDA, the TDRA does contain an express
affirmative defense for parodies.212 However, the Act exempts from
parody protection any mark used “as a designation of source for the
[defendant’s] own goods or services.”213 As a result of that exemption
and the constrictive interpretation of fair use by many courts, the fair use

208

Nabisco did not randomly choose to manufacture a cracker in the shape of a
fish. The Nabisco product was designed as a joint promotion with Nickelodeon
Television Network, to promote the Nickelodeon CatDog cartoon. Id. The
cartoon featured a two-headed creature (half cat, half dog) that liked to eat fish
(for the cat) and bones (for the dog). Id. The CatDog cracker mix was to
contain crackers in the shape of the CatDog cartoon character and its favorite
foods, fish and bones. Id. at 213.
209
Id. at 222 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127(c)).
210
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
211
Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 222; see also supra note 189.
212
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (providing that “[a]ny fair use” is not
actionable dilution, including use in connection with “identifying and parodying,
criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services
of the famous mark owner”).
213
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
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defense under the TDRA remains inadequate to insulate from liability
many uses of a famous trademark that should not be actionable.
In the context of trademark law, courts have defined “parody” as
“a simple form of entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent
representation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the
mark’s owner.”214 Simply stated, parodies use trademarks (often famous
ones) to make fun of the companies who “own” those marks and may
profit from them to an enormous degree. Historically, trademark holders
have not appreciated this type of humor and often consider it to
constitute dilution, particularly dilution by tarnishment.215 At least to
some degree, however, the First Amendment protects “successful”
parodies.216
The predecessor to the TDRA, the FTDA, did not contain an
explicit statutory exemption from liability for fair use in the form of
parody.217 Rather, if parody was exempted from statutory liability at all,
it was because it fell within the scope of the general “noncommercial
use” exemption.218 This omission was heavily criticized for its potential

214

Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260
(4th Cir. 2007); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).
215
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902–03 (9th Cir.
2002) (alleging that the song “Barbie Girl” by the band Aqua tarnished the
Barbie trademark because the song was “inappropriate for young girls”); Haute
Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252, 264 (alleging that “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys were
likely to tarnish the Louis Vuitton mark because the toys “pose a choking hazard
for some dogs”); Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44–45 (2d
Cir. 1994) (alleging that MTD’s portrayal of the John Deere logo as a fleeing,
frightened deer amounted to dilution by tarnishment); Jordache Enterprises, Inc.
v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.1987) (alleging that the use
of the name “Lardashe” on the seat of jeans “for larger women” amounted to
tarnishment of the Jordache trademark).
216
See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902–07 (discussing tension between liability for
dilution under the FTDA and the First Amendment in the context of parody).
217
The FTDA definition of fair use was limited to “use of a famous mark by
another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify
the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C.
§1125(c)(4)(A).
The FTDA also contained a general exemption for
“noncommercial uses” of a mark, which is identical to the language in the
current version of the statute. Id. at (c)(2)(C).
218
Both the FTDA and the TDRA contain a general exemption from dilution
liability for “[a]ny noncommercial use of a mark.” See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(3)(C).

No. 2]

THE MYTH AND REALITY OF DILUTION

266

negative impact on the right of free speech.219 In response to that
criticism, the TDRA exempts from liability any “fair use” of a mark
designed to identify and parody, criticize, or comment upon “the famous
mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.”220
However, this statutory exemption does not apply when the defendant
has used the plaintiff’s mark “as a designation of source” for her “own
goods or services.”221
To be considered “successful” and hence not actionable as
trademark infringement or dilution, a parody must copy the original
trademark only so much as is necessary to communicate to the public
that it is making fun of the trademark (and/or its owner) and is not a
message originating from the trademark holder itself. “Thus, ‘[a] parody
relies upon a difference from the original mark, presumably a humorous
difference, in order to produce its desired effect.’”222 In a case that
contains perhaps the most thorough judicial analysis of the TDRA’s
parody provisions to date, the Fourth Circuit held that Haute Diggity
Dog’s use of the mark “Chewy Vuiton” for its own brand of dog toys
was a successful parody of the famous trademark held by Louis Vuitton,
maker of luxury purses.223 The court concluded that Haute Diggity
Dog’s parody of Louis Vuitton succeeded because it “undoubtedly and
deliberately conjures up the famous [Louis Vuitton] marks and trade
dress, but at the same time, it communicates that it is not the [Louis
Vuitton] product.”224 Even though the parody was “successful,”
however, the statutory language designed to protect parodies did not
apply.
The court in Louis Vuitton held that a finding of a successful
parody does not guarantee immunity from liability under the TDRA’s
fair use exemption from liability, which by its plain language does not
apply when defendant’s mark is being used as a designation of source for

219

See, e.g., Sarah Mayhew Schlosser, Note, The High Price of (Criticizing)
Coffee: The Chilling Effect of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act on
Corporate Parody, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 962 (2001) (criticizing the fact that
trademark laws “emphasize economic and commercial factors over free
speech”).
220
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).
221
Id. at (c)(3)(A).
222
Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260 (quoting Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v.
Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d, 1482, 1486 (10th Cir.1987)).
223
Id. In a case interpreting state anti-dilution law, the court held that the use of
the mark “Lardashe” for jeans was a successful parody of the “Jordache” jeans
trademark. Hogg Wyld, 828 F.2d at 1482.
224
Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260.
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its goods, as in this case.225 Moreover, it did not discuss the First
Amendment in its analysis of the defendant’s parodic use of the Louis
Vuitton trademark. Rather, the court considered the parodic nature of
Haute Diggity Dog’s use of the Louis Vuitton mark in balancing the
statutory factors for dilution by blurring.226 In affirming the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Haute Diggity Dog on the
dilution by blurring claim, the court of appeal speculated that the Chewy
Vuitton parody might actually increase, rather than decrease, the
distinctiveness of the Louis Vuitton mark: “[B]y making the famous
mark an object of the parody, a successful parody might actually enhance
the famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon. The brunt of the
joke becomes yet more famous.”227 The court also paid scant attention to
Louis Vuitton’s dilution by tarnishment claim, for which it had little to
no evidentiary support.228
The scope of the TDRA’s parody exemption, at least as
interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, appears to be quite narrow and still
raises First Amendment concerns.229 Because the statute’s fair use
defense categorically excludes all parodies that function as trademarks,230
courts must engage in a fact-specific weighing of factors in these types of
cases to determine whether the use will “impair the distinctiveness” of
the famous trademark or harm its reputation.231 Although the court in
225

Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
227
Id. at 267 (citing cases).
228
Id. at 268–69. Although Haute Diggity Dog’s goods, specifically the Chewy
Vuiton dog toy, were clearly of inferior quality when compared to luxury Louis
Vuitton handbags, the evidence cited in the summary judgment motions (and
consequently on appeal) regarding dilution by tarnishment focused on the
peculiarly narrow claim that Louis Vuitton’s reputation could be harmed
because a dog could choke on the Chewy Vuiton toy. Id. Based on this limited
evidence and argument, the court affirmed summary judgment on this claim. Id.
at 269.
229
See, e.g., Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note, Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism
and Free Speech Problems with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923, 1940 (2007) (“While the vast majority of dilution
cases do not implicate First Amendment issues, there have been a number of
cases under federal and state anti-dilution statutes that have broached the
topic[.]”); see also infra notes 346-360 and accompanying text.
230
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A).
231
Other circuits may of course choose to reject the test adopted by the Fourth
Circuit in the Haute Diggity Dog case, either on statutory or Constitutional (First
Amendment) grounds. See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee,
Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2009) (declining to decide whether to adopt the
Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the statutory exemption from liability for parodies,
when defendant’s parody is also used as a trademark).
226
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Louis Vuitton ultimately concluded that the Chewy Vuitton parody
would have neither effect, that result was not a foregone conclusion.232
Moreover, subtle yet potentially humorous references to a
famous trademark are not likely to be considered successful parodies.
For example, in Charbucks, the Second Circuit found that Black Bear’s
reference to the Starbucks trademark was at best a “subtle satire” and
therefore too indirect to be considered a parody.233 Under the specific
language of the Act, the business owner who wishes to choose a
trademark that parodies but does not dilute is therefore faced with a
difficult task. A parody, by its very nature, evidences an “intent to
associate” with a famous trademark.234 That intent to associate, however,
is one of the factors that tends to show a likelihood of dilution by
blurring.235 If the parody is ultimately deemed unsuccessful—either
because it is not considered humorous by the judge or jury, fails to
sufficiently distinguish itself from the famous trademark, or any other
reason—efforts to associate with the mark owner will almost certainly
not be viewed in a favorable light. The would-be parodist must thus
choose a name that invokes the original in a humorous way, directly
enough so that the humor is apparent, but not so directly as to leave
himself open to a claim of trademark infringement or dilution. If the
reference is too indirect the parody defense will likewise fail, as it did in
the Starbucks case.
The statute’s fair use exemption for comparative advertising236
likewise does not appreciate subtlety. Comparative advertising has long
been considered a fair use defense to a claim alleging misuse of a
trademark, both in the infringement and dilution contexts.237 However, if
the comparative advertising is not stated in an obvious way, the purveyor
of the advertisement will not be insulated from liability. The Starbucks
case illustrates this principle as well. Black Bear’s parody defense, as
232

In contrast to the court’s decision in Haute Diggity Dog, see Deere & Co. v.
MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44 -45 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding trademark
dilution where defendant used plaintiff’s famous logo in a comparative
advertisement that mocked plaintiff).
233
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir.
2009).
234
See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252,
260 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A parody must convey two simultaneous—and
contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the
original and is instead a parody.”) (citations omitted).
235
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(v).
236
See id. at (c)(3)(A)(i) (exempting from liability any “advertising or
promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services”).
237
See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 526, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1968).
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noted above, was rejected in part because the reference that it made to
the Starbucks trademark was too subtle and indirect. Somewhat
ironically, the parody claim was also rejected because the court
interpreted Black Bear’s message, as communicated via the Charbucks
marks, as one of comparative advertising (casting Starbucks in a positive
rather than a negative light) rather than humor. The court described the
Charbucks logo as a “beacon to identify Charbucks as a coffee that
competes at the same level and quality as Starbucks in producing darkroasted coffees.”238 If Black Bear had made this statement directly—
“this coffee competes at the same level and quality as Starbucks in
producing dark-roasted coffees”—rather than using the Charbucks marks
as a “beacon” to convey the same message, presumably its use would
have been protected from a dilution claim as a matter of law.
In sum, the TDRA has led trademark dilution law far away from
its Rational Basis roots.
Because Congress has eliminated the
requirement of proving “actual dilution,” it is now difficult to determine
what exactly the plaintiff is required to prove to sustain a claim of
dilution. Proof of association (and intent to create the same) between the
two marks clearly goes a long way. Fair use is often an ineffective safety
valve. Proof of harm caused by dilution may be difficult to come by
because, in fact, dilution causes no economic harm. These results are
profoundly problematic.

II. THE MORAL PREDICATE OF DILUTION
As discussed above, the economic justification for the dilution
cause of action is weak at best. However, despite the less than
convincing evidence of the harm it is supposed to address, the cause of
action has expanded rather than contracted in recent years. Given that
the holders of famous trademarks are typically corporate entities with a
duty to maximize shareholder value, it therefore may seem facially
surprising that they would champion the dilution cause of action and
often spend vast sums of money litigating these claims. The economic
harm caused by dilution, assuming it exists, is almost certainly dwarfed
by the cost of enforcement. If economic harm were the only, or even a
primary, rationale motivating these claims, we would expect the holders
of famous trademarks to be considerably less enthused about dilution
laws.
A better explanation for the existence of dilution law, as well as
its practical utilization, is that it confers a moral right upon the
corporations that create, nurture, and profit from famous trademarks.
238

Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 113.
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Like the authors of creative works, these corporate entities would like to
control all uses of their marks, particularly those that are offensive to
them, and not just those that cause them economic harm. For example,
when testifying before Congress on the subject of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, counsel for Warner Brothers Studios said, “[T]he
trademark owner, who has spent the time and investment needed to
create and maintain the property, should be the sole determinant of how
that property is to be used in a commercial manner.”239 Dilution, at least
as currently construed, comes close to granting this wish.

A. Moral Rights in the United States
A moral right is one that does not (unlike most intellectual
property law in the United States) depend upon an economic or
utilitarian framework to justify its existence. Moral rights are based on
the personal rights of the creator, with the idea being that the creator of
an artistic work should retain some amount of control over it, even if he
does not “own” the work. Moral rights primarily encompass (1) the right
of attribution (the right to be named as the author of the work) and (2)
the right of integrity (the right to prevent others from mutilating the work
or to present it in a manner not approved by the author).240 The right of
attribution broadly “gives the author the right to control the association
of his name with the work,” including the right “not to associate his
name with the work,” and the right to be anonymous.241 The right of
integrity, sometimes referred to as the “right of respect,” enables the
author to prevent any modification or distortion of his work that
misrepresents his “vision or concept.”242 In sum, these rights “function

239

Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
111 (1995) (statement of Nils Victor Montan, Vice President and Senior
Intellectual Property Counsel, Warner Brothers).
240
See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 6-7 (2010) (noting that “both the
right of attribution and the right of integrity function to safeguard the author’s
meaning and message, and thus are designed to increase an author’s ability to
safeguard the integrity of her texts”); see also Edward J. Damich, The Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection
for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 958–64 (1990).
241
Damich, supra note 240, at 949 (emphasis added); see also KWALL, supra
note 240, at 5 (“The right of attribution safeguards the author’s right to be
recognized as the creator of the work.”); id. at 87–110 (discussing the right to be
anonymous or to use a pseudonym).
242
Damich, supra note 240, at 949.
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to safeguard the author’s meaning and message, and thus are designed to
increase an author’s ability to safeguard the integrity of her texts.”243
Perhaps as a result of the lack of economic or utilitarian
justification for moral rights, moral rights have gained limited traction in
the United States. Although other U.S. laws may be interpreted as
indirectly supporting the moral rights of the author, the statute that most
explicitly protects the rights of attribution and integrity is the Visual
Artists Rights Act, or VARA, which was appended to the Copyright Act
in 1990.244 VARA was enacted in an effort to comply with the Berne
Convention, which the United States had signed two years earlier.245 The
Berne Convention requires its signatories to provide authors with the
moral rights of attribution and integrity:
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.246

VARA is largely regarded as insufficient to satisfy the United
States’ obligations under the Berne Convention.247 Although VARA

243

KWALL, supra note 240, at 6.
See id. at 25–35; Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (tit.
VI), 104 Stat. 5128 (codified in various sections of 17 U.S.C.).
245
See KWALL, supra note 240, at 27–28 (discussing legislative history of
VARA).
246
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Article 6bis further provides that
“[t]he means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall
be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.” Id.
at 6bis(3). The House Report on VARA observes that the United States joined
the Berne Convention “[a]fter almost 100 years of debate,” primarily due to
“debate over the requirements of Article 6bis. The principal question was
whether that article required the United States to enact new laws protecting
moral rights.” H.R. Rep. 101-514, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917 (1990).
247
See, e.g., KWALL, supra note 240, at 37 (“[T]here is a stark reality that we
may not be in compliance with our obligations under the Berne Convention.”);
Damich, supra note 240, at 996 (characterizing VARA as “a step in the right
direction,” although it “does not meet the requirements of the Berne
Convention”); Coree Thompson, Note, Orphan Works, U.S. Copyright Law, and
International Treaties: Reconciling Differences to Create a Brighter Future for
Orphans Everywhere, 23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 787, 805 (2006) (“VARA
failed to . . . bring the United States into full compliance with the Berne
Convention . . . .”).
244
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does provide for basic rights of attribution and integrity,248 it does not
apply to all types of authorial works. As its name implies, VARA’s
protections extend solely to authors of works of “visual art.”249 A work
of visual art is defined as a “painting, drawing, print, or sculpture” and
some photographs.250 VARA’s exclusion of entire categories of works,
such as sound recordings and books, is probably the most obvious way in
which it conflicts with the Berne Convention.251 VARA also allows an
author to waive (but not transfer) her rights.252 VARA’s waiver
provisions are arguably inconsistent with Berne’s definition of a moral
right, which is said to exist “[i]ndependently of the author’s economic
rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights.”253 Traditionally,
moral rights have been considered inalienable and nonwaivable, owing to
their intrinsically personal nature.254 As a result of these and other
limitations, one commentator has characterized VARA as the “Mini Me”
of moral rights laws.255
The federal trademark statute (the Lanham Act) makes no
specific reference to moral rights or the right of attribution or integrity.
However, Section 43(a) of the Act, which prohibits “false designations of
origin,”256 has been cited as a source of moral rights protection.257 At
248

The House Report accompanying VARA states that the Act “provides . . .
artists with the rights of ‘attribution’ and ‘integrity.’ The former ensures that
artists are correctly identified with the works of art they create, and that they are
not identified with works created by others. The latter allows artists to protect
their works against modifications and destructions that are prejudicial to their
honor or reputations.” H.R. Rep. 101-514, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 1990 WL
258818 (1990).
249
17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006).
250
17 U.S.C. § 101. Photos are covered only if produced “for exhibition
purposes only,” and then only if signed by the author. Id. Copies of the
original, as to any type of work, are protected only if signed and consecutively
number by the author; 200 is the maximum number of allowed copies. Id. The
Act specifically excludes from the definition of a visual work of art, among
other things, “applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book,
magazine, [and] newspaper.” Id.
251
See Damich, supra note 240, at 951–58 (discussing this aspect of VARA);
KWALL, supra note 240, at 28 (describing this exclusion as problematic).
252
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e).
253
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art.
6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
254
See Damich, supra note 240, at 966–67 (arguing that moral rights should not
be waivable, due to their personal nature and the inequality of bargaining power
likely to exist between artist and patron).
255
See Dana L. Burton, Artists’ Moral Rights: Controversy and the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 463, 505 (2011).
256
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
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least in some cases, Section 43(a) has been successfully invoked to
prevent a “mutilated” version of the author’s work from being presented
under the author’s name.258 In one such case, the Second Circuit
reasoned that “[t]o deform [the author’s] work is to present him to the
public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him subject
to criticism for work he has not done.”259
However, the Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.260 interpreted Section 43(a) narrowly, thereby
thwarting its extension into the moral rights arena. The key question in
this case was whether the defendant could edit and repackage footage
from plaintiff’s television series (the copyright for which had expired)
and sell it under defendant’s name, with no mention of plaintiff. In
essence, plaintiff argued that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protected
the moral right of attribution via a cause of action for “reverse passing
off.” The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the author of the
original work (the television series) constituted the “origin” of the goods
in that case, rather than the producer of the videotapes containing edited
footage from the original work.261 The Court reasoned that extending the
Lanham Act in this manner would “conflict with the law of copyright,
which addresses [the right of attribution] specifically,” in VARA.262
Absent Congressional intent explicitly to the contrary, the Court
concluded that “[t]he right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once
a copyright has expired . . . passes to the public.”263 Dastar’s

257

See KWALL, supra note 240, at 30–31 (describing Section 43(a) as a source
of moral rights protection under US law).
258
See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24–25
(2d Cir. 1976) (holding that re-broadcast of substantially edited or “mutilated”
Monty Python scripts, attributed to Monty Python, constituted a false
designation of origin and therefore violated Section 43(a)).
259
Id. at 24 (internal citation omitted).
260
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
261
Id. at 33–34.
262
Id.
263
Id. at 33. Similarly, in Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, Inc., 9
F.3d 1091, 1103 (4th Cir. 1993), the court observed that to preserve competition,
“Congress . . . . has therefore confined and limited the rewards of originality to
those situations and circumstances comprehended by our patent, copyright, and
trade-mark laws. When these statutory frameworks are inapplicable, originality
per se remains unprotected and often unrewarded. For these reasons and with
these limitations the bare imitation of another’s product, without more, is
permissible. And this is true regardless of the fact that the courts have little
sympathy for a willful imitator.” Id.
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interpretation of Section 43(a) thus severely restricted its applicability in
these types of cases.264
Given the intensely personal nature of moral rights, it is hard to
imagine why a corporation would want them. Moreover, as the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dastar illustrates, the Lanham Act itself does not
guarantee moral rights, at least in literal terms. To understand the
analogy between moral rights law and dilution, one first must consider
the sometimes intensely personal relationship between corporate
America and its brands.

B. Corporate America’s Love Affair with the Brand
Corporate megabrands—the type of trademarks that are easily
considered “famous” under the TDRA—are much more than sourceidentifiers for a particular product. These brands also derive a massive
amount of value from their embodiment of expressive meanings, well
beyond their concurrent roles as source identifiers and symbols of
corporate goodwill.265 The corporations that develop and promote these
trademarks deliberately cultivate expressive meanings associated with a
given mark. In doing so, the creators of the mark endeavor to generate a
specific type of “emotional connection” with the consumer.266 When the
trademark is used in an unapproved manner that is inconsistent with the
corporation’s vision of its mark, the corporation’s message becomes
distorted. Corporations accordingly try to control the manner in which
their marks are used to the full extent permitted by the dominant legal
regime.

264

See generally Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar
“Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659 (2007) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dastar and the lower courts’ subsequent interpretation and
application of it).
265
See infra notes 346-355 and accompanying text.
266
Ruth Shalit, The inner Doughboy: How an army of admen battle to define
and protect the true nature of the Jolly Green Giant, the Pillsbury Doughboy
and other advertising spokescharacters, SALON.COM (March 23, 2000, 12:00
PM), http://www.salon.com/media/col/shal/2000/03/23/doughboy (quoting
David Altschul, president of the advertising division at Will Vinton Studios, as
stating, “[w]e are focused on the emotional connection with the consumer”); see
also Peter Walshe, Brand Personality: Unlocking key traits for success and
value, in BRANDZ TOP 100 MOST VALUABLE GLOBAL BRANDS 45 (2012),
http://www.millwardbrown.com/brandz/2012/Documents/2012_BrandZ_Top10
0_Report.pdf (concluding that “understanding a brand personality enables the
brand owner to deliver a consistent brand experience that connects with
consumers and leaves a deeper and more sustainable impression”).
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The famous trademarks that perhaps best illustrate this
phenomenon are the anthropomorphized corporate children that have
fictional personalities and “friends” on Facebook. For example, Mattel’s
iconic doll/trademark, Barbie, has over 2.5 million friends on the social
media website Facebook and identifies herself as a Public Figure who is
“[i]n a relationship” (presumably with Ken).267 In one recent post,
Barbie reported the following status: “Relaxing today with my tried and
true solution . . . retail therapy!”268 Sometimes her posts are more
inspirational: “I’ve had over 130 careers and I don’t plan on stopping! If
you can dream it, you can be it!”269 Barbie even comments on recent
events.270 She seems to think she is a real person.271 Mattel deliberately
uses Barbie’s online image to create a specific persona associated with
the famous Barbie trademark.
Even corporate icon/trademarks less human-looking than Barbie,
like the Pillsbury Doughboy and the Planters Peanut, similarly articulate
scripted personalities that endeavor to create an emotional connection
with the consumer. Pillsbury maintains a detailed set of official
guidelines dictating the Doughboy’s personality and what he can and
cannot do.272 The Doughboy is described as “warm and sweet and
enthusiastic and helpful.”273 Mr. Peanut is apparently more emotionally
complex.274 According to a Planters corporate officer, Mr. Peanut is
“very classy and upscale” – “someone you might meet at a celebrity
267

Barbie, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/#!/barbie (last visited Aug.
15, 2012).
268
Id. In the same vein, Barbie reports, “Woke up from a terrible nightmare that
all of my shoes went missing! I was so happy to open my closet and see them
safe and sound. Phew!” Id. (August 10, 2011).
269
See Barbie, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/#!/barbie (last visited
August 24, 2011).
270
On August 23, Barbie commented on a rare East-coast earthquake: “O.M.D.
Seems like my dolls on the East Coast and in Colorado experienced an LA-style
quake! Hope everyone is safe and sound.” Id.
271
Studios have also established on-line identities for movie characters (e.g.,
Ricky Bobby, played by Will Ferrell in the film Talladega Nights). See
Elizabeth Holmes, On MySpace, Millions of Users Make ‘Friends’ with Ads,
WALL ST. J. Aug. 7, 2006 at B.1; see also Ricky-Bobby, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/Ricky-Bobby/146097352118333
(last
visited Aug. 15, 2012) (Facebook site for Ricky Bobby, self-identified
“Athlete”).
272
Shalit, supra note 266.
273
Id.
274
Mr. Peanut also identifies himself as a Public Figure on Facebook. See Mr.
Peanut, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/mrpeanut (last visited Aug. 15,
2012).
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party, or at a new club, or lounge or bar. And – to your surprise – he
talks to you! He engages you in conversation! So yes, he’s got his top
hat and monocle. But paradoxically, he’s also quite approachable and
down-to-earth.”275
Even brands that do not employ spokescharacters like the
Planters peanut endeavor to cultivate “personality characteristics” to
connect with the consumer.276 For example, one marketing expert
characterizes the Mercedes brand as “relatively ‘assertive’ and ‘in
control,’ while BMW is more ‘sexy’ and desirable.’”277 The Apple brand
is considered “‘creative’” and “‘adventurous,’” while Red Bull (an
energy drink) is “‘adventurous’ and ‘brave,’ if a bit ‘arrogant.’”278 These
brand personalities enable the trademark holder to more effectively reach
the target market for the products her brands are designed to sell.
One common feature of many brand guidelines is a keen concern
for maintaining the “icon’s moral hygiene.”279 Pillsbury’s desire to keep
the Doughboy morally flawless, for example, prevented him from
appearing in a commercial sponsored by the California Milk Processor
Board. As part of the Board’s “Got Milk?” campaign, the planned ad
featured an “all-American family” sitting down to enjoy a plate of
freshly baked Pillsbury cookies. In the ad, the dad discovers, to his
dismay, that someone has drunk the last of the milk. The culprit turns
out to be a chagrined Doughboy, who promptly dashes off camera.
Pillsbury would not, however, consent to the Doughboy being portrayed
in this manner. Pillsbury’s director of brand development explained why
the company rejected the ad: “For some other character, taking the milk
might be fine. . . . But not the Doughboy. He doesn’t trick people. He
doesn’t take advantage. It’s not in his character to do that.”280

275

Shalit, supra note 266. Other trademark icons are similarly invested with
personalities. An advertising executive described the M&M characters as
follows: “The red M&M – he’s the calculating one. A little bit small-minded, a
little ambitious and full of himself. Yellow is good hearted, but a bit slow on the
uptake. Blue is closer to Woody Allen in terms of attitude. A little more wry, a
little more understated. Occasionally a bit sarcastic.” Id.
276
Walshe, supra note 266, at 45.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 47.
279
Ruth Shalit, The Mr. Peanut Chronicles: Burned by past disasters, icon
managers have learned the hard way that the suave mascot must never wear a
wetsuit and that Ronald McDonald cannot hang out in bars, SALON.COM
(March 24, 2000), http://www.salon.com/media/col/shal/2000/03/24/doughboy2.
280
Shalit, supra note 266.
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Given Pillsbury’s refusal to have the Doughboy portrayed as
“mischievous” enough to drink the last of the milk,281 it is perhaps not
surprising that the company filed a lawsuit when the Doughboy appeared
in Screw magazine engaging in sexual intercourse and fellatio.282 In that
case, Pillsbury prevailed on its state law dilution claim,283 but the court
declined to grant relief for “tarnishment of trade characters,” which it
characterized as a “theretofore unheard of cause of action.”284 In
pleading this cause of action, Pillsbury claimed that the defendant had
“altered the image” of the Doughboy, to whom it referred as its
“corporate spokesman,” in a way that made him “distasteful or even
repulsive” to many Pillsbury customers.285 Pillsbury’s “tarnishment of
trade character” cause of action clearly evinces a perceived entitlement to
a type of moral right in its trademark Doughboy. Although the purported
“trade character” cause of action was unsuccessful, Pillsbury got the
same injunctive relief under a claim of dilution.
In a similar vein, toymaker Mattel sued artist Thomas Forsythe
when he produced a series of photos that depicted “one or more nude
Barbie dolls juxtaposed with vintage kitchen appliances” in “various
absurd and often sexualized positions” (“Food Chain Barbie”).286 The
artist explained that the photos were intended to critique and lambaste
the “objectification of women” and “conventional beauty myth”
embodied by Barbie.287 Forsythe earned less than $3,700 in gross
revenue from the Food Chain Barbie series of photographs, over half of
which derived from sales to Mattel investigators.288 The Ninth Circuit
281

Id. According to the Milk Processor Board, one reason cited by Pillsbury for
refusing the milk-and-cookies ad was the lack of the word “mischievous” in the
Doughboy guidelines. “‘Playful’ is there. ‘Mischievous’ is not.” Id.
282
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 125, 126 (N.D. Ga.
1981).
283
Pillsbury Co., 214 U.S.P.Q. at 135. The court reasoned that “[t]he basis for
[the dilution] cause of action is the belief that the owner of these marks should
not have to stand by and watch the diminution in their value as a result of
unauthorized uses by others. All the plaintiff need show to prevail is that the
contested use is likely to injure its commercial reputation or dilute the distinctive
quality of its marks.” Id.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
(“For example, ‘Malted Barbie’ features a nude Barbie placed on a vintage
Hamilton Beach malt machine. ‘Fondue a la Barbie’ depicts Barbie heads in a
fondue pot. ‘Barbie Enchiladas’ depicts four Barbie dolls wrapped in tortillas
and covered with salsa in a casserole dish in a lit oven.”) Id.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 797 & n.3.
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affirmed summary judgment for Forsythe on Mattel’s trademark and
trade dress dilution claims, holding that the works constituted a
noncommercial fair use and were protected by the First Amendment.289
Although Mattel and Pillsbury clearly have a tremendous
economic stake in their brands, the amount of money and effort they
invested in these lawsuits is disproportionate to the economic threat
posed by these defendants. Particularly in the Mattel case, the artistic
depictions of Barbie that offended the company received vastly greater
circulation and publicity as a result of the lawsuit than ever would have
been the case if the artist had been ignored. Moreover, the company
spent more money litigating the claim than the economic harm caused by
the artist, if any, could possibly justify.290 Both lawsuits used claims for
trademark dilution as a tool to preserve the perceived integrity of their
famous trademarks, much like an artist who raises a claim of moral rights
to prevent the mutilation or distortion of his work. In the United States,
however, the corporate trademark holder is more likely to succeed on
such a claim, under a theory of dilution, than would be the artist.

C. The Path to Moral Rights in Trademark
Given this country’s hesitance to guarantee or enforce the moral
rights of authors, even in the face of an international treaty compelling it
to do so, it is difficult to imagine why the U.S. would be willing to
extend such rights to corporations.291 If dilution is in fact a type of moral
right, or at least analogous to one, then the immediate question becomes
why it exists.

289

Id. at 812.
In addition to granting summary judgment in favor of the artist/defendant in
this case, the district court also awarded defendant $1.8 million in attorney fees
and costs. Id. at 816. The court noted that “[p]laintiff had access to
sophisticated counsel who could have determined that such a suit was
objectively unreasonable and frivolous. Instead, it appears Plaintiff forced
Defendant into costly litigation to discourage him from using Barbie’s image in
his artwork.” Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 2004 WL 1454100 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).
291
See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Markets, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 137, 172 n.167 (2010) (noting that “the moral rights argument would be
particularly unpersuasive in the trademark context, since moral rights are
thought to derive from the intimate connection an author has with her work. The
‘authors’ of trademarks, which generally are corporate entities, have no human
dignity at stake when others use their marks.”)
290
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1. Dilution as a “Moral” Right
The cause of action for trademark dilution bears more than a
passing resemblance to the author’s moral right of integrity, the right to
prevent others from mutilating or distorting the author’s work.292 In a
manner not unlike the author who has created a sculpture or work of
literature, the companies who create and nurture famous trademarks have
a genuine desire to maintain and enhance the image they have created for
their brands. The author likewise has an intrinsically personal interest in
ensuring that his vision for the work he created is not distorted by others,
even those who may obtain a subsequent ownership interest in his work.
Dilution, at least in its modern conception, protects a
corporation’s right to preserve the “integrity” of a famous trademark by
granting a broad power to restrict others’ use of the mark, even when the
trademark holder cannot show that it has been economically harmed by
that use. As discussed above, if the trademark holder can prove that a
consumer is likely to “associate” the famous trademark with that of the
defendant, then that association is, in many cases, tantamount to proof of
a likelihood of dilution.293 Whether the cause of action for dilution is
based on a theory of blurring or tarnishment, the effect is the same: the
owner of the famous trademark obtains a considerable degree of control
over the manner in which the mark can be used by others, even
referentially, particularly in commercial settings.
2. Legislating Moral Rights in the Copyright and Trademark Arenas
One reason why trademark dilution has encountered less
legislative resistance than moral rights in the copyright context is
because dilution does not expressly bear the “moral rights” label.
Dilution as a cause of action is instead justified under the same basic
economic model that grounds claims for trademark infringement, i.e.,
reduction of consumer search costs and preservation of goodwill.294
Although some commentators have referred to dilution as a “moral right”
in a trademark,295 Congress and the courts have not. If the corporations
292

See supra notes 240-243 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142-186 and accompanying text.
294
See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
295
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, The Expansion Trajectory: Trademark
Jurisprudence in the Modern Age, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 474,
486 (2010) (“The trademark right in the United States has slowly come to be far
more similar to the nature and extent of moral right protection, rather than the
mere right to exclude.”); see also Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L. J. 407, 438-39 (2009) (comparing trademark
dilution protection and moral rights); Kenneth L. Port, Judging Dilution in the
293
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who hold famous trademarks had directly asked Congress to pass
legislation preserving their “moral rights” in those marks, they probably
would have been considerably less successful.
The relative ease with which trademark dilution legislation was
passed in the U.S. Congress, as compared to VARA, can also be
explained, at least in part, through pure and simple politics.296 The
corporations that hold famous trademarks are some of the wealthiest and
most influential companies in the United States. For example, in 2012,
the three most valuable brands, Apple, IBM, and Google,297 were all
listed among the top 100 of the Fortune 500 companies.298 These
corporations are all members of the International Trademark Association
(INTA), a group that describes itself as “a leading advocate for the
interests of brand owners”299 and “a powerful network of powerful
brands.”300 Representatives of INTA and other advocacy groups that
promote the interests of trademark holders, such as the American
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), provided extensive
testimony to Congress on the TDRA.301 By contrast, only a limited
United States and Japan, 17 TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 667, 681
(2008) [hereinafter Judging Dilution] (“The only justification that makes sense
[for U.S. dilution laws] is to say that the holders of famous marks obtain a
personality right in and to that mark much like the notion of a moral right.”);
Roe, supra note 160, at 604 (characterizing dilution by tarnishment as
“analogous to copyright law’s moral rights doctrine”).
296
Professor Denicola has also observed that an imbalance of political power
may at least be partially responsible for the expansion of trademark rights in
recent years. See Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661,
1683–84 (1999) (noting that, compared to copyright users, “[t]he users of
others’ trademarks. . . are less likely to be either influential or sympathetic”).
297
BrandZ Top 100 Most Valuable Global Brands 2012, MILLWARDBROWN,
HTTP://WWW.MILLWARDBROWN.COM/BRANDZ/2012/DOCUMENTS/2012_BRANDZ
_TOP100_CHART.PDF (last visited Aug. 31, 2012).
298
On the Fortune 500 list for 2012, Apple ranked 17th; IBM was 19th; and
Google was 73rd.
Fortune 500, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/full_list/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2012).
299
Policy
and
Advocacy, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASS’N,
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/main.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
300
Overview, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, http://www.inta.org/About/Pages
/Overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 15, 2012). INTA’s members include “5,900
trademark owners, professionals and academics from more than 190 countries.”
Id.
301
See, e.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act Hearing of the Subcommittee on
Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 53 (Feb. 14, 2003) (statement of
Kathryn Barrett Park, Executive Vice President, International Trademark
Association, arguing in favor of a likelihood of dilution standard of proof); id.

281

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

[Vol. 11

amount of opposing testimony was offered by free speech advocates such
as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In passing the earlier
version of the federal dilution law, the FTDA, Congress heard hardly any
testimony, and all of it was in favor of the bill.302
Comparatively
speaking, federal dilution legislation cut through Congress like a hot
knife through butter.
By contrast, proponents of moral rights legislation in the
copyright context faced a much stiffer opposition, in particular, the
powerful entertainment and film industries.303 Although, like the FTDA,
VARA passed through Congress with little debate, that lack of debate did
not evidence a lack of opposition. VARA passed on the last day of the
Congressional session, and it was included in a bill that authorized
eighty-five new federal judgeships.304 Without that piece of legislative
horse-trading (and the compromises that have weakened VARA’s
impact),305 it is unclear whether and in what form VARA would have
been passed.
3. The Rhetoric of Moral Rights
Substantive as well as political reasons help to explain the ease
with which dilution has been accepted and implemented as a moral right,
while those same types of rights have encountered so much hostility in
the copyright context. First, dilution neatly fits into the rhetoric of the
natural law of property rights and hostility to free riding on the efforts
and property of others. These themes are pervasive in American
jurisprudence, including intellectual property law. Moral rights in the
copyright context, however, cut against that grain. Dilution is viewed as
(statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association).
302
The Supreme Court summarized the legislative history of the FTDA as
follows: “On July 19, 1995, the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Judiciary Committee held a 1-day hearing on H.R. 1295.
No opposition to the bill was voiced at the hearing and, with one minor
amendment that extended protection to unregistered as well as registered marks,
the subcommittee endorsed the bill and it passed the House unanimously. . . . In
the Senate an identical bill, S. 1513, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., was introduced on
December 29, 1995, and passed on the same day by voice vote without any
hearings.” Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003).
303
See KWALL, supra note 240, at 28; see also David Goldberg & Robert J.
Bernstein, Legislation by the 101st Congress, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1991, at 3
(noting “intense and extensive opposition to extending specific moral rights
protection to audiovisual and other works”).
304
See KWALL, supra note 240, at 28 (describing VARA legislative history).
305
See supra notes 247-255 and accompanying text.
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protecting property holders’ rights against interlopers (i.e., “pirates and
cheats”306). On the other hand, the moral rights of authors have been
characterized as undermining property rights. Second, extensive moral
rights protections in copyright law have been criticized for having a
negative impact on the First Amendment rights of others, due to the
restrictions moral rights may place on works that have otherwise entered
the public sphere.307 Although trademark dilution laws have also been
criticized for their negative impact on that same public sphere and the
First Amendment, that criticism has been more muted because these
laws, by their nature and by statutory definition, typically impact
commercial speech. At least until relatively recently, commercial speech
has been entitled to limited First Amendment protection.
The rhetoric of property rights is prevalent in trademark law.308
The Lockean notion that one should not reap where one has not sown has
intuitive appeal, and has been cited as the true policy concern driving the
development and expansion of trademark dilution law in the United
States.309 Although trademark law, at least in the modern era, has
consistently warned that trademark rights are limited and do not exist “in
gross,” it is equally certain that the holders of famous trademarks view
them as extremely valuable forms of property over which they should
exercise considerable, if not complete, control. As explained by a
spokesperson for Ralph Lauren, “We consider the Polo brands to be the
306

The legislative history of the Lanham Act specifies that “where the owner of
a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the
product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates
and cheats.” S.Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1946).
307
See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Right in Copyright, 58 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 795, 814 (2001) (observing that, when an author objects to the
alteration or use of his work in a context that may be characterized as “fair use,”
“implementation of the traditional droit moral may result in prohibiting actions
based on the First Amendment’s right of free expression”) (emphasis added).
308
The Lockean notion that one is entitled to the fruits of one’s labor – and the
converse, that one is not entitled to profit from the results of someone’s else’s
labor – was dominant in the nineteenth century and prevalent in early trademark
law. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1847, 1876 (2007).
309
See, e.g., David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a
Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law,
56 HASTINGS L. J. 117, 119 (2004) (“A strong case can be made that free-riding
on a famous mark is unfair and economically undesirable. The judicial
inclination to punish free-riding deserves respect and refinement, not dismissive
condemnation.”); see also S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)
(“Where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its
appropriation by pirates and cheats.”) (legislative history of 1946 Lanham Act).
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essence of our company. They are our identity, our face, our worth – in
other words, our property. For Polo Ralph Lauren, and many other
American companies, the most valuable piece of property that they own
is their good name, or, as we say in the industry, their brand . . . .”310
Dilution law enables trademark holders to prevent others from freeriding on their “property,” an idea that resonates in U.S. law, even
though U.S. dilution law has never codified this policy goal, and it has
been subject to vigorous critique.311 In other nations’ legal systems, such
as the European Union and Japan, the desire to discourage and punish
free-riders explicitly justifies and underlies trademark dilution statutes.312
310

Oral Statement of Sherry L. Jetter, Vice President, Intellectual Property, Polo
Ralph Lauren Corporation, before the Hearing of the Subcommittee on Courts,
The Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong., 2d Sess., Serial No. 53 (Feb. 14, 2003).
311
The anti-free riding impulse in U.S. unfair competition law historically has
been tempered by the law’s concurrent resistance to monopoly and devotion to
the value of competition, which is inevitably restrained when the ability to copy
is impeded. In the words of an iconic First Amendment scholar, “Most of us get
along by developing the ideas of others. That is how the world progresses. . . .
‘A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant
himself.’ Columbus discovered America, but here we are.” Zechariah Chafee,
Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1318 (1940). Many commentators
have deplored the dangers of “over-propertizing” trademark law. See, e.g.,
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 291, at 187 (concluding that “a trademark law
that is distorted into a right to own markets—one that seeks out and tries to
forbid all free riding on a mark—ends up interfering with rather than enabling
competition”); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J.
367, 455 (1999) (concluding that “property-based trademark is likely to have a
more substantial anticompetitive impact than deception-based trademark”);
Stacey L. Dogan, What is Dilution, Anyway?, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 103, 106 (2006) (arguing in favor of retaining a dilution standard
focused on preventing harm to the plaintiff, rather than punishing free riding by
the defendant).
312
In the European Union, “marks with a reputation” are protected from uses
that take “unfair advantage of” or are “detrimental to the distinctive character or
the repute of the trade mark.” First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws
of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks 89/104/EEC, art. 5, 1989 O. J. (L
40) 5 (EC). See Thomas J. McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and
United States Law Compared, 94 TRADEMARK RPTR. 1163, 1165 (2004)
(arguing that the phrase in the European Union’s Trademark Directive, “without
due cause takes unfair advantage,” invokes the notion of free riding); Marcus H.
Luepke, Taking Unfair Advantage or Dilution of a Famous Mark—A 20/20
Perspective on the Blurred Differences Between U.S. and E.U. Dilution Law, 98
TRADEMARK RPTR. 789, 813 (2008) (noting the “unfair advantage” cases
recognized by the European Union include “instances where there is clear
exploitation and free-riding”); see also Port, Judging Dilution, supra note 295,
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In the copyright context, however, moral rights are controversial
largely because they have been characterized as restricting the property
rights of copyright owners, who often are not the original author(s) of the
work.313 Under U.S. law, copyrights are alienable and transferrable.314
The notion that an author should be able to control the manner in which
her work is used, even after she has sold her copyright in the work to
someone else, contradicts the fundamental definition of what it means to
“own” something in the United States.315 Some have argued that
investment of moral rights in existing works might effect an
unconstitutional taking of property (from the holder of the copyright).316
Therefore, moral rights law, in the copyright context, clashes with the
rhetoric of property. Moreover, when legislation implementing the
Berne Convention was debated in Congress, that clash generated
considerable political opposition from powerful groups who purchase
and hold large numbers of copyrights (e.g., movie studios), who did not
wish to have laws enacted that would constrain their ability to exploit
their copyrights.
Moral rights in copyright law have also encountered resistance
due to their perceived negative impact on the public domain. Unlike
trademarks, which can continue to exist so long as they are being used,

at 681–82 (“The concern in Japan centers around . . . whether a defendant
simply is riding on the goodwill of another.”).
313
Media mogul Ted Turner, who undertook to colorize certain films that had
originally been shot on black-and-white film, encountered resistance from the
original directors of those films. In response to the controversy, he stated, “The
last time I checked, I own those films.” William H. Honan, Artists, Newly
Militant, Fight for their Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1988, at C29.
314
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a “transfer of copyright ownership” as
“an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance,
alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect,
but not including a nonexclusive license”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (transfer
of copyright must be in writing).
315
See Lee, supra note 307, at 814 (“The notion that an artist may, in the name
of the personal interests in the work, prevent the purchaser and holder of title in
the work from doing with it what she wishes may run contrary to the American
socio-legal culture and border on the heretical.”); see also Roberta Kwall,
Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) (referring to the “tradition of safeguarding only the
pecuniary rights of a copyright owner” in the United States).
316
See, e.g., Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of
Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 NW.
UNIV. L. REV. 1011, 1071 (1988).
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copyrights eventually expire.317 When they do, works of authorship pass
into the public domain, for the public to use as they see fit, regardless of
the desires of the author.318
Moreover, even during the life of the
copyright, the statutory fair use doctrine and the First Amendment permit
uses of copyrights that are arguably inconsistent with the concept of
moral rights.319 For these reasons, not only copyright owners but also
free speech advocates have opposed the adoption and vigorous
enforcement of moral rights laws in the context of U.S. copyright law.320
Free speech advocates have opposed the enactment and
enforcement of dilution law as well, but their arguments have had less
impact, in part for the political reasons discussed above. Moreover, as a
substantive matter, free speech arguments in the trademark context have
had limited success because most trademark disputes arise in the
commercial speech arena. When trademark holders have filed lawsuits
to constrain noncommercial speech, specifically artistic speech that is
more frequently the subject of copyright disputes, their arguments have
met with limited success.321 Although dilution law undoubtedly imposes
costs in terms of its impact on the right to free expression protected by
the First Amendment, as discussed infra, those costs have often been
downplayed (perhaps unjustifiably) because the speech constrained is
commercial.322

317

See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (listing duration of copyright for various types of
work); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (upholding
constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the duration
of most copyrights to the life of the author plus seventy years).
318
VARA does not conflict with this aspect of copyright law, as it provides that
its rights do not extend beyond the life of the author. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).
319
See supra note 307.
320
But see NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 216 (2008)
(arguing that limited moral rights protections in the United States would
enhance rather than detract from First Amendment values).
321
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the use of the Barbie trademark in a song lampooning Barbie
qualified as a non-commercial use under FTDA and therefore did not dilute the
Barbie mark); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that the use of the Barbie trademark in photographic works of
parody did not dilute or infringe).
322
See infra notes 361–369 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutionality
of dilution as a restriction on commercial speech).
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4. An Alternative Explanation: The Right of Publicity
Trademark holders’ rights under dilution law have also been
analogized to the right of publicity.323 The right of publicity (which
exists under state law only324) gives an individual the ability to control
others’ use of his image or identity for commercial purposes.325 The
right of publicity has itself been characterized as a type of moral right, as
it originated (at least in part) to protect the integrity of the individual.326
Particularly in the case of anthropomorphized famous trademarks, like
Barbie and the Pillsbury Doughboy, it is not difficult to see the parallels
between an individual’s right of publicity and a famous trademark
holder’s right to protection against dilution. If Vanna White has the right
to enjoin Samsung’s use of a wheel-spinning robot that evokes her
image,327 why shouldn’t Barbie have the right to control others’
commercial use of her image as well? Moreover, the right of publicity,
like dilution laws328 and unlike the droit moral in the copyright

323

See, e.g., Mary LaFrance & Gail H. Cline, Identical Cousins?: On the Road
with Dilution and the Right of Publicity, 24 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH.
L. J. 641, 642–645 (2008) (discussing the parallels between dilution law and the
right of publicity); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1197–1200 (same).
324
Compared to state law claims for dilution, state laws regarding the right of
publicity are much less uniform. Moreover, there is no federal cause of action
for infringement of the right of publicity. Therefore, although generalizations
can be made about this tort, based on the rules adopted in the majority of states
that recognize the cause of action, its application varies widely, depending on
the jurisdiction.
325
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (defining
such “purposes of trade” relevant for the right of publicity claim); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977) (holding that news
broadcast of plaintiff’s performance as a “human cannonball” violated plaintiff’s
right of publicity); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1992) (holding that use of a female-shaped robot in defendant’s
advertisement violated plaintiff’s right of publicity); Haelan Labs v. Topps
Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (recognizing a baseball
player’s right of publicity in his image); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr for Social
Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prod., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 702–03 (Ga. 1982)
(holding that the manufacture and sale of plastic busts of Dr. Martin Luther King
violated right of publicity held by Dr. King’s heirs).
326
See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1180–84 (discussing moral rights
theory underlying the right of publicity).
327
See White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (holding that the defendant’s advertisement,
when viewed as a whole, violated Vanna White’s right of publicity); see also
Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right To Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 292 n.7
(2003) (discussing the White case).
328
See supra notes 306-312 and accompanying text.
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context,329 arguably finds justification in the anti-free-riding impulse that
permeates property law in the United States.330
However, there are some key differences between the right of
publicity and the dilution cause of action as well. At least in its modern
conception and in the typical case, the right of publicity relates less to the
individual’s desire and ability to control her image and more to her
ability to profit from it.331 Therefore, damages (in addition to injunctive
relief) are routinely awarded as a form of relief in right of publicity
cases.332 However, damages are the exception and not the rule in the
context of dilution law. Under state dilution laws, an injunction was
originally the only form of available relief. Even under the TDRA,
damages are available only in cases of “willful” dilution, and injunctive
relief remains the primary form of remedy.333 Moreover, at least in most

329

See supra notes 313-316 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sheldon Halpern, The Right of Publicity: The Maturation of an
Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 853, 873 (1995) (“There is, at bottom, recognition of the fact that
there is something wrong, a manifest ‘unfairness,’ when one person seeks to
trade on the personality of another. The right of publicity is the means to
address and ameliorate that wrong.”); but see Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89,
at 1181-83 (critiquing “labor and unjust enrichment rationales” for the right of
publicity).
331
See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 89, at 1181–82 (“Even assuming that
human dignity includes the right to prevent people from making true statements
about you to sell a commercial product, it fits uneasily with a right of publicity
that is only rarely about preventing such uses and almost always about
maximizing the celebrity’s profit from them.”)
332
Statutory damages are commonly available under right of publicity statutes.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012) (providing for relief in the
form of statutory damages of $750 or actual damages, whichever is greater);
WASH. REV. CODE. § 63.60.060(2) (2011) (providing for relief in the form of
statutory damages of $1500 or actual damages, whichever is greater); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2741.07(A)(1)(a)&(b) (West 2011) (providing for relief in the
form of statutory damages of $2,500-$10,000 or actual damages, at plaintiff’s
election). At least at common law, the right of publicity may also require proof
of harm as an element of the cause of action. See, e.g., Slivinsky v. Watkins–
Johnson Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 (Cal. App. 1990) (“Resulting injury is the
sine qua non of a cause of action for misappropriation of name.”); Cohen v.
Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (same).
333
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (providing for injunctive relief when plaintiff
proves likelihood of dilution); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i)&(ii) (providing for
damages and potentially attorney fees when defendant’s conduct is “willful”);
see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 14247(a) & (b) (West 2008) (providing for
injunctive relief; damages available only when defendant’s conduct is willful).
330
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states, the right of publicity is freely alienable and transferable.334
Trademarks generally are not. Under trademark law, at least in theory,
the holder of a famous trademark cannot sell or even license it without
also transferring the accompanying goodwill.335 Transfers of interest
without goodwill can lead to the invalidation of the trademark.
These doctrinal divergences derive from the variance in the
theory and policy at the core of these respective doctrines. Although the
right of publicity has origins in the right of privacy and other distinctly
“moral” predicates, the doctrine in its current form is more about
commodification than control. The basic theory behind most right-ofpublicity cases is that the defendant has unjustly profited by using the
plaintiff’s image or likeness, without her consent. The right of publicity
tort forces the defendant to pay plaintiff for the use of her image.
The desire to be compensated for economic harm (even under a
theory of unjust enrichment) has never driven trademark holders’
enthusiasm for the dilution claim. Although dilution laws are justified on
334

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.04 (West 2011) (“The right of
publicity in an individual’s persona is freely transferable and descendible. . . .”);
WASH. REV. CODE. § 63.60.030(1) (2011) (right of publicity “shall be freely
transferable, assignable, and licensable, in whole or in part”); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-25-1103(b) (2012) (right of publicity is “freely assignable and licensable”);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.800(1) (2011) (right of publicity is “freely
transferable”); IND. CODE § 32-36-1-16 (2012) (right of publicity is “freely
transferrable and descendible, in whole or in part”).
335
Both naked licenses and assignments in gross (transfers of interest in a
trademark without the accompanying goodwill) are considered forms of
trademark abandonment. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (allowing trademarks to be
assigned “with goodwill”); In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“A trademark owner . . . might delegate so much responsibility to the service
provider as to lose the right or power to assure the quality of the trademarked
brand, and then he would lose the trademark. . . .”); Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., 277 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that
the licensor of a trademark must “maintain some control over the quality of the
licensed property . . . . or risk abandonment of its mark”); Tumblebus, Inc. v.
Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 764–65 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that one method for
abandoning the trademark is through “naked licensing”); Marshak v. Green, 746
F.2d 927, 929–30 (2d Cir.1984) (observing that courts have not allowed trade
names or marks to be validly assigned in gross); but see Calboli, The Sunset of
Quality Control, supra note 83, at 384 (arguing that recent practices involving
assignments or licenses-back “profoundly deviate[] from the traditional view of
trademark law”); Calboli, Trademark Assignment with Goodwill, supra note 83,
at 774 (noting that “trademark practices have traditionally provided instruments
to minimize, if not legally overcome, the effects” of the rule against assignment
in gross).
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the theory that dilution causes economic harm, that harm is
acknowledged to be so inchoate and minute, at least in individual cases,
as to be incapable of measure. Therefore, the cause of action exists
“regardless of the presence or absence of . . . actual economic injury.”336
Famous trademark holders do not want alleged diluters to pay for the use
of famous marks; they want such unauthorized uses to cease. As
explained above, the most likely explanation for the trademark dilution
claim – one which is consistent with the elements of the cause of action
and the typical forms of relief that it provides – derives from the
trademark holder’s desire to control the manner in which others use (or
evoke) the famous mark.
5. Dilution and the Personification of Corporate America
Despite their differences, the right of publicity and the copyright
concept of moral rights do share one key trait: they are distinctly
personal rights. Extending this type of right to the holders of famous
trademarks, the vast majority (if not all) of which are corporations,
continues the trend seen in other areas of the law, such as the First
Amendment, in which distinctions between the legal rights of natural
persons and the corporate personality have faded. In Citizens United, the
United States Supreme Court held that political speech, in the form of
monetary campaign contributions made by corporate entities, was
entitled to full First Amendment protection.337 This opinion has been
subject to vigorous critique, not just for its public policy implications in
terms of campaign finance regulation, but also for its conclusion that
corporations should enjoy the same First Amendment rights as
individuals. Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens opined that “[t]he conceit
that corporations must be treated identically to natural persons in the
political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify the
Court’s disposition of this case.”338

336

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010) (holding that “political
speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a
corporation’”) (citation omitted). The Court observed that “[c]orporations and
other associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to
foster.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also id. at 904 (“Political speech ‘is
indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because
the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual.’”) (internal
quotations omitted).
338
Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see generally Randall P. Bezanson, No
Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV.
649 (2011) (critiquing the Citizens United decision).
337
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The policy implications of extending moral rights to the
corporate holders of famous trademarks—like the expansion of speech
rights for corporate actors in Citizens United—are significant. If the
point of dilution law is to allow the holders of famous trademarks to
preserve the integrity of their marks and to prevent others from
mutilating them, then logically they should not be required to prove
actual harm, actual dilution of the mark’s distinctiveness or goodwill, or
actual damages. The harm caused by the violation of a moral right is
inchoate and essentially incapable of economic proof. When the proper
label is placed on the cause of action, however, a further, more
fundamental question should be answered: Should we enforce a cause of
action that enables corporations to protect their “moral rights” in a
trademark? If so, should that cause of action look like the current
version of the federal dilution law? The answer to those questions, as
explained below, is “no.”

III. DILUTION REFORM
Vindicating the moral rights of corporations may seem like a
questionable legislative endeavor. However, if the dilution cause of
action imposed no costs—in other words, if dilution laws were harmless,
as some have perceived them to be—then the exact nature of the interest
they are intended to protect would be largely academic. Dilution laws
do, however, impose substantial costs that must be considered in
assessing whether the cause of action should continue to exist, at least in
its current form. Those costs, particularly the negative impact on speech
and competition created by the enforcement of these laws, outweigh their
benefits. Although the outright repeal of the TDRA is unlikely, the
statute should be amended or at least narrowly construed to minimize the
externalities that it imposes.

A. Why Dilution Laws Matter
The practical effect of a dilution cause of action is difficult to
precisely identify. Few complaints solely assert a cause of action for
trademark dilution. Moreover, famous trademarks are entitled to such a
broad degree of protection in trademark infringement actions that the
dilution claim is typically superfluous.339 Perhaps as a result, empirical
data from the ten-year period preceding enactment of the TDRA (1996339

Beebe, supra note 105, at 1161; see also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark
Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection,
58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 846–47 (1997) (noting that trademark dilution law
“simply relieves the senior users of such marks from having to make a confusion
showing”).
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2006) indicated declining rates of enforcement of dilution claims in
federal courts.340 Based on this data, Professor Clarissa Long concluded
that “[i]n the federal courts, . . . dilution cases are not exactly a
juggernaut.”341 An empirical study of cases decided in the year
following the enactment of the TDRA yielded similar results, leading
Professor Barton Beebe to opine that the dilution claim remained
superfluous and that anti-dilution law had “no appreciable effect on the
outcomes of federal trademark cases or the remedies issuing from those
outcomes.”342
The characterization of dilution claims as superfluous hardly
constitutes a ringing endorsement.343 As Professor Beebe and others
have argued, famous trademark holders may not “need” dilution
protection in the vast majority of cases, given the scope of modern
trademark infringement law. If dilution claims imposed no costs, their
superfluous nature would at least potentially render them harmless if not
helpful.
However, dilution claims tend to matter the most when their
potential for negative impact on speech and competition hits its peak:
cases in which the plaintiff cannot prove trademark infringement, even
under today’s broad standards. Conversely, in such cases the likelihood
that the trademark holder has suffered any significant economic injury
reaches its nadir. The manner in which courts have interpreted the
TDRA (in addition to the language of the Act itself) has exacerbated this
problem. Moreover, the mere threat of a dilution suit in federal court,
with the possibility of being forced to pay plaintiff’s attorney fees in
addition to your own, is often more than enough to chill protected speech
and potentially suppress competition. As a result, the cost of superfluous
or even frivolous dilution claims may be substantial.

B. The Externalities of Modern Dilution Law
Dilution laws come close to granting trademark rights “in gross.”
Traditionally, trademark law has not reached this far, primarily because
(1) unlike copyrights and patents, trademarks are not constitutionally
sanctioned monopolies; and (2) also unlike copyrights and patents,
340

Clarissa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2006)
(observing that the relief rate for dilution claims has been on a “downward
trajectory” since the first year of the FTDA’s existence).
341
Id.
342
Barton Beebe, The Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence
from the First Year of Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA
CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449, 450 (2007-2008).
343
The phrase “damning with faint praise” comes to mind.
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trademarks do not have an expiration date; they endure so long as they
continue to be used to identify the mark holder’s goods or services.344
The expansive rights granted by trademark dilution laws have been
justified or at least excused on the grounds that, in practical application,
they impose little in terms of costs.345 In other words, protecting
trademark holders against dilution has been characterized as creating few
significant externalities. This view of trademark dilution law, however,
underestimates its capacity to harm.
1. The Clash between Dilution Law and the Value of Speech
The famous trademarks that are most likely to qualify for
dilution protection, e.g., Google and Coca-Cola, are ironically the marks
that objectively need dilution protection the least. Empirically speaking,
their fame insulates them from dilution, as the brand is so well
established in the consumer’s mind that it is difficult to budge.346
Moreover, their sheer ubiquity makes it easy to argue, whatever the
context, that another’s use of the same or a similar mark will lead to a
likelihood of consumer confusion.
These marks are also the ones that carry with them the most
potential for expressive use.347 The famous brands that are entitled to
protection under the TDRA are not just “mega-valuable corporate
assets”; they also are part of contemporary culture and, as such, embody
a host of linguistic meanings.348 As discussed above, the corporations
344

See Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1800–01 (discussing distinctions
between trademarks and copyrights and patents, and the policies underlying the
prohibition of trademark rights “in gross”).
345
See supra notes 339–342 and accompanying text; but see Carter, supra note
80, at 784-86 (arguing that trademark law insufficiently accounts for the
externalities that it creates).
346
See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.
347
See Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1801–05 (discussing trademarks’
capacity for expressive use); see also Beebe, supra note 42, at 624 (arguing that
trademarks are “a semiotic doctrine elaborating the principles of . . . language.
If there is a ‘language of commodities,’ then trademark doctrine is its grammar,
and this grammar must be understood not simply in economic, but also in
linguistic terms.”); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks
as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 401 (1990)
(discussing trademarks’ ability to exhibit both “their signaling and expressive
functions”).
348
Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1804; but see Landes & Posner, supra
note 82, at 168–69 (examining economics of language and noting, “[t]he
importance of trademarks to language is only modest, however, because the
contribution they make to the language is mainly a byproduct of the contribution
that the products they designate make to the world of things.”).
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that seek dilution protection for famous marks definitely comprehend
these trademarks’ significance beyond their commercial function and
attempt to cultivate (and control) that aspect of their meaning.349
The staggering value of these brands350 derives in large part from
their expressive function. “Brands can become symbols by which people
define and express themselves, such that people spend money far beyond
the cost of the utility of the good to reinforce that identity or have that
means of expression.”351 For example, a Louis Vuitton purse signals that
the consumer who owns it is in the company of celebrities and others
who can afford to pay $1000 for a purse (and are willing to do so).352
Although the purse is hopefully well constructed, it is highly unlikely
that the majority of the purchase price derives from the value of the labor
and materials required to make it. Reduction in consumer search costs
and goodwill does not account for billions of dollars in brand value.
Famous trademarks may also take on expressive meanings that
are not deliberately created by their corporate handlers, and which may
be neutral or even negative in terms of their impact on brand value. For
example, the word “Barbie” not only signals a doll manufactured by
Mattel, complete with the image Mattel would like her to represent, but
also functions expressively when used to refer to a beautiful yet “emptyheaded” woman.353 The pop band Aqua undoubtedly intended to tap into
the unofficial expressive meaning of Barbie when it produced the hit
song Barbie Girl, as the lyrics demonstrate.354 As is often the case,
349

See supra text accompanying notes 265–290.
According to the BrandZ report published by Millward Brown, the top three
brands in 2012 were Apple, IBM, and Google, each of which was valued at over
$100 billion. See BrandZ Top 100 Most Valuable Global Brands 2012,
MILLWARD BROWN http://www.millwardbrown.com/brandz/2012/Documents/
2012_BrandZ_Top100_Chart.pdf (last visited August 24, 2012).
351
Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1796; see also Beebe, supra note 43, at
624 (noting that “firms produce trademarks as status goods”); see generally
MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN & NEIL FISKE, TRADING UP: WHY CONSUMERS WANT
NEW LUXURY GOODS—AND HOW COMPANIES CREATE THEM (2005).
352
See Dilbary, supra note 90, at 647-63 (explaining the economic rationale
behind the willingness to pay more for branded products).
353
Dreyfuss, supra note 347, at 400. To illustrate the expressive meaning of
“Barbie,” Dreyfuss quotes Joan Kennedy, who once said the following about her
experiences on the campaign trail with her husband, Senator Ted Kennedy:
“When I campaign alone I’m approachable. Women talk to me. . . . but when
I’m with Ted I’m a Barbie doll.” Id. at 397 (citation omitted).
354
See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the singer, who identifies herself as “Barbie,” describes herself as “a
blond bimbo girl, in a fantasy world,” who commands, “Dress me up, make it
tight, I’m your dolly.”) Id. at 901.
350
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Mattel was not amused and filed suit for trademark infringement and
dilution. Although the court ultimately held that the use of the Barbie
mark in a song was not actionable because it was a constitutionally
protected parody, the language of the FTDA (the governing statute at the
time) by no means clearly embraced the “Barbie Girl” song as a fair
use.355 Moreover, the litigation was enormously contentious and hence
expensive, prompting Judge Kozinski to end his opinion by advising the
parties “to chill.”356
The federal dilution statute, both in its current version (the
TDRA) and its previous incarnation (the FTDA), provides scant room for
these types of expressive uses, particularly in commercial contexts.
Although the TDRA more clearly exempts parodies from dilution
liability than did the FTDA, the statutory exemption does not apply when
the parody is embodied within a trademark.357 As a result, at least one
circuit court has held that parodies that are also trademarks are protected
only if they do not dilute.358 Although the court in that case found no
dilution, it is far from certain that every court will reach the same
conclusion, given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry. For example, in
the Barbie Girl case, the court concluded that the Barbie Girl song was
in fact “dilutive” and insulated from liability only because it constituted a
“noncommercial use” of Mattel’s trademark.359 The narrow scope of the
fair use defense therefore raises serious First Amendment concerns.360
Even outside noncommercial or obviously expressive uses of
trademarks, i.e., in the realm of purely commercial speech, the dilution
cause of action still impacts First Amendment rights.
Some
355

See id. at 904–07 (interpreting statutory language re “noncommercial use”
and discussing First Amendment limitations); see generally Patrick D. Curran,
Comment, Diluting the Commercial Speech Doctrine: ‘Noncommercial Use’
and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 71 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1077 (2004).
356
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 908. Somewhat ironically, Mattel later licensed the
Barbie Girl song and used it (with modified lyrics) to promote sales of the
Barbie doll. Stuart Elliott, Years Later, Mattel Embraces ‘Barbie Girl,’ THE
NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 26, 2009, 4:30 PM), available at
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/years-later-mattel-embraces
-barbie-girl/?pagemode=print.
357
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006); see also supra notes 217-221 and
accompanying text.
358
See supra notes 223-232 and accompanying text.
359
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903, 904-07.
360
See Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark
Law, 61 S.M.U. L. Rev. 381, 438-47 (2008); see also Jesse A. Hofrichter, Note,
Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech Problems with the
Trademark Dilution Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923 (2007).
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commentators have convincingly argued that the dilution cause of action
fails the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson test for commercial speech
and therefore violates the First Amendment.361 Commercial speech is
protected under the First Amendment if it concerns lawful activity and it
is not misleading.362 Speech that constitutes trademark infringement is
not protected because the likelihood of consumer confusion that it creates
renders it misleading.363 Because a dilution claim does not require proof
of likelihood of confusion, the speech it targets is not misleading and,
therefore, should be entitled to constitutional protection.
Moreover, speech that allegedly dilutes may be affirmatively
valuable to both consumers and competitors. In Central Hudson, the
government claimed that the speech at issue (advertisements by a
monopolistic electric company) was not entitled to constitutional
protection because, even though the speech was non-misleading, it was
not “of any worth,” as it did not convey useful information to
consumers.364 The Court rejected that argument, reasoning that “[e]ven
in monopoly markets, the suppression of advertising reduces the
information available for consumer decisions and thereby defeats the
purpose of the First Amendment.”365 Similarly, speech that allegedly
dilutes a famous trademark can provide useful information to consumers
about the defendant’s goods and services and thereby allow the
defendant to more effectively compete.
When a proprietor chooses a name for her business (i.e., a
trademark) that taps into the expressive meaning of a famous mark,
without creating a likelihood of consumer confusion, both the proprietor
and the consumer stand to benefit. By associating herself and her
361

See Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional
Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 58 S.C.L. REV. 709 (2007); see also
Ramsey, supra note 360, at 438–39 (arguing that dilution laws constitute
content-based restrictions on speech); Paul Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution
Revision Act--A Consumer Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 1189, 1193 (2006) (“[D]ilution law’s limits on truthful commercial
speech raise serious questions of public policy as well as constitutionality.”).
362
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
363
See Castrol v. Pennzoil, 987 F.2d 939, 949 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is well settled
that false commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment and may
be banned entirely.”); FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d
35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that “the subcategory of commercial speech
consisting of false and deceptive advertising ‘remains subject to restraint.’ In
fact, ‘[m]isleading advertising may be prohibited entirely.’”) (citations omitted).
364
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566–67.
365
Id. at 567.
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business with the famous trademark, the proprietor increases the
efficiency of her new mark by conveying useful information about the
good or service to which it is attached.366 The consumer benefits because
the mark more effectively reduces search costs. For example, a person
who sees an ad for “Victor’s Little Secret” has some idea of what is for
sale, without knowing anything about the store other than its name. Yet
an intent to associate with a famous mark weighs in favor of a finding
that the proprietor of such a business has diluted the famous mark.367 The
TDRA thus undoubtedly (and intentionally) discourages such associative
uses, thereby suppressing speech.
If commercial speech is protected, then the regulation restricting
it must directly advance a “substantial government interest.”368 The
Supreme Court has clarified that “[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain
a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree.”369
Dilution laws do not appear to directly advance a substantial
government interest. By their express terms, the TDRA and state
dilution laws do not require a finding that the plaintiff has been
economically harmed. They are not designed to protect consumers in
any meaningful way. Although the TDRA prohibits uses of famous
trademarks that “cause” dilution of those marks, the plaintiff need not
prove that any such dilution or actual harm has occurred to prevail under
this statute. The alternative, more realistic, explanation for dilution laws
is that they exist to facilitate the preservation and control of corporate
persona and image, as embodied in famous trademarks. While
corporations may have a substantial interest in achieving this end, the
government does not. For these reasons, the dilution cause of action
raises significant First Amendment concerns.
The corporations that “own” famous trademarks cultivate and
profit enormously from the expressive meanings that these marks
convey. Much like an artist who has crafted a great sculpture, these
trademark holders wish to control all uses of their creations, especially
366

See Dogan, supra note 327, at 321 (concluding that “courts should be
mindful of the positive reasons for allowing parties to evoke others’ products or
services in pro-competitive ways”).
367
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(v) (2006).
368
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
369
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188
(1999).
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those they find offensive. However, in the absence of any real economic
injury to the trademark holder (and certainly not any measurable one),
the control granted via the dilution cause of action should take into
account the costs that go along with it. Prohibiting others from tapping
into these expressive meanings, even in commercial settings, is a
substantial externality of the dilution cause of action and arguably one of
Constitutional proportion.
2. The Impact of Trademark Dilution Law on Competition
The expressive function of famous trademarks is enormously
valuable, both for the holders of such marks and the public at large.
Preventing proprietors from tapping into those expressive meanings in
developing their own trademarks, when such uses do not cause a
likelihood of confusion with the original mark holder, deprives the
proprietor of an efficient trademark and negatively impacts his ability to
compete. Current dilution doctrine, particularly under the TDRA and
recent interpretations of that statute, poses more direct threats to
competition as well. Although suits between direct competitors were not
originally envisioned under the dilution cause of action, such lawsuits are
in fact often the cases in which dilution claims matter the most. When a
trademark infringement claim fails because the facts will not support it,
dilution is a useful stand-in. In such cases, it may be difficult if not
impossible to distinguish the kind of association between two marks that
constitutes actionable dilution from the “injury” that a trademark holder
suffers as a result of regular competition. The extent to which dilution
laws suppress competition should be recognized as a cost and considered
in examining the scope of the doctrine.
Lawsuits between competitors, based on the use of their
respective trademarks, have traditionally been resolved under the rubric
of the trademark infringement cause of action, specifically the likelihood
of confusion standard. The interests of consumers and the plaintiff are
largely aligned in such cases:
both are harmed by trademark
infringement.370 At least in theory, the dilution claim should have no
impact in these lawsuits. In such suits, one would expect that a dilution
claim would be superfluous.371 However, the plain language of the
TDRA (and its predecessor, the FTDA) does not bar its application in
lawsuits between competitors and, in fact, says the opposite.372 Dilution
370

See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 321-342 and accompanying text.
372
15 U.S.C. § 1025(c)(1) (providing injunctive relief against any use of a
famous trademark that causes dilution, “regardless of the presence or absence of.
. . competition”).
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claims are becoming increasingly relevant in such lawsuits, to the
detriment of competition.
As discussed previously, some courts have interpreted the
TDRA’s six-factor test for dilution as eliminating the “substantial
similarity” test from trademark dilution analysis.373 As a result, in some
cases a trademark dilution claim has survived summary judgment or
other adjudication when a trademark infringement claim has not, often
because the marks in question were not similar enough to support an
infringement claim. In essence, the dilution claim picks up where
infringement leaves off, resulting in potential liability, or at least the
inability to win the case on a summary judgment motion, in a case where
the plaintiff would otherwise be expected to lose. Such cases may do
more to create “unfair competition” than eliminate it.
A recent case involving Levi Strauss and Abercrombie & Fitch
illustrates how suits between direct competitors, particularly in the
context of trade dress dilution, poses problems.374 Both Strauss and
Abercrombie sell blue jeans that are adorned with pocket stitching.375
The pocket stitching by Strauss, the plaintiff, is considered famous, and
in fact would be easily recognized by most American consumers.
Strauss alleged that Abercrombie’s pocket stitching infringed and diluted
Strauss’s famous design. Analyzing the infringement claim in this
lawsuit would have required an answer to the following question: Would
a person encountering Abercrombie’s pocket stitching on the backside of
a pair of jeans likely be confused into thinking that the jeans were in fact
made by Strauss? The answer to that question was apparently “no.”
The dilution claim, by contrast, poses a much more difficult
question: After encountering Abercrombie’s pocket stitching on the
backside of a pair of jeans (which the consumer would not be likely to
mistake for Levi’s), would the consumer think of Strauss just as quickly
the next time she saw Strauss pocket stitching, or would her response
time be slower because her mind had been “polluted” by subconscious
images of the Abercrombie design? As an empirical matter, that
question is exceedingly difficult to answer,376 but, more importantly, it is
unclear how this kind of “mental pollution” differs from the desired
373

See supra text accompanying notes 168-171.
Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th
Cir. 2011).
375
Attachment A, appended to the end of this article, reproduces a photo of the
parties’ respective designs that was attached to the court’s opinion in this case.
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See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text (discussing empirical
evidence of dilution and the limitations of that evidence).
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effect generated by legitimate competition.377 Of course Abercrombie
wants to pollute the customer’s mind with images of its own jeans in
addition to the ones sold by Levis; that is the point of competition. If
Abercrombie is prohibited from provoking these kinds of associations, its
ability to compete will be compromised. Although Strauss might like to
prevent all other jeans makers from adorning the backsides of jeans, lest
such adornments intrude upon the “uniqueness” of the Strauss trademark,
it is unclear why this is a desirable result from anyone’s perspective other
than Strauss.
The trade dress utilized by a competitor may often bear some
resemblance to the plaintiff’s because the two parties are, in fact,
competitors, i.e., they produce goods or services in the same market.
Particularly given that the “substantial similarity” test no longer acts as a
robust gate-keeper in the dilution analysis,378 the danger presented by
trade dress cases like Levi Strauss is that courts and juries will have
difficulty distinguishing between the type of “association” that tends to
prove actionable dilution under the TDRA and the association between
products that is deliberately and legitimately generated in the course of
competition.379
The existence of a trade dress dilution claim also implicates the
doctrine of aesthetic functionality, an affirmative defense that exists to
ensure that trade dress protection does not negatively impact free
competition.380 When trademark protection is extended beyond the
377

See Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir.
1987) (“A response that one ‘associates’ a given product with the name of a
competitive product may simply reflect the recognition that the two products are
competitive and serve the same purpose.”).
378
See supra text accompanying notes 168-171 (describing evolution of
substantial similarity standard under the TDRA).
379
Professor Stacey Dogan has made this point as well: “[T]he public
frequently benefits when a new market entrant uses product trade dress to evoke
the strong trade dress of an entrenched market participant. So long as there is no
confusion, however, the evocation serves an important public policy goal of
market competition. With dilution protection for trade dress, some of this
desirable activity might subside.” Dogan, supra note 327, at 317; see also
Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187, 196-98 (2007) (criticizing TDRA for extending
dilution protection to trade dress); Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The
West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution
Statute to Protect Product Configuration, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415, 423–24
(1998) (arguing that the FTDA should not be construed to apply to trade dress).
380
For example, when Wallace Silversmiths claimed trade dress infringement of
its Grand Baroque silverware pattern, it was not allowed to enjoin a competitor
from producing similar-looking (although not identical) silverware, because the
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“precise expression of a decorative style,” there is a danger that
competitors will lose access to “basic elements” of the style that are
important to competition in the relevant market and hence should remain
part of the public domain.381 Granting too wide a swath of trade dress
protection risks depriving competitors of a sufficient range of alternative
designs, thereby hindering their ability to compete.382 In such cases, it is
not unusual for the market entrant to be aware of or “inspired by” the
more famous trade dress,383 but that type of awareness or intent should
not suggest actionable infringement or dilution.
The same issue may arise in cases involving word marks,
particularly when a small business owner desires to compete with the
owner of a famous trademark. The small business owner may want, both
understandably and legitimately, to draw upon the expressive meaning of
the famous trademark to communicate a message about his own
business. The proprietor may also wish to convey to consumers, through
his own trademark, that he not only is competing with the famous
trademark holder, but that his product is better than the famous one. If
such claims were made directly—e.g., my coffee is better than
Starbucks—they would almost certainly be considered comparative
advertising and hence a fair use of the Starbucks trademark.384 However,
when the proprietor attempts to convey the same message in a more
subtle or humorous way—e.g., by selling a blend called “Mr.

design was deemed aesthetically functional. The court reasoned that Wallace
could not “exclude competitors from using those baroque design elements
necessary to compete in the market for baroque silverware. It is a first principle
of trademark law that an owner may not use the mark as a means of excluding
competitors from a substantial market.” Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v.
Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990).
381
Id.
382
Id. at 81; see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S.
23, 33 (2001) (noting that “[i]t is proper to inquire into a ‘significant nonreputation-related disadvantage’ in cases of esthetic functionality”); Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 170 (1995) (“The ‘ultimate test
of aesthetic functionality’. . . . ‘is whether the recognition of trademark rights
would significantly hinder competition.’”); Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves
Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 2012 WL 3832285 at *9 (2d Cir. 2012)
(noting that “Lanham Act protection does not extend to configurations of
ornamental features which would significantly limit the range of competitive
designs available”) (citation omitted).
383
See Wallace, 916 F.2d at 77 (noting that defendant admitted its designers
were “inspired by and aware of” plaintiff’s design).
384
See supra text accompanying notes 236-238 (discussing comparative
advertising fair use defense to claims of trademark infringement and dilution).
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Charbucks”—he may be subject to a claim of trademark dilution.385
Both instances of comparative advertising threaten the uniqueness of the
Starbucks mark in the same way. When the more subtle or humorous use
of the mark does not cause a likelihood of confusion, it is unclear why it
should be actionable.
In sum, dilution claims may negatively impact competition when
they are raised in cases between competitors. The cost of allowing such
claims is particularly evident when the trademark infringement claim that
accompanies the dilution one is weak and perhaps does not survive, and
only the dilution claim keeps the case in court. These costs should also
be considered in construing the TDRA and contemplating its future.
3. The Cost of Trademark Bullying
The final dilution externality involves the phenomenon of
trademark “bullying.”386 The true impact of dilution law cannot be
measured by tallying the number of cases in which it appears as a standalone cause of action or by any alternative measure that focuses on
complaints filed (or published decisions).387 A more accurate account
must consider the number of times the dilution claim is threatened and
attempt to gauge the impact of those threats, a certain percentage of
which are objectively meritless, on consumer behavior. Like the harm
caused by dilution itself, this injury is difficult if not impossible to
accurately measure.
However, the phenomenon of trademark
overreaching in the form of threatened lawsuits of questionable merit is
real, and it is exacerbated by the existence of the federal dilution cause of
action. This, too, is a cost to be considered in assessing the externalities
of dilution.
385

The record in the Starbucks case demonstrated that defendant’s intent in
choosing the Charbucks mark was at least in part a desire to convey a message
of comparative advertising. The Second Circuit characterized the Charbucks
logo as a “beacon to identify Charbucks as a coffee that competes at the same
level and quality as Starbucks in producing dark-roasted coffees.” Starbucks
Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir. 2009).
386
See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WISC.
L. REV. 625 (2011); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of
Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008); Kevin Greene, Abusive
Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking Confusion Doctrine –
Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and Cyberspace, 27
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 609 (2004); see also Desai & Rierson, supra note 17,
at 1834–42 (discussing problems caused by over-policing of trademarks).
387
See Long, supra note 340, at 1031 (acknowledging that “[i]t could well be
the case that dilution law is a powerful bargaining chip in cease-and-desist
letters and in negotiations outside the legislative arena”).
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As Deven Desai and I have elsewhere observed, “Typically, the
threat of litigation alone (even when ever so lightly implied) by a
corporate giant is sufficient to dissuade a person from making fair use of
a trademark.”388 Frequently, when small businesses like Victor’s Little
Secret and Black Bear Coffee receive a cease-and-desist letter from the
likes of Victoria’s Secret and Starbucks, threatening to sue them in
federal court, they will do whatever is necessary to prevent such lawsuit
from being filed. Cease-and-desist letters typically demand that the
recipient change the name of her business and/or her website. Given the
level of financial resources, time, and energy required to defend a federal
lawsuit, even a “winnable” one, most people would rationally choose to
change the name of their business. Moreover, given the inherent
ambiguity of dilution law, discerning the winnable cases from the
unwinnable ones poses a challenge for even the most competent of
lawyers.
The website Chillingeffects.org, a joint project of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation and various law school clinics, acts as a depository
for a wide range of demand letters in all areas of intellectual property
law.389 A recent example taken from this website illustrates the type of
over-reaching that often appears in such letters. The letter was sent by
the National Pork Board, an agency representing purveyors of “The
Other White Meat,” a slogan that is a federally registered trademark.
The recipient was The Lactivist Breastfeeding Blog, which was selling tshirts and other merchandise bearing the slogan “The Other White Milk.”
The National Pork Board threatened suit for both trademark infringement
and dilution, claiming that “even were this use of the slogan ‘The Other
White Milk’ found to be not confusing, which we think is unlikely, this
slogan nevertheless damages National Pork Board’s rights in the famous
mark THE OTHER WHITE MEAT, because the slogan significantly
dilutes the distinctiveness of the mark.”390 The letter ends by demanding
that the Breastfeeding Blog (1) destroy all of the t-shirts and promotional
388

Desai & Rierson, supra note 17, at 1839–40.
CHILLING EFFECTS, http://chillingeffects.org/.
390
Pork Board has a Cow Over Slogan Parody, CHILLING EFFECTS,
http://chillingeffects.org/trademark/notice.cgi?NoticeID=6418
(letter
from
National Pork Board attorneys Faegre & Benson to The Lactivist Breastfeeding
Blog, dated January 30, 2007). The letter also contains a somewhat humorous
claim of dilution by tarnishment: “[Y]our use of this slogan also tarnishes the
good reputation of National Pork Board’s mark in light of your apparent attempt
to promote the use of breastmilk beyond merely for infant consumption, such as
with the following slogans on your website in close proximity to the slogan ‘The
Other White Milk’: ‘Dairy Diva,’ ‘Nursing, Nature’s Own Breast
Enhancement,’ ‘Eat at Mom's, fast-fresh-from the breast,’ and ‘My Milk is the
Breast.’” Id.
389
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materials bearing the offending slogan; (2) cease use of the slogan on any
website; and (3) agree to never again use the slogan “The Other White
Milk.”391
Even a person who knows little about trademark law can
probably figure out that consumers who buy “The Other White Milk” tshirts are not likely to be confused: the average consumer will not
mistakenly believe that the shirts are sold or endorsed by the National
Pork Board. Even though the law is far from crystal clear, the standard is
at least intuitive. However, understanding what dilution is, let alone
whether a t-shirt like the one referenced in this letter is “likely to dilute,”
is entirely another matter. The inchoate nature of dilution makes it
difficult for anyone, particularly a layman, to separate the cases that have
merit from those that do not.
The provisions in the TDRA that allow for recovery of damages
and attorney’s fees in cases involving “willful dilution” make it even
more likely that a threat of suit will chill uses of a trademark that do not,
in fact, dilute it. The TDRA permits recovery of profits and attorney’s
fees, in the case of dilution by blurring, whenever “the person against
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the
recognition of the famous mark.”392 It is unclear how a willful intent to
“trade on the recognition of the famous mark” differs from an intent to
“associate” with the famous mark, one of the factors courts consider in
assessing a dilution claim. Whenever a person makes a referential use of
a trademark, at least in a commercial context, that person is arguably
attempting to “trade on the recognition of the famous mark.” Even the
purveyors of t-shirts bearing the slogan “The Other White Milk” were in
some sense attempting to sell more t-shirts by trading off the recognition
of the allegedly famous393 slogan, “The Other White Meat.” If the pro391

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i) (2006).
393
The ambiguousness of the term “famous” itself makes it difficult to predict
when a plaintiff may be entitled to sue under the TDRA, and hence even the
holders of marks that are unlikely to qualify as famous may credibly threaten
suit under the Act. Although the TDRA was supposed to codify a fame standard
solely for marks that qualify as “household names,” see, e.g., Nissan Motor Co.
v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004), some of the
trademarks that have been deemed “famous” under this Act objectively do not
seem to meet this standard. See, e.g., New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC
Triathlon Club, Inc., 2010 WL 808885, *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Dallas Cowboys
Football Club, Ltd. v. America’s Team Props., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 622, 643
(N.D. Tex. 2009); Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1307 (D.
Kan. 2008); Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (D.
Utah 2007).
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pork slogan were not recognizable to the average consumer, the prolactation slogan would not be funny. In fact, the cease-and-desist letter
from the National Pork Board included a promise to “recover from you a
judgment for all of your profits in connection with any infringing sale as
well as all of [the National Pork Board’s] reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs” in the event its demands were not met.394 The average person,
business proprietor, or non-profit organization simply cannot risk the
possibility of being stuck with that kind of bill.395
In assessing the externalities of dilution, therefore, we must
assume that some fair uses of famous trademarks will be suppressed.
Due to the inherently amorphous nature of the dilution claim, a potential
defendant has a low ability to assess her real exposure and, given the
potential penalties and costs, a high incentive to avoid the risk of
litigation.

C. Proposals for Reforming Dilution Law in the United States
For these reasons and others, federal trademark dilution law is, at
the very least, in need of reform. Dilution does not cause measurable
economic harm to the holders of famous trademarks (hence the statute’s
explicit exemption from proving any such harm). Moreover, enforcing
dilution law, at least in its current state, imposes costs by negatively
impacting speech and competition. Dilution laws essentially extend a
form of moral right protection to the holders of famous trademarks, the
vast majority of which are corporations. At the very least these laws
need to be narrowly construed and statutorily reformed, and potentially
abolished outright.
1. Doing Away With Trademark Dilution Statutes
Perhaps the most obvious, yet least politically feasible, solution
to the problems addressed in this Article would be to repeal the
trademark dilution statutes, particularly the TDRA. The moral rights
theory may help to explain why famous mark holders want dilution
protection, but it does not tell us why they should get it. In the copyright
context, moral rights exist to preserve uniquely personal interests in
artistic creation. In the words of Professor Kwall, moral rights protect
the “honor, dignity, and artistic spirit of the author in a fundamentally
394

Pork Board has a cow over slogan parody, CHILLING EFFECTS,
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395
See, e.g., Super Duper, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 2010 WL 2340250, *5–6 (4th Cir.
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of “willful dilution”).
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personal way.”396 Works of art may embody “the author’s intrinsic
dimension of creativity,” which emanates from “inner drives that exist in
the human soul.”397 Although corporations may embrace their brands
with fervor and take pride in their creation, neither corporations nor their
trademarks possess the type of “human soul” that cries out for protection
via a moral right.
If dilution law is forced to justify its own existence on traditional
trademark (i.e., economic) grounds, it almost certainly is a loser. The
benefits gained by dilution enforcement, which are slim at best, are
outweighed by the attendant costs, including those that are occasioned by
the inevitable overreaching that it enables. If the holder of a famous
trademark is injured by another’s use of its mark, trademark infringement
law, particularly in the breadth of its modern application, should be more
than adequate to prevent real economic injury. Even in trademark
infringement cases, the famous trademark holder can obtain injunctive
relief without proving anything beyond a likelihood of confusion; harm
is presumed.398 Moreover, to the extent another has intentionally harmed
the mark’s reputation by making false statements about the famous
trademark or the mark holder, tort law should provide a remedy.399 From
the plaintiff’s perspective, dilution is an attractive cause of action, at
least in part, because the evidentiary hurdle a plaintiff must clear to state
a claim is low. Whether mark holders should be entitled to such broad
396

KWALL, supra note 240, at xiii.
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Whether an automatic presumption of irreparable harm should persist in
trademark infringement cases, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay
v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), doing away with such
presumptions in the patent infringement context is an interesting question which
is beyond the scope of this article. See Sandra L. Rierson, IP Remedies After
eBay: Assessing the Impact on Trademark Law, 2 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 163
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Ebay).
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protection, particularly given the impact of these claims on the First
Amendment rights of others, is dubious.
The TDRA, then, is the legal equivalent of a sledgehammer
levied against a gnat. When there are plenty of fly swatters lying about,
perhaps it is time to put away the sledgehammer. Whether a proposal to
do away with dilution statutes is feasible, from a political standpoint,
however, is another matter. As discussed above, the corporate holders of
famous trademarks feel deeply entitled to dilution protection, and they
have lobbied hard (and successfully) to get it. For this reason, the
dilution cause of action is unlikely to go away any time soon.
2. Amending the TDRA
Given that the TDRA is likely to be part of the legal landscape of
trademarks for some time to come, it may be more productive to focus on
minimizing its negative externalities. Although dilution law may
continue to be superfluous and hence unnecessary, its attendant costs
could be reduced by modifying the statute.
When Congress amended the federal dilution statute in 2006, it
weighted the scales too heavily in favor of plaintiffs claiming trademark
dilution. The TDRA is essentially flawed because it eliminated the
plaintiff’s burden of proving “actual dilution” without clearly
establishing what plaintiffs do have to prove to prevail in these cases. By
elevating the importance of evidence indicating “association” between
the parties’ marks and de-emphasizing the significance of mark
similarity, the courts have extended dilution protection in cases that
essentially state weak trademark infringement claims. Once the plaintiff
has proven that his trademark is truly “famous” and that consumers may
“associate” defendant’s mark with his own, he has gone a long way
toward proving a likelihood of dilution. That burden is too light.
The Act should be amended to codify the “identical or
substantially similar” standard previously adopted by many courts in
assessing claims under the FTDA.400 This rule had the advantage of
eliminating claims that were based on non-infringing but arguably
referential uses of famous marks.401 Perhaps more importantly, a
requirement that the defendant’s mark be “identical or substantially
similar” to the plaintiff’s mark would provide at least the potential for
400

See supra text accompanying notes 168-171 (describing evolution of
substantial similarity standard under the TDRA).
401
See Dogan, supra note 327, at 319 (arguing that “[e]xtending dilution rights
to all marks bearing any associational relationship to famous ones exceeds the
narrow objectives of the [FTDA], at a significant societal cost”).
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obtaining summary judgment in appropriate cases. This result is less
likely to occur when the court must engage in the intensely factual
process of weighing the statutory factors, of which mark similarity is just
one.
Harmful dilution litigation under the TDRA could also be
curtailed by restricting the availability of dilution claims in cases
between competitors. This end could be achieved by deleting the
language in the statute indicating that it applies “regardless of the
presence or absence of . . . . competition”402 and replacing it with a
statutory factor targeting the level of competition between the parties. A
high level of competition between the parties would tend to suggest that
a likelihood of dilution did not exist. Addressing the competition issue
by adding a factor rather than an outright prohibition of dilution claims
between competitors would avoid the “coverage gap” problem posited by
the Second Circuit in Nabisco; i.e., that a plaintiff would have no remedy
under either infringement or dilution due to an insufficient level of
competition for one claim but too much for the other.403 Whether this
objection has any merit, particularly given the marginal relevance of
competition under modern infringement law, is questionable. However,
the factorial approach (as opposed to a ban) would allow the courts to
weigh the degree of competition appropriately, according to the facts in a
given case.
To further reduce the negative impact of dilution law on
competition, the Act should be amended to eliminate dilution of trade
dress as a cause of action.404 As discussed above, trade dress dilution
claims are likely to arise in cases involving competitors, such as the
recent Ninth Circuit case involving two competitors in the blue jeans
market, Levi Strauss and Abercrombie & Fitch. Non-competitors,
because they do not offer the same types of products or services, are
unlikely to use even vaguely similar trade dress. Allowing claims for
trade dress dilution under the TDRA, particularly as it is currently
construed, enables dominant market players like Levi Strauss to
discourage competition by threatening and filing dilution suits when
trademark or copyright infringement claims would fail. If the plaintiff is
economically harmed in these types of cases, the alleged harm or loss of
market share is more likely to flow from the effects of desirable

402

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
404
Technically, this change to the Act would require deleting § 1125(c)(4),
discussing the burden of proof in trade dress dilution cases, and adding trade
dress claims to the list of exclusions in § 1125(c)(3).
403
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competition, not the claimed dilution of the source-identifying capacity
of the famous trade dress.
The Act should also be amended to eliminate the availability of
damages and attorney’s fees in cases of “willful” dilution. If the
prospect of damages and attorney’s fees is deemed necessary to prevent
parties from acting in bad faith, then the statute should be amended to
explicitly require a finding of bad faith in such cases. By contrast, the
current statute is ambiguous, as almost any dilution claim may carry with
it a credible threat of damages and attorney’s fees in addition to
injunctive relief. The attorney’s fee provision significantly increases the
likelihood that the threat of dilution will be used to suppress fair uses of
famous trademarks.
Finally, the TDRA’s fair use exemption needs to be
strengthened. Specifically, the requirement that the fair use exemption
be limited to uses “other than as a designation of source for the person’s
own goods or services” should be eliminated. A trademark, like the
Chewy Vuiton dog toy, may simultaneously function as both a source
identifier and a parody. A trademark may also communicate a subtle
comparative advertising message, like Mr. Charbucks coffee. These uses
should be protected as a matter of law. To the extent these marks are
perceived as harmful to the more famous trademarks to which they refer,
that injury, if any, is outweighed by the harms to both speech and
competition that result from the suppression of their use.
3. Re-interpreting the TDRA
In the absence of Congressional action to modify or repeal the
TDRA, the judiciary should interpret the Act differently. At a bare
minimum, the TDRA should be read narrowly to minimize the negative
impacts of over-enforcement on speech and competition.
The conflict between the TDRA and the First Amendment
presents a strong justification for construing the Act narrowly (and its
exemptions broadly).405 Some courts have recognized that “where the
unauthorized use of a trademark is part of an expressive work, such as a
parody, the Lanham Act must be construed narrowly.”406 Although
405

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (“[T]he First Amendment mandates that speech
restrictions be ‘narrowly drawn.’”) (citations omitted).
406
Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Harley Davidson, Inc. v.
Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that parodies “often lie
within the substantial constitutional protection accorded noncommercial speech
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parodies and other forms of noncommercial speech reside closer to the
heart of the First Amendment, non-misleading commercial speech is also
entitled to First Amendment protection.407 Trademark injunctions
necessarily suppress speech because they force the defendant to refrain
from using certain language.408 Moreover, a broad construction of the
dilution cause of action can negatively impact competition. Therefore,
courts should narrowly construe the TDRA.
This duty to narrowly construe dilution laws should inform the
courts’ interpretation of the factors-based approach to assessing
likelihood of dilution. First, even if the TDRA is not amended to codify
the “identical or substantially similar standard,” courts should still
heavily emphasize this factor when considering a likelihood of dilution
claim. The Act specifies that courts may consider “all relevant factors,”
including the six that are listed.409 In any given case, one or more of the
listed factors may be more relevant than others, and some will routinely
carry more weight.410 The mere fact that the statute suggests six nonexclusive factors, without more, does not compel the court to give each
factor equal weight.
Second, even if the TDRA is not amended to include a factor
referencing the level of competition between the parties, courts should
and may thus be the subject of liability only in the most narrow circumstances”
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. i (1995)).
Professor Lisa Ramsey has also argued that courts have a duty to “attempt to
resolve any conflict between trademark law and the First Amendment by
interpreting trademark claims narrowly and trademark defenses broadly in ways
that protect expression.” Ramsey, supra note 360, at 448; see also id. at 447–50
(discussing “contextual, speech-protective interpretations of trademark law”).
407
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (“The First Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from
unwarranted governmental regulation.”); New York State Rest. Ass’n v. New
York City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[C]ommercial
speech is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment.”); El Dia, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 413 F.3d 110, 115-17 (1st Cir. 2005)
(analyzing government regulation of commercial speech under Central Hudson
test). See also supra notes 346-369 and accompanying text.
408
See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30 n.2 (1st Cir.
1987) (noting that “[w]hen judicial enforcement of private personal rights
touching forms of communication restricts freedom of speech, state action is
implicated,” in the context of analyzing trademark dilution claim); see also New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
409
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(b) (2006).
410
See generally Beebe, supra note 62 (discussing multi-factor balancing test for
likelihood of confusion).
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consider such evidence regardless. As noted above, the statute instructs
courts to consider “all” relevant factors in assessing likelihood of
dilution; the six listed factors are not meant to be all-inclusive. The level
of competition between the parties is relevant to determine whether the
defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark is likely to dilute it. This solution
would admittedly face a potential hurdle, given that the statute specifies
that a mark holder is entitled to an injunction against another who uses
her mark in a way that is likely to dilute it, “regardless of the presence or
absence of . . . competition.”411 However, that language could be read as
precluding competition (or lack thereof) from acting as an absolute
affirmative defense to a dilution claim. The statute should not preclude
courts from considering the level of competition when determining
whether a likelihood of dilution has occurred in the first place.
Third, the courts should not create presumptions or shift the
burden of proof to the defendant merely because one of the factors listed
in the statute weighs in favor of the plaintiff. For example, the Sixth
Circuit’s recent opinion in Moseley II reads into the TDRA a
presumption or strong inference of dilution when plaintiff has shown a
“semantic association” between its famous mark and a mark used by
defendant to sell “sex-related” products.412 In doing so, the court shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove tarnishment when such
association can be shown.413 This presumption or inference appears
nowhere in the statute, and, particularly given the First Amendment
issues discussed above, the courts should not place it there. The burden
of proof should remain with the plaintiff.
Finally, courts should construe the damages and attorney’s fee
provisions of the statute narrowly as well. Even though the words “bad
faith” do not appear in the statute, they should be read into it, as some
circuits have done in the context of trademark infringement claims.414
Attorney’s fee awards are “subject to the discretion of the court and the
principles of equity,”415 which gives the courts broad leeway in

411

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010).
413
Id.; see supra notes 180–185 and accompanying text.
414
See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 194-95 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that any party must provide “evidence of fraud or bad faith” to
recover attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act); but see Scotch Whisky Ass’n v.
Majestic Drilling Co., Inc., 958 F.2d 594, 599-600 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
prevailing plaintiff must prove bad faith to recover attorney’s fees in trademark
infringement action, but prevailing defendant need not prove bad faith to
demonstrate entitlement to fees).
415
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5) (2006).
412
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determining whether the case presents “exceptional circumstances”416
justifying such an award. Attorney’s fee awards in particular should be
reserved for cases in which one of the parties has truly acted in an
abusive manner.417

CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a new way of looking at the cause of
action for dilution. The dilution cause of action imbues corporations
with a broad “moral” right to control and exclude others from the
expressive sphere surrounding their famous trademarks. In enforcing
this right, we impose costs on those who are excluded and controlled,
both in terms of their right to speak freely and compete fairly. When the
dilution doctrine is viewed for what it really is, or at least what it has
become, it becomes apparent that the law causes more harm than good.
It should either be abolished or substantially reformed.

416

15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
What would constitute “bad faith” in the context of a trademark dilution suit
is itself somewhat unclear. In the trademark infringement context, courts have
defined bad faith as conduct that is “malicious, wanton, oppressive, or
opprobrious.” Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 825
(9th Cir. 1997). The key distinction between the current standard, which allows
for enhanced penalties in cases of willful attempts to “trade on the recognition of
the famous mark,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i), and “bad faith,” would be the
nature of the targeted intent. As discussed above, many if not most dilution
defendants attempt to profit by making referential use of a famous mark, often
by tapping into its expressive meaning. Bad faith should require proof of much
more. Presumably, bad faith would entail a deliberate effort to undermine the
famous mark’s ability to identify the mark holder’s goods or services. How a
defendant could accomplish such a goal, without creating a likelihood of
consumer confusion, is unclear. The possibility of bad faith is perhaps more
evident in the context of a claim for dilution by tarnishment. The current statute
targets the willful intent to “harm the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(5)(B)(ii). Requiring a showing of bad faith would target defendants
who deliberately attempt to injure the mark holder by implying association with
offensive matter that has no connection to them or their goods and services,
without the intent to criticize the famous trademark or the mark holder. By
contrast, a defendant could attempt to harm the mark holder’s reputation because
the defendant could in fact believe that the reputation was unearned or
undeservedly positive.
417
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ATTACHMENT A
(TO FOOTNOTE 375)
These photographs were copied from the appendix to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633
F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Abercrombie Pocket Stitching Design

The Levi Strauss Pocket Stitching Design

